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THE TRUTH ABOUT
MOROCCO

"THE truth is that incapacity at the Foreign Office is a national calamity of the first magnitude. It can neither be criticised or let alone without grave injury to national interests."

The Times, May 21, 1891.

THE ANGLO-FRENCH CONVENTION

"THE last agreement is that with France. I am not less glad than you are that an agreement has been brought about with France, but I am compelled as an old Foreign Secretary to look a little more closely at the bargain than you do. No one can exceed me in sympathy with the object that the Government has in view in concluding that bargain. I will not discuss it now. Perhaps I will not discuss it at all, because on the whole it is better not to debate matters as between nations which are sealed and closed. I will say, however, two things about it, if they be the only two things that I ever say about it. And they are these, that no more one-sided agreement was ever concluded between two Powers at peace with each other. I hope and trust, but I hope and trust rather than believe, that the power which holds Gibraltar may never have cause to regret having handed Morocco over to a great military Power."—*Speech of Lord Rosebery at the meeting of the Liberal League at Queen's Hall, June 10th, 1904.*

THE TRUTH ABOUT MOROCCO

AN INDICTMENT OF THE POLICY
OF THE BRITISH FOREIGN OF-
FICE WITH REGARD TO THE
ANGLO-FRENCH AGREEMENT

BY

M. AFLALO

COMENDADOR ORDINARIO DE LA REAL
ORDEN DE ISABEL LA CATÓLICA

WITH A PREFACE BY

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JOHN LANE · THE BODLEY HEAD
LONDON & NEW YORK · MDCCCCIV

Printed by BALLANTYNE, HANSON & CO.,
London & Edinburgh

P R E F A C E

It is delightful nowadays to read a book written by one who knows his subject well. In general men get up their knowledge of a country out of handbooks, or by swapping brains with other tourists, as if by rubbing two damp sticks together one could expect a blaze.

There is, of course, another way—more admirable, but possibly as ineffective—that is, to travel for a month in the doomed land of which you are to write, and then, by virtue of Bismillah, Rahat-la-Koum, Mashallah, and an oath or two in Arabic, in Turkish, or Urdu, and plentifully bedewing every page with yes and no, translated to the idiom of the country that you have travelled in, so to daub on local colour that your work appears a page torn from the note-book of a dragoman and printed holus-bolus to make people stare. Then with due puff preliminary, and interviews, in which you tell your favourite recreations and religious views to the expectant public, you wait with confidence the announcement in the papers (sent to them by yourself) that

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Mr. Philip Greenup is employed upon a monumental work treating of San Marino or Andorra, in which he deals with the folk-lore, topography, geology, the marriage customs, state of trade, both foreign and interior ; the history, laws, and architecture of that but little visited and interesting land, in his inimitable style. You publish on a royalty of three per cent., arrange for good reviews, send copies to the chief crowned heads of Europe, and get the President of the United States to puff you in true knickerbocker style, are made an X.Y.Z., a member of the league of travelling showmen on the make ; then a fond public buys your work by thousands, and declares it is the very book they would themselves have written had they only had the time.

Clubs, circulating and free libraries, gentlemen's book-rooms, and the be-dusted over table of the smoking-room in country houses, on which lie "Handley Cross," "Ruff's Guide," and "Silk and Scarlet," with last week's *Field* and *Land and Water*, all possess your work.

The Press declares that England's heart is sound, and that the Empire is securely founded on a rock, and all is well with it, as long as men such as yourself, who write so tersely, with so much wit and humour (the words are interchangeable to the reviewer) and yet in such a manly vein, without a single unclean or unhealthy line, even

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when dealing with the marriage customs of the strange land in which you have so freely ventured, taking your life into your hand as we may say, still grow on every hedge.

This book, to which I, the unworthy preface-monger, prefix my most unnecessary page, being myself a unit of the Hallelujah Band of the swinked tourists to whom I have referred, is of another sort. By language, and by blood, the author is attached both to the land and to the people about whom he writes. Nor has he lacked the great essential opportunity without which so many of us pass our days, watching our lives slip past as noiselessly and with as little record of their passage through the spheres, as a snake roused when basking in the sun leaves on the features of a rock.

Sprung from a family which has given already several devoted servants to the Moorish Court, the author, as it were by divine right, became the English agent of the Sultan Mulai-el-Hassan, holding the office for ten years.

A trusted agent, and speaking Arabic as easily as English, he enjoyed chances of seeing the interior workings of the Moorish Court perhaps more fully than has any other man not born a Moor.

The confidence reposed in him by the late Sultan was not withdrawn after his death, and in

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the life of Ibn Moussa, the last great Minister whom the Moors have had, he still remained a loyal servant of the Moorish Court.

During this time he did good service both to Morocco and to the Europeans settled there.

He was not one of those to whom the ruin of almost the last of the once powerful Mahommedan kingdoms of North Africa is due. No one can point the finger at him, and twit him with having dumped grand pianos and motor-cars, balloons and diving-bells, with hansom cabs, state coaches, and electric launches by the score upon the prince who trusted him. The ruin of Morocco has been consummated in the main by Christian agents of various nationalities, who either have designedly and of set purpose pushed on the present Sultan to mad extravagance, or have not known how to restrain him with advice.

Our author sets forth in his book that, for his part, he rather would have had reform from the inside, and seen Morocco self-regenerate.

That he does so is not extraordinary when I remember how I met him first.

Walking along the sandy lanes which the inhabitants of Morocco city think are streets, in a dark alley between tall houses, over whose tops the sky seemed stretched like the velarium in a Roman amphitheatre, with dust on every side, the dust of refuse left to rot in the

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dry atmosphere of crumbling tapia walls, and generally the dust which has been never swept but by the wind since first Yusuf-ibn-Tachfin founded the city, elbowed by sweating crowds, pressed on by laden asses, and jammed in doorways by passing camels, I met a man in European clothes, seated upon a high red saddle on a mule. Three or four men, of the class that Europeans know as soldiers, but which, I think, is better typified by the old Spanish phrase, "Moors of the King," walked by his mule, clearing the way for Ibn Moussa's friend. As Europeans in the town at that time did not number ten, he knew me, and, reining up his mule, told me that he was going to the Court. In those times, every pedlar of new bicycles, vendor of kodaks, dealer in jewelry, and purveyor of indecent photographs, had not free access to the Sultan's presence, as subsequently was the case, when the descendant of the rulers who, in old times, treated on equal terms with England and with France, made Spain uneasy, and threw Italy into alarm, became a sort of peepshow, with the ordinary process of the show reversed, for those who gaped were paid for gaping, either in money or in kind, or had the privilege bestowed on them of being made purveyors to the Court, of diving-bells, or wheezy motor-cars.

Much did the rider on the pacing mule talk of the Sultan Mulai-el-Hassan, telling me how that

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monarch was a king such as an Oriental loves. How that he passed his days upon his horse, travelling about and gathering up the taxes at first hand, as Sultans should do with an army corps, and cutting off his subjects' heads both with precision and much regularity whenever they rebelled.

I listened to the story of the Emperor's wish to place his country under the ægis of the British flag, after the entry of the French into Tunisia ; and how he said, quite in the manner of an ordinary Moor, "Wa wold-el-Haram" (sons of the illegitimate), when speaking of the French.

This might have happened had not sagacious Ibn Moussa sent a man to ask, in the event of Queen Victoria having spread her skirt over Morocco, whether the treasury would be controlled by Christians or by Moors.

Most probably the author had his own idea as to the faith of those who would control the treasury, whether the country still stayed independent, or became protected by the British crown. But he made answer that probably the misbelieving Nazarenes would insist on having a word or two to say. All this in Mequinez, the capital, which that great ruler Mulai-Ismaïl built for himself mainly with Christian slaves, occasionally pounding one alive into the tapia walls when he conceived he loitered at his work.

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Thinking no malice, seated in an orange garden, watching the trees, on which the fruit, the blossom, and the buds hung all together, our author waited for the time when he should have to stand before the King. Before the message came, the Grand Vizier, surrounded by his guard, came to the garden and called our author out. "Take care," he said, "to speak no word of a protectorate to our lord ; my eye shall be upon you. Now get upon your mule and come to Court."

As they rode through the streets, and passed into the courtyard of the palace, it is not hard for any one to see that the thoughts of the writer of the book could not exactly have been enviable. No doubt he wished the British flag had been already waving over Mequinez. But be that as it may, he passed into the palace, and got off at the courtyard, where night and day stand horses saddled, and armed men lounge lazily about. Vizier and writer stood before their lord, who, seated on a European chair, with his legs tucked upon the seat, augustly waited for them. Three or four times the conversation turned on the protectorate, and it appeared as if a pair of gimlets pierced the writer, and that a stream of quicksilver was running down his back, so keenly did he feel the eyes of the Vizier. Skating upon the thinnest of thin ice he turned the conversation warily, after the fashion of a man on a young horse, who

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holds his reins half gingerly, fearing upon the one hand if he gives the horse his head he may unseat him with a plunge, and if he checks him he may rear and fall upon him. Luckily or unluckily our lord the King was pleased to be diverted from the idea of the protectorate, and soon was brought to talk of horses, rifles, and repeating watches, the locusts, railways, and of Paris, that great city where the houris gad about the streets unveiled, no man restraining them. As they emerged into the outer courtyard, where the mules waited, it appeared (at least he says so) that the author of this book had entered into a new lease of life, and he remembers during all the time he stood before the King that some one, somewhere in the recesses of the house, strummed on a piano music of Offenbach's, which he heard vaguely, and recalls with terror down to the present day, when he thinks on the fateful interview.

Thus it will easily be seen that, being as he is attached so strongly and so strangely to the Moors, he wishes, as every man who cherishes his own land cannot but do, that they should still retain their independence, and, if possible, regenerate themselves. But, as an Englishman, he feels that we in catching at the shadow may have let the substance go, and he sets forth in good set terms, and with a wealth of

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figures, and a knowledge of the case to which few can aspire, the reasons why, in his opinion, even yet, the Anglo-French Agreement might be revised.

Into such mysteries who would care to pry, even when standing on the Pisgah of a preface? Revise a Treaty! Surely the very word revision seems to imply a doubt as to the infallibility of statesmen, a thing far worse than witchcraft, and which dubs the man who uses the fell phrase as a mere Little Englander, a doubter of the law of five per cent., which fell from heaven, a giber at Park Lane and all its coruscations of the clearest brilliants, sweated out from the mud of Kimberley, and set in purest gold fresh from Johannesburg.

The reasons that he gives are cogent, and his right to speak undoubted, both on account of his long service to the Moorish Court, and because when he advised the Sultan and his late Vizier, the country prospered under his advice. All in this topsy-turvy world is relative, and the devouring progress, which in the end, like time, will eat itself, is not for Eastern lands; but still the Treasury was full, men reaped and sowed as their forefathers were accustomed, since the days when the first plough and sickle came into being, and were contented, knowing no other life.

Reform, that kittle heifer always apt to overkick the stool and leave the milker in the dust

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with his cans clattering about his ears, was only dreamed of ; but slowly as it worked, and timidly, in it the writer of the book had his full share. He it was who got the island in the harbour of Mogador on which to build a lazaretto, for before his time the pilgrims from the East introduced sanctity and plague into the land, all at their own sweet will. Wonderful to tell, the various Ministers of great and other Powers, who, from the representative of holy Russia down to Haiti (republicans may, of course, reverse the order if they choose), infest Tangier, were all agreed in backing him, with Don Emilio de Ojeda, the *doyen*, at their head.

So it appears his good advice bore fruit, a most usual thing at courts of Christian kings. Fearing that Britain whilst she ruled the waves might not have time to keep an eye upon diplomacy, and that our interests might be sacrificed, during the negotiations between France and England, he sent a copy of his book in manuscript to the Right Honourable and Noble Lord who deigns to occupy himself with foreign policy when he feels strong enough. Most likely that the Noble Lord did not lose time in dallying with the work, but straight consigned it to that bourne from which no book returns, but at the same time taking leave to assure the author of his consideration and esteem. This may well be, but now the

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writer turns to the public hoping they may read his book, and reading, learn and inwardly digest some facts unknown to them.

Few men have so good right to speak as he has, and for my part I write this screed because I, like the author, love the country, and would wish to see it work out its own damnation after the fashion that best pleases it. Some wags have said renunciation is the act of giving up that which a man has no desire to do. If that is so, then generosity may be defined as giving up to some one that which the giver has no title to bestow, and so of France, of England and the Moors. England has given up to France that which was never hers to give, and France as gratefully received it as a "fence" receives the swag from the swell mobsman's hand, when all the police are down the areas or are drunk.

The author says that we have lost by the transaction, and as far as he can see, have not made friends with France.

If this is so, his book is worth the reading to all those who prate of politics, and to those who, looking at a country, measure the happiness of those who live in it above the price, the shares its gold mines may be quoted at, upon the Stock Exchange.

R. B. CUNNINGHAME GRAHAM.

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FAC-SIMILE OF A LETTER FROM THE VIZIER HAMED BEN MOUSSA TO THE AUTHOR, who had been requested to furnish information respecting Russia, and other Powers. Russia about this period, was contemplating the appointment of a Minister to reside at Tangier.

الحمد لله وحده

ولا يدوم الا ماله

و بحمد ربك سبحانك وزير النخبة الشريف ومنعذ اولينا المنيعة اذ الله
 عز وجل ما اقرضك الله الا بالحق والصدق والصدق والصدق
 بعد الشؤال بحسبك ومحبة ان تكون بخير مفر وطولنا بك الاول الثاني
 هينان فامر حمة واخوال الا باقوا والافواحي وما اشرت به مما يتعلق
 بعرفه صالح الا يلد له السعيك من وطنا وجهته من ارضه ولا يتأيد
 لرضاه ولا احسنك في الا علاج بزارك كذا احسنك في الا علاج بالموسم
 لم ايسر هذه الكوسمة المولوية ولا باسرا علامك بزارك في المستقبل
 وختم في هارمظن علاج والحق

Praise be to God, whose Kingdom alone is everlasting. From the servant of God (be he glorified) the Vizier to his Shereefian Majesty, and through whom his commands are conveyed. Hamed ben Moussa to our friend, Moussa Aftalo, greeting, trusting you are well. Your first and second letters have been received, giving us information respecting the various Powers of the World, and their territories and their possible influence on these happy dominions. The illustrations and details you sent are to hand, and they have enabled us to understand them, as also all the information respecting shipments to the various ports of this Coast. You may continue to advise us on this subject in future.

Dated 10 Ramadan 1313, corresponding to 25 February, 1896.

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INTRODUCTION

IT is somewhat unusual in these days for one who has travelled over the greater part of an Empire, visiting every capital city, every port of note, and every accessible town, with one exception (Tarudant), and thrice residing at the Court by invitation, to abstain from publishing his experiences of the land immediately on his return.

But the tenure of an official post, held during ten years under the late Sultan and during the Regency of the late Vizier Bën Moussa, imposed a silence which it was intended should never be broken, least of all to advocate the introduction of foreign control into the internal administration of Morocco. But when it is persistently rumoured abroad that it is in contemplation to give another great Power the preponderating influence in Morocco over every other Power, and when the newspapers in France never cease to refer to the coming ascendancy of their country in the counsels of the empire, it is no longer a breach of loyalty to advocate that Great Britain should be associated in any importation of foreign control.

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Twenty-three years ago the late Sultan Moulai Hassan was inclined to invite Great Britain to establish a Protectorate over Morocco, and, were he still living, he would desire her co-operation in any project of the kind.

Considering the importance of the geographical position of Morocco, and the detriment to the world at large, which its falling under the domination of one alone of the great Powers would mean, the hope was entertained by all lovers of the country that its regeneration might have been brought about by its own sons, thus rendering outside intervention uncalled for. Many thought that we were within measurable distance of so desirable a consummation during the reign of Moulai Hassan and the Regency of the Vizier Hamed ben Moussa, but with the death of these two foremost men all such hopes were dissipated. Moulai Hassan, than whom no wiser, no more enlightened, and no more humane sovereign ever occupied the throne of the Shereefs, governed his country well, and was ever zealous for its welfare. Sir John Drummond Hay styled him "our good, well-meaning Sultan." During his reign there was comparative peace in the land; commerce flourished; the custom-house receipts were constantly expanding, so much so that he felt himself warranted in remitting certain internal taxes, which had pressed heavily upon his native sub-

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jects, especially as the foreigner was exempt from paying them.

He paid off in 1883 the balance of the half-million pounds sterling 5 per cent. loan contracted by his father, Sidi Mohamed, in 1862.

He was the only Moor who seemed actuated by genuine patriotism, a sentiment not generally shared by his subjects.

The Arabic language has an equivalent for patriotism—"Mahabt al Wattan"—but for the majority of the nation it ends with words. One of the wisest acts of Moulai Hassan was to send several promising native youths to Europe to be educated, some to Italy, and some to this country, where many passed through our military school at Chatham.

He also sent several young native mechanics to the engineering works of Cockerill at Seraing in Belgium.

All these men are to-day doing good work in the Empire. Seyid Guebbaz, who has recently been appointed Minister of War, was one of the Chatham pupils. Doubtless he will acquit himself creditably in his new post, although, with an impoverished exchequer, the task of preparing for the coming campaign against the Pretender will not prove an easy one.

Another among the Chatham students is the Sultan's architect, Seyid Zobeir Skeerdj, who has

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planned many useful public works all over the Empire, notably the new waterport and custom house of Mogador. It was known to a few in 1899 that the late Vizier Ben Moussa contemplated sending fresh relays of young men to Europe, following the example of Moulai Hassan.

Unfortunately he died early in 1900, and with him died all hope of carrying out this and many other wise reforms.

Many have thought that the late Vizier Ben Moussa, besides being more fanatical, was not so imbued with the advantages of European education as was the Sultan Moulai Hassan; but those who knew him well found that, in many of his acts, he placed the welfare of his country before every other consideration. Morocco has always, at recurring intervals, suffered famine, owing to the devastations of locusts which were allowed to continue their depredations unmolested. The Vizier Ben Moussa set the example, for the first time in the history of the Empire, of exterminating this pest by ordering its destruction, an example which was followed by the present Sultan in the first year in which he took up the reins of government, and at a cost of many hundreds of thousands of dollars.

For the last three years the locusts have not put in an appearance, although, as they travel in armies, if their Intelligence Department knew of

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the depleted state of the Imperial Treasury, it would consider the present time most propitious for an invasion of Morocco. The action of the present Sultan in so energetically stamping out the locust pest, and thereby saving his Empire from famine, is deserving of all praise, and contrasts favourably with the apathy shown by the French authorities of Algeria even at the present time, who do very little to counteract the ravages of this insect.

Mr. Budgett Meakin, in his "Moorish Empire," referring to the Regency of Si Ahmad Ben Moussa after the death of Moulai Hassan, says :

"Whatever peace and quiet Morocco has since enjoyed must be set down to Si Ahmad's strong hand and political skill. Certainly not for many a long day has Morocco known such an administration ; but the question is, how long will it last ?

"A most praiseworthy act of Si Ahmad's was the prohibition of the Mekka pilgrimage in 1897, on account of the epidemic in the East.

"This was done at the instance of the foreign representatives at Tangier. It was forbidden by a solemn, lengthy edict, read in all the mosques."

Again, in 1899, the Vizier Si Ahmad, at the urgent request of the Diplomatic Corps at Tangier, ceded the island of Mogador to serve as a lazaretto for all time, in which to place under supervision the pilgrims yearly returning from Mecca, in order

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to prevent their introducing the cholera and the dreaded plague into the land.

Formerly it would have been considered sacrilege to combat nature in this manner.

It was maintained that if Providence thought fit to send locusts and epidemics into the land, it was but part of a wise dispensation, and it was not for man to take any preventive measures.

The Vizier Ben Moussa did not allow such considerations to sway him. He recognised his responsibilities to his country, and took the right course.

Seeing that the large fortune left by the Vizier Ben Moussa reverted to the State, and bearing in mind his refusal to invest part of it in Europe, which he was constantly urged to do by the writer and other friends, his reply being that he was convinced that the Sultan would never allow his children or family to want, it is to be hoped that the Sultan, Moulai Abdelaziz, will see to it, that the family be placed in a position of comfort if not of affluence ; for assuredly, as Mr. Budgett Meakin shows us, Morocco owes a deep debt of gratitude to the memory of the late great Vizier and Regent, Hamed Ben Moussa.

Were the future guidance of the government and peoples of Morocco to be placed exclusively in the hands of the French, these latter would find themselves greatly handicapped by their

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earlier records in the neighbouring colony of Algeria.

The harsh methods, to speak euphemistically, adopted by their generals and soldiers during the earlier decades of the occupation, the war they waged against Abdel Kader, who was a hero in the eyes of the population of Morocco, from the Sultan downwards, the dispersal on the flimsiest of pretexts of many of the tribes from their lands, some of them the most fertile in the colony, in order to make way for any abnormal influx of French colonists, the none too happy condition, even at the present time, of the native population of Algeria, rumours of all these things have crossed the frontier and have become household words in Morocco.

The unwise treatment of Abdel Kader by the French after his submission created a bad impression, which has lasted in Morocco to the present day.

The echoes of the guns of General Bugeaud at the battle of Isly and of those of the Prince de Joinville's fleet, which bombarded in 1844 the ports of Tangier and Mogador, still reverberate throughout the land. Many innocent people were killed and many prosperous families ruined at those two seaports by French guns. Add to this the unrighteous dispute with the Bey of Tunis in 1881 and the forcible occupation of the Regency, the

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news of which stirred the heart of Morocco to its very depths. With these high-handed doings still fresh in the minds of the people, it will be conceded that France's credentials are not of a nature calculated to ensure her a hearty welcome in Morocco.

Mr. Stanley Lane Poole, in his history of the "Barbary Corsairs," says, "there is no more humiliating record in the annals of annexation than this miserable conquest of Algiers. Temper, justice, insight, and conciliation would have done more in four years than martial intolerance and drum tyranny accomplished in forty." Only within the last twelve months the sound of guns has again been heard in Morocco, the French having bombarded the frontier town of Figuig, causing great slaughter. On the other hand, England has not within the memory of the last six or seven generations of the people of Morocco, fired a single gun in anger against any port on the coast.

The occupation of Tangier by the English two hundred and twenty years ago, as part dowry from Portugal to King Charles's Queen, belongs, in the Moorish mind, to prehistoric times, and even there what firing did take place was merely in self-defence. The milder Egyptian is not to be compared with the wild Kabyles of Algeria, but the Moor in Morocco does not note this distinction.

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It tells well in his mind in favour of Great Britain that, after the battle of Tel-el-Kebir, all the action which British troops had to take was fighting on behalf of, and not against, the Egyptian people.

Contrasting the respective records of France and England in these regions during the past three quarters of a century, and the more expeditious regeneration of Egypt, which has taken place under British guidance in twenty years, with what has been the case in Algeria under French rule in seventy, the reader will readily recognise the immense advantages which would accrue to Morocco and to its population were the conciliatory and more experienced Englishman to be associated with the unadaptive and less experienced Frenchman in carrying out the proposed regeneration of the Empire.

The eight or ten millions of the high-spirited natives of Morocco would find it less galling to accept the joint tutelage of two nations, amongst the foremost in the world, representing eighty millions of people, than they would do were such tutelage to be undertaken by one only of these nations, with but thirty-eight millions of people at its back.

The French nation should bear in mind that, in taking up the *rôle* single-handed, it would be confronted by a subject and fanatical population of eighteen millions in Tunis, Algeria, and Morocco,

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all of the same race and creed, and all imbued with the same aspirations to release themselves from the yoke of the foreigner.

In the year 1881, Mr. Montague Guest, M.P., published a pamphlet against the folly of permitting France to occupy Tunis and Bizerta. He quoted the very serious warning of Lieutenant Spratt, R.N., against the danger of such a policy, but all in vain. Lord Granville preferred to believe the solemn assurances of the French Government that "the operations about to be commenced on the borderland between Algeria and Tunis were meant solely to put an end to the constant inroads of the frontier clans into Algerian territory, and that the independence of the Bey, and the integrity of his territory, are in no way threatened."

These words were uttered in March 1881, and on May 12 of the same year the Treaty of Kassar Said was signed, establishing a French protectorate over the whole regency of Tunis. It is now seen how right was Mr. Montague Guest and how wrong was Earl Granville.

The object of the present book is to give a similar warning against handing over to France the slightest preponderance in Morocco, a country of much greater importance than Tunis.

Should the same fate as attended Mr. Guest's book be in store for this one, and should the present warning be similarly disregarded, the people of

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this country will very soon see the dire consequences which will follow.

Our apathy will be the more culpable in this case, as we have had the experience in the past of the value of French assurances, both as regards Tunis and, on a former occasion, in respect of Algiers.

With the wilful repudiation of assurances given on the two occasions before us, to say nothing of Madagascar, it will be seen what an impossible task Lord Lansdowne will find it to frame any conditions and safeguards which will be at all binding for all time.

One word more by way of personal *apologia*. The writer of the following indictment of a certain policy of the present Government is in accord with that Government on every other issue. He has no personal feeling against the French, and a very real affection for their beautiful country. Lastly, he has for many years ceased to have any commercial interest in either Morocco or Manchester.

CHAPTER I

POLITICAL AND STRATEGICAL

It is a matter of common knowledge that negotiations have been in progress for some time past between our Foreign Office and the Quai d'Orsay relative to the future of Morocco.

Rumour has it that our Government is effacing itself at the Moorish Court in favour of France, giving to that nation a free hand in the future supervision over the rulers of the Empire, in so far as the government of its Hinterland is concerned, and that a neutral zone is to be created on the coast at the back of all or of certain of the seaport towns.

This much we hear and no more. In matters of this nature our Ministers do not take the nation into their confidence ; everything is carried on with the greatest secrecy. Were it obligatory for such Agreement to be submitted to Parliament for ratification, this secrecy would be of no moment ; but when the time arrives for communicating to the nation the result of such negotiations, it is

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generally found that the terms agreed upon are irrevocable, and that it is useless at this stage for any one conversant with the subject to endeavour to influence public opinion against ratification.

The British nation may therefore awaken any morning to find that our Ministers have parted with a most valuable asset which, from a commercial standpoint, will have for result, in a decade or two, the closing of one more door against the commerce of this country, shutting us out from a trade potentially enormous, and, from a political and strategical standpoint, will be fraught with the greatest peril to us, and will threaten our very existence as a great Power. It would, in fact, probably sound the death-knell of our supremacy in the Mediterranean and of our retention of Malta, Cyprus, Egypt, and, ultimately, Gibraltar.

The question might here at the outset be asked, since nothing authentic is known about the supposed negotiations, why these pages, and where their *raison d'être*? Where are any proofs of the existence of such *pourparlers* between the two Governments giving the slightest preponderance to France in Morocco? To this we reply. From what has already been remarked, were we to wait until such proofs be forthcoming, it would be to wait for a time when warnings would no longer be of any avail. We can only conjecture as to what is going on from certain signs, which have more

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significance perhaps for those who study Moroccan affairs than for the general public. When Lord Lansdowne lately promised a deputation of merchants engaged in the trade with Morocco that he would safeguard British trade interests, the inference to be drawn from this promise was that some new outside element of control was about to be introduced into Morocco necessitating such safeguards, for, so far as the Moorish authorities are concerned, no such safeguards are necessary, since they adhere loyally and strictly to the various terms and conditions contained in the several Treaties in existence.

Again, no responsible Minister would utter such words as are attributed to M. Delcassé, unless he were sure of his ground and of British complacency, when he declared that the French Government had no intention (we presume in spite of Algerian firebrands) of sending an army into Morocco, but that it would trust to pacific penetration.

This complacency on the part of Great Britain is a plant of very recent growth, seeing that for the last half-century, during the *régime* of the late Sir John Drummond Hay and since, the message from this country to France with respect to Morocco has been, not "pacific penetration," but plain Anglo-Saxon "Hands off."

Yet another sign: the Moorish Commander-in-Chief, El Mehdi El Mnibhi, quondam Ambas-

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sador to Great Britain, the man who, two years ago, returned to his country imbued with very strong ideas of reforms, and zealous as to their introduction into Morocco—a brave General of reckless courage in the field and skilful in Morocco warfare, but unfitted by his early training for the successful carrying out of so difficult and delicate a mission among fanatical populations entirely opposed to all change—a Knight Grand Cross of the Order of St. Michael and St. George, and a partisan of everything British—this man has been removed from his post. Doubtless, his British proclivities were not palatable to our neighbours, and it is not difficult to surmise at whose instigation his removal has been brought about. As a proof that the Sultan is not inimical to him, but, on the contrary, well disposed, and that his removal is no mere whim of an Oriental sovereign, El Mnibhi appears to have received the sanction of his master to perform a pilgrimage to Mecca, probably an Oriental form of Chiltern Hundreds attending resignation, and was, on his arrival at Tangier, the recipient of an ovation on the part of the officials and inhabitants of that seaport.

Added to this, we have the preponderance of French officials at the present time at the Moorish Court, and the absence either temporary or permanent of those of British nationality.

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These portents are perfectly suggestive to the student of Morocco as to what must be going on behind the scenes.

The only hope left to those who feel strongly on the subject of Morocco is that Parliament may intervene betimes and so prevent the ratification of a policy so disastrous.

When two parties are engaged in making a bargain, unless both be equally expert, the greater expert alone will profit, while the less goes to the wall. In the case of Morocco, France is undoubtedly the expert. In England, many people have scarcely ever heard the name Morocco ; many would find it difficult to point out, off-hand, its position on the map ; many more have the idea that it already belongs to France ; few have any notion of its resources present or potential ; others again believe that its population is all black !

Morocco appears to have so little interest in the eyes of the British public that it would be safe to assert that cablegrams of the latest scores of test matches in the Antipodes receive more attention and cause far greater excitement in this country than would the news of fresh French aggressions on the south-eastern frontier of Morocco, or the communication from our Government to the nation that it had finally conceded to France a free hand in Morocco, a

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policy full of the gravest dangers to the British Empire.

France, on the other hand, knows full well the value of Morocco, nor is she guided in her estimate of such value by the present backward condition of the Empire, as many Englishmen undoubtedly are. She can clearly see ahead that it is a country of immense possibilities, probably the most favoured spot of the whole of the African Continent. From the highest in the land down through many grades of society, the eyes of all Frenchmen are turned towards that Empire, coveting it with an intense longing. This alone should open the eyes of the people of Great Britain to the fact that there must be some supreme reason for this great desire on the part of France to possess the land.

The French people have studied the resources of Morocco and they recognise its immense superiority over their own large colony of Algeria, a superiority marked in point of climate, of natural resources, of greater rainfall, of fertility of soil, of larger area, of larger population and, above all, of position.

France knows what she wants. She has for half a century dominated Morocco from the eastward. During the last four years she has been burrowing on its south-eastern frontier, lopping off oasis after oasis from the parent land, oases,

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in the mosques of which weekly prayers have been recited for the Sultans of Morocco for many centuries past, prayers which will now be as ruthlessly obliterated from their ritual in favour of others praying for their new rulers, as will the name Manchester be obliterated from the cloths with which the inhabitants have hitherto clothed themselves. Henceforth their cotton stuffs will bear the name "Rouen." Ultimately France will wend her way south-westward, through Taflat, until she reaches the sea at Cape Bojador on the Atlantic, thus finally enveloping the Empire on all sides, as she has been permitted by apathetic British Governments to envelop our own Colony of Gambia and strangle the commerce of our traders. But little Gambia with its total annual trade of £400,000 is one thing, while Morocco with its close upon £4,000,000 of trade is another. When France shall reach the Atlantic at Cape Bojador, strange to say, she will be trenching upon ground to which Great Britain has the right of pre-emption. Great Britain on behalf of a British Company sold this coast from Wad Draa to Cape Bojador to the Sultan for £50,000, and by an agreement signed in March 1895 it was stipulated that the Sultan was not to part with any portion of this coast or its Hinterland to any other Power without first obtaining the assent of the British Government.

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This is the coast M. Lebaudy is desirous of annexing.

It is a coast which promises to be very much in evidence in the near future.

Having gone so far, France now aspires to the next step towards ultimately appropriating the whole of the 300,000 square miles of the Moroccan territory, with its magnificent coast line of 1300 miles on two of the world's most important waterways. She requires it to round off and consolidate an Empire in the North, North-west, West, and Central portions of the African Continent, down past Timbuctoo and Lake Tchad, and back to Ghadames, an Empire equal to, or exceeding in area, that of our Indian Empire, an African Empire at her very door, with all the advantages accruing from proximity, advantages such as are denied to us in the case of far off Hindustan.

It is time here to make a statement, that we disclaim in these pages any intention of being, in any sense, offensive to France. It were ungracious to admit any such feeling at a time such as the present, when harmony reigns between the two nations. On the contrary, it is a source of intense gratification to those of us who remember the existence of an *entente* between the two peoples, when they fought side by side fifty years ago, to see such an understanding renewed at the present day, and to note the good fruit which it

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is now bearing within six months from the date of its renewal. It may be our privilege to hear from Blue Books later on, of the strenuous efforts which the Foreign Offices of the two nations will have made to counsel peace in the far East, in order to avert the calamity of war between Russia and Japan, a war the results of which, for the many Powers of the world, no man can foretell. It will be the fervent prayer of all Britons that the two nations may ever remain indissolubly united to labour together for the peace of the world and for the advancement of civilisation, a noble example for other nations to follow.

France is well within her rights to do the best she can for herself. Every act, every intention, every *arrière-pensée* imputed to her in these pages, could equally well and with as much reason be imputed to any of the other European Powers without exception. Diplomacy has no creed and very little conscience.

All the nations are now struggling for existence, and therefore for fresh commercial fields. Most nations covet the rich possessions of their weak neighbours, and so long as there exists no clashing of interests of any of the other great Powers in the regions so coveted, a free hand is usually conceded. Where, however, interests clash, either neutrality, tacit or agreed, obtains, as in the case of Holland and Belgium, or war, such

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as that to-day looming over Corea. These processes have gone on, and are still going on, before our eyes. Germany took the Duchies from Denmark and Alsace Lorraine from France. France took first Algeria, then Savoy, from Italy, and later on she took Tunis from its Beys. Great Britain has absorbed the Transvaal and the Orange Free State. The United States have dealt similarly with Spain in Puerto Rico and the Philippines. Russia, ever restless, has laid hands on Manchuria and covets Corea. Italy's eyes are directed to Tripoli, rather a barren possession, seeing that its principal emporium, Ghadames, has been appropriated by France.

In the case of Morocco, it should be clearly and courteously pointed out to France that in asking for a free hand in that Empire she is asking too much. It is too ambitious a scheme. Great Britain has vital interests in the Empire, as she has any time during the past fifty years constantly asserted.

It is to those who have had a long experience of Moroccan affairs a matter of surprise to note the *volte face* of our present Government in this Morocco question.

If the integrity of Morocco for the last half-century has been deemed indispensable by successive Governments in this country, we should like to learn what fresh circumstances have arisen to

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induce us to abandon our former attitude. Not even to purchase France's neutrality, desirable as that would be, in the event of our being forced to side with our ally Japan against Russia, would it be politic to abandon Morocco.

The French, so rumour has it, ask for a mandate to deal exclusively with an immense area which is practically a part and parcel of Europe, an area with almost identically the same flora and fauna and productions as those of the countries of Southern Europe bordering on the Mediterranean. Was it Castelar, the Spanish patriot, who said that Europe ended at the Atlas, Africa commencing on the other side of that chain of mountains? Geologists tell us that about the pliocene period the North African Continent was joined to Europe in the neighbourhood of the Straits of Gibraltar, and again at a point in Sicily, the theory being that the Mediterranean was an inland sea where, owing to rapid evaporation, the level sank so much lower than that of the Atlantic Ocean that the pressure of this latter caused a breaking away of the intervening land and an irruption of the ocean took place: hence the narrow Straits. At the present day the two Continents are divided at one point by barely nine miles of sea. He would be a rash man who, in these days of engineering skill and daring, would deny the probability of this narrow neck of the sea being bridged over at

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some future time, thus once more linking Europe and Africa.

To hand over so immense an area, all but touching Europe and practically European in its characteristics, would, by a single stroke of the pen, add a population of eight or ten millions of a hardy race to the thirty-eight millions of the population of France, a native population from which, in the course of time, large armies would be recruited as a menace to Europe. For several centuries before the Christian era we find the Carthaginians pouring out of Africa and overrunning Spain, Italy, and Sicily, and for nearly four centuries waging war, first with the Greeks and subsequently with the Romans, dictating terms to both these peoples. Had Carthage possessed an adequate navy under a leader as renowned on the sea as Hannibal was on land, the whole face of South European history might have been changed.

Again, the Berber races swarmed out of Mauritania, overrunning Spain, Portugal, Sicily, Italy, and France, advancing as far as Bordeaux and Tours, and, but for Charles Martel defeating them at the latter town in A.D. 732, who can say but that these hordes might not have crossed over to Britain and established themselves on the banks of the Thames, with, later on, Westminster Abbey and St. Paul's Cathedral built upon the sites of

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Moslem mosques, as is the case with so many churches in Spain?

It is one thing for any great Power to absorb at a stroke of the pen tens of millions of population in the far-off East; it is a very different matter, and one which might be attended with very serious consequences, for such a Power to absorb eight or ten millions of hardy people, if not in Europe itself, at any rate at its very gates. Such a sudden accretion to its home population would constitute a menace to the other Powers of Europe. In speculating upon the probable success or defeat in the struggle of the future between Teuton and Gaul, stress is always laid on the larger and ever-increasing population of the former in contradistinction to the smaller and stationary population of the latter. But if this latter is to become a nation of thirty-eight millions, plus a native population of fifteen millions, in North Africa, in sight, and almost within touch, of Europe, the balance of population would be suddenly disturbed. And whether the populations of North Africa immediately facing Spain, France, and Italy to be incorporated under the tricolor are to be fifteen millions or five millions, depends upon whether Morocco is or is not to be handed over to France. We refrain for the moment from including here the further millions of population under French sway in Senegambia, from which large

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numbers of Senegalese sharpshooters are recruited. Most of us remember how Algerian native troops were employed by France in her war with Germany. Many; again, will remember how Lord Beaconsfield brought a contingent of Indian troops to Malta when war with Russia was imminent ; but to bring an army from India to Europe would be a much more difficult and costly affair than for France to bring over to some European battlefield a quarter of a million of hardy trained African auxiliaries.

If it be contended that the ruling Powers in Morocco are unequal without assistance to put that Empire in order, a contention which one has reluctantly to confess is borne out by the facts, it is plainly to the interest of Great Britain, as also to the interests of Europe at large (and, if France could only be brought to see it, to her interest as well) that Great Britain should be associated in a dual control of that Empire.

Great Britain invited the co-operation of France in the task of regulating Egyptian affairs, and Egypt is a country very similar to Morocco, showing in the minds of our statesmen the feasibility of the principle of a dual control. We have said that the adoption of such dual control would be to the interest of France. It would avert jealousies and recriminations and the rankling of hearts, and probably something worse later on. In

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a dual control, each power would vie with the other to do the best for the country. The immense interests of Great Britain in the Mediterranean (with her possession of Gibraltar, Malta, and Cyprus, and her position in Egypt), her concern for the Atlantic coast of Morocco, from Tangier to Cape Bojador, which skirts for a thousand miles the over-sea route to South Africa, India, and Australia, and her preponderating share of the commerce of Morocco, all undoubtedly entitle her to a voice in the suggested future control of the government of Morocco.

A dual control being established, the fanatical populations of Morocco would come to regard with far less suspicion the spectacle of two great nations like France and England engaged jointly in regulating the government of their country than they would be likely to do, were this *rôle* to be relegated to one of these Powers alone, and that one the Power which had under their eyes absorbed during the past seventy years the two large sister Mahomedan States lying to the Eastward. The adoption of a dual control by these two nations would, in the eyes of the natives, be a guarantee of their disinterestedness. It would from the outset show them the utter hopelessness of resistance in the face of perfect accord existing between these two nations, and the task would thereby become infinitely less

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onerous, a minimum of blood would be shed in the pacification of the country, and the Moorish populations would soon resign themselves to the new order of things, feeling assured that they would henceforth be governed with justice and moderation, witnessing, as they would do, the ever-advancing material and moral prosperity of their country.

A further favourable condition would be that the two contracting nations would themselves incur no outlay other than what could easily be defrayed out of Morocco's own resources. Given good administration, with the currency placed on a firm basis, with the country on the upward grade, capital would be attracted to the land, trade would increase by leaps and bounds, a greater area would be brought under cultivation, the increasing receipts of the Custom Houses for Duties on Imports and Exports would, with the presence of European assessors, increase apace and would find their way, entirely without leakage, into the Treasury, itself in the hands of Europeans. Added to all this, the internal taxes of the Empire, also levied under European supervision, would easily swell the revenue of the Empire to over a million and a half pounds sterling annually, to expand year by year in the future. Should, at the commencement, any extraordinary expenditure be necessary for the purchase of plant and material

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for the improvement of the country, to which reference will subsequently be made, it would be a simple matter for the two controlling nations to borrow two or three millions sterling at say $3\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. interest, and both the interest on this loan, as well also as that on Morocco's present indebtedness, viz., £900,000, would easily be met without the slightest inconvenience. A sinking fund would be established, so that the loan would be repaid in a few years, when Morocco would certainly no longer need to borrow at all.

The two Western nations, on their side, would no longer need to spring at each other's throats in a way which would be a scandal to civilisation. Mr. Balfour remarked, they have had sufficient fighting over Mohammedan Empires for a century and a half back. These two Powers would behold with satisfaction the good work in which they were jointly engaged, and which, loyally carried out, would result in once and for all settling the Morocco question, a question which has for the best part of a century been fraught with serious danger to the peace of Europe, as foreshadowed by the late Lord Salisbury. The freedom of the Straits of Gibraltar would be assured to the commerce of the world for all time. Golden words were those of Mr. Balfour at the Mansion House dinner. They were perhaps not intended to refer to a dual control

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in Morocco ; but we can apply them to our contention for such control :

“The weaker power first leans on one European Government, then upon another European Government, intrigues with both, does everything to bring the two into conflict, in the hope that it may come out the better for it and the great danger which this carries with it to European peace. Nothing can meet that danger but the growing sense among the nations of Europe that they must work together to produce common harmony of action, and that the best way to attain that result is by an open and frank diplomacy between them.”

The constant close intercourse between numbers of French and British officers and civilians engaged in this work of regeneration would tend to bring about a better understanding between the two nations, causing them to appreciate and respect each other, engendering a *camaraderie*, the beneficial effects of which would be felt in their respective countries, and not confined to Morocco alone. It would cement and perpetuate friendship and amity between these two really foremost nations, a combination and an example which would work for peace among the nations of the world and serve as a model for other Powers, which might be wrangling over the territory of some weak State, to imitate and so settle their difference by arrangement, instead of drifting into war with each other, leaving an aftermath of hate

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in the heart of the defeated nation, when all might have been peace and harmony.

The fact of the other nations of Europe looking on this regeneration of Morocco and the mode of carrying it out would act as a salutary check and deterrent upon either of these two reforming powers, should it develop an inclination to overstep the bounds of its apportioned share in the work, or seek to hamper it in any way, or to arrogate to itself the adoption of views incompatible with the mutual arrangement for equality of co-operation. Reforms would be carried out in the fierce light of day, and under the scrutinising eye of Europe.

No one can question the wisdom of conciliating France, and of living with her, as our closest neighbour, on the kindest terms, but she really should not ask us to pay too great a price even for so desirable and laudable an end.

Two questions now suggest themselves. Here we have an Empire like that of Morocco, which has for a century excited such an amount of interest and keen rivalry among some fourteen nationalities of the world, as to have led them to establish at Tangier Legations and Consulates-General of a magnitude, and entailing an expense, out of all proportion to the importance of the Empire. How comes it, after all these international precautions and all this lavish expendi-

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ture, that these various States should stand by and accept the situation, while France to-day, as she has done for many years in the past, claims that she and she alone should consider herself, above all and sundry of these nations, entitled to the reversion of the Moorish Empire?

The second question is :

Seeing that Great Britain has for over half a century and more opposed any forward movement on the part of France in Morocco, and seeing also Great Britain's immense interests, political and commercial, in the Empire and in the Straits of Gibraltar and in the Mediterranean, what compensation is France offering to this country for standing aside and for climbing down from her previous position?

Let us analyse the first question. Italy's acquiescence has no doubt been obtained by a promise of giving her a free hand in Tripoli. It is so easy to give away what does not belong to us, and Tripoli happens to belong to Turkey. Spain either appears to be hypnotised, or else has been secretly promised some compensation. That the other Powers do not move in the matter is perfectly inexplicable, and therefore it is useless to discuss them further, although we should much like to know what Germany has to say. We should rather endeavour to divine the arguments upon which France bases her claim to the rever-

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sion of Morocco. This involves questions within questions.

(1) Is it that she considers herself entitled to some compensation from Great Britain on account of the latter's occupation of Egypt?

(2) Does she base her claim upon the principle of contiguity of territory, Morocco being Algeria's neighbour?

(3) Is it because France has had a prior occupation of some part of the Empire?

(4) Or is it upon the monetary system of the Empire being French, or upon any preponderance of French commercial interests?

(1) As to compensation for the British occupation of Egypt, when France occupied Algeria in 1830 she gave assurances to this country that such occupation should only last until such time as she could safely leave Algeria to govern itself.

Through all these seventy-four years which have elapsed, Great Britain has remained complacent, and, so far as we can remember, has never called upon France to redeem her promise.

It is true that Great Britain gave similar assurances with respect to Egypt, when she occupied the land in 1882.

Neither France nor Great Britain has thought it her duty to fulfil these assurances. They are then so far mutually absolved; but the balance is not quite even, for France had again, on the

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principle, we presume, of contiguity of territory, absorbed Tunis to the eastward in 1881.

Great Britain again proved complacent, and acquiesced in the commencement of her commercial effacement and extinction in that regency, following upon her almost complete commercial effacement and extinction in Algeria.

Are not, then, Algeria and Tunis to be considered sufficient compensation for our occupation of Egypt, or is France now to claim to move to the westward, and throw Morocco—the last of the Barbary States, with an area exceeding that of Algeria and Tunis together—into the scale?

Where is this lateral expansion to end? Further westward it would be impossible, seeing that the Atlantic bars the way. But what about eastward and southward? Should this enormous Empire to which France aspires become consolidated under the tricolor, it would then stretch down some 1600 miles to Timbuctoo, Lake Tchad, and north again to Ghadames; and if we add the millions of peoples under French sway in Senegambia, it becomes a very serious question what effect this enormous Empire, with a weight of population numbering in time twenty or thirty millions of warlike peoples, stiffened by a French backbone of half a million of fighting men, might eventually have upon our tenure of Egypt, the Soudan, and our Colonies on the West Coast, whenever this

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demon craving for lateral expansion should again become rampant in years to come. It is just this enclave of Morocco, with its eight or ten millions of people, which stands in the way of the consummation of so colossal an Empire and saves the situation.

(2) As regards the plea of contiguity of territory, is it France solely who is Morocco's neighbour?

Does the proximity of Gibraltar at the very gates of Morocco count for nothing? Britain has at great cost held this isolated fortress for two centuries, almost entirely dependent upon Morocco for its daily supplies. We hear of Algeria having cost France one hundred and fifty millions of pounds sterling since the occupation in 1830. What of the seventy or eighty millions of pounds expended by Great Britain upon the fortifications and docks and other public works at Gibraltar, to say nothing of the money spent in Malta? The Mediterranean being a neighbouring sea of Morocco, as is also that portion of the Atlantic skirting the Morocco coast, what shall we say of Great Britain's interest in these two neighbouring seas? It would be no exaggeration to estimate that one-half of the eight hundred and fifty million pounds sterling of her total annual exports and imports pass annually within a measurable distance of one or other of the coasts of Morocco, and

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the greater proportion within a few miles of her coasts. What about the value of Great Britain's Mediterranean fleet, as also of her Channel fleet, which often finds its way into the Mediterranean? What of the value of the thousands of steamers of her mercantile marine which constantly plough those seas? If we add to this the wealth of this country invested in Gibraltar, Malta, and Egypt, it staggers the imagination to realise this colossal stake, surely far exceeding the total wealth of France's colony of Algeria.

Taking now the question of population, there are about 318,137 Frenchmen in all Algeria. If we take into account the British garrisons of Gibraltar, Malta, Cyprus, and Egypt, add to them their various civilian populations, add again the *personnel* of our fleets and the sailors of our immense mercantile marine, is it not a question whether our population constantly passing by the coasts of Morocco, and stationed in our outposts in the Mediterranean, does not equal those of France in Algeria? Do not these populations and the colossal material wealth of Great Britain constitute this country as much a neighbour of Morocco as is France?

Dartmouth, whence British steamers sail weekly for Morocco, is about 1000 miles from Tangier, as against a distance of 700 miles from Marseilles to the same Moorish port.

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We therefore fail to see any validity in the argument respecting contiguity of territory between Algeria and Morocco.

(3) As regards any prior occupation, France has never occupied any part of Morocco for any length of time, whereas England did occupy Tangier for twenty-two years from 1661 to 1683.

(4) As regards monetary system and trade, no French money is used in commerce in Morocco. Five-franc pieces, once in use, have long disappeared from the land, their place being taken by Spanish and Moorish coins; and, as regards French trade, the proportion of British trade in Morocco is about 50 per cent. of the total, whereas the trade of France varies from 25 per cent. in some of the ports to only 19 per cent. in others. We really fail to see upon what data the French claim for a preponderating hand in Morocco is based.

Stay! Surely it cannot be based upon the old dream of the "Mediterranean a French lake." Is this old watchword to be resuscitated? Impossible! Why should France, with a limited coast-line in the Mediterranean, and with a total population of thirty-eight million souls, consider herself entitled to an exclusive possession of the Mediterranean Sea, which washes the shores of Spain, Italy, Austria, Greece, Turkey, Egypt, Malta, Cyprus, and part of Morocco, with an

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aggregation of populations numbering between 140 and 150 millions of people, and with untold wealth, both stationary and floating, belonging to Great Britain and other countries?

Now, what is the compensation which France offers to Great Britain? It is rumoured that this compensation is to consist in Great Britain having a free hand in Egypt, and in France abandoning all claims to the rights of her fishermen using the Newfoundland shore.

Firstly, as regards Egypt:

It is clear that England has a fairly free hand in Egypt, and also that she is using it for the benefit of the country. She has righted the finances of the land; she has transformed it into a haven of peace and prosperity and justice for its people. The fellahin, or peasantry, who were formerly oppressed, their labour taken by force, and without pay, their property torn from them at the caprice of the ruling class, are at the present day rich and prosperous, contributing to the agricultural wealth of the land. England has constructed the gigantic Nile Barrage at immense cost, assuring a constant supply of water for agriculture at all seasons, and turning many a sandy desert waste into lands of luxuriant vegetation. That more has not been done is owing to what remnant of power is left in the hands of France to raise obstructions against an even fuller

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development of Egypt. How long France may persist in this obstruction in the face of the civilised world is best known to herself. Morocco is, in any case, too great a price to pay for the removal of these remaining obstacles, a process in which time will eventually assist.

So much for Egypt, now as to the Newfoundland shore.

Every year sees a diminution of the number of French vessels using the Newfoundland coast, and it is expected that their fishing trade in those seas will be extinct in a few years.

It is rather a significant fact that rumours are already afloat, hinting at the two fishing islands of St. Pierre and Miquelon off the Newfoundland coast being in the market for sale, Canadians being greatly perturbed lest they should be purchased by the United States. If—the fates forbid!—the present negotiations should end in France obtaining a free hand in Morocco, the very least our Government should do would be to obtain the cession of these two islands, and present them to loyal Canada.

Under any circumstances, it ought not to be permissible for a foreign Government like France to sell to the United States islands which are by nature part and parcel of Canadian territory.

It would be as reprehensible on our part, were we desirous of parting with our Channel Islands,

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to sell them to Germany without giving France the option of purchasing them herself.

There are two morals in this question of the Newfoundland shore deserving attention. The first is that the solicitude and the excitement of Canadians about the passing away to another Power of two insignificant islands, barely 100 square miles in area, and the patriotism evinced, are in remarkable contrast with the apathy of the people of this country, with regard to the fate of 300,000 square miles of Morocco, and with all the serious consequences that would ensue from their falling under French rule.

The second is a moral illustrating the non-infallibility of Ministers who rule this Empire, and it should engender caution upon their descendants. The French were granted their rights on this Newfoundland shore by the Treaty of Utrecht in 1713, and that of Versailles of 1783. These rights have been a source of friction between us and the French, bringing the two nations to the brink of war, and of irritation between ourselves and the Newfoundland population, for nearly two centuries, often straining the loyalty of these latter almost to breaking-point, and goading them into clamouring for annexation to the United States. The *modus vivendi* with France is even now passed yearly only with great difficulty. Now, in the years 1814-1815 the

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Congress of Vienna sat for a period of nine months for the rearrangement of territory, after the incarceration of Napoleon in Elba. Taking into consideration the enmity shown by Napoleon to this country, and the great sacrifices it had to make to resist his ambitious schemes, why did not our Ministers of the day insist upon passing their pens through the clauses of these two treaties, in so far as they related to French rights on the shores of Newfoundland? Had they done this, who was there to say them nay? Had they adopted this course, what trouble might they not have spared both this country and Newfoundland!

This lapse on the part of Ministers of that day, a lapse of which no Russian statesman would have been guilty, should suggest the greatest possible caution to our present Ministers lest they should make some similar lapse in these early days of the twentieth century.

We deem it incredible that the people of this country should consider these two concessions on the part of France as adequate compensation to Great Britain, for allowing her a preponderating influence in Morocco.

Before alluding to the proposed safeguards in the interests of British commerce, we propose to deal with our strategical position, in the neighbourhood of Morocco. We take it that the idea

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of a neutral coast zone is for the purpose of assuring the free waterway into and out of the Mediterranean, as also down the thousand miles of Atlantic coast-line of Morocco, for our over-sea trade. The first question which suggests itself is—who is to rule in this neutral zone? It cannot be left without a ruler. Again, to whom are the import and export duties levied at the Moroccan seaport custom houses to be paid? If to the Sultan, that would be tantamount to paying them over to the Sultan's tutors, the French.

Now, in the event of the tribes of Morocco, impatient at the sight of French officials dominating the Sultan and his Viziers, becoming turbulent, the introduction of French Army Corps would become a necessity.

Does any sane mandare assert that, as time proceeds, hundreds of thousands of French officers and soldiers would rest content to remain by moral restraint alone behind an imaginary neutral line, or would it not rather be probable that they would burst through this zone and reach the sea? As sure as glaciers grind their way slowly but irresistibly down to the sea, so surely and so irresistibly, but much more swiftly, would French armies follow the same course, and once on the coast, Bizertas would spring up on the edge of that coast-line skirting the highways of commerce,

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on both the 300 miles of the Mediterranean and the 1000 miles of the Atlantic coast. With French legions swarming along the coast of Morocco, from the river Kiss on the Algerian frontier down to Cape Bojador on the Atlantic, and with the whole of these coasts fortified at regular intervals, what will become of the freedom of navigation on the Atlantic? Where will be free ingress into and egress out of the Mediterranean? Then will come the crisis. Could this country stand by and see this happen? A few years back the establishment of Bizerta on the Tunis coast was considered to be a standing menace to our position in the Mediterranean. Our naval experts were uneasy at seeing so extensive a sweep of coast, one day possibly hostile, from Tunis to the River Kiss, in the hands of France, and now we seem to be light-heartedly running the risk of extending this sweep of coast another 300 miles westward to the Straits of Gibraltar, and further down the Atlantic coast, to Bojador, all under the tricolor. As sure as fate, it will come to this, if France be granted preponderance in Morocco. Is it not better to face the difficulty at once? Any patching up of the question, for the sake of present quiet, would constitute a crime, inasmuch as it would be leaving a heritage of trouble to the next generation or two of Britons who would find it infinitely more diffi-

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cult to deal with then, if, in the interval, France has had a free hand of twenty or twenty-five years' domination in Morocco, and become rooted to the soil, than we should find it to-day, before she enters the Empire upon such favourable conditions, such as, it is believed, are now contemplated.

Assuming that, in course of time, the whole of Morocco, both Hinterland and coast, should have fallen into the hands of France, what would be the position of this country in the event of a war with France, and with probably Spain dragged in as her ally, the bait being a promise of the restoration of Gibraltar?

Gibraltar would be isolated and its two sources of supply Morocco and Spain, from which it has been victualled for centuries, would be cut off.

The coasts on either side of the Straits would be hostile, one in the hands of France and the other in the hands of Spain, with sixty millions of foes on the North and another thirty millions of enemies on the South from Tunis to Senegambia. Over these coasts would float the tri-color of France and the red and yellow flag of Spain.

Our vessels sailing to and from Malta, Cyprus and Egypt would be compelled to run the gauntlet of Bizerta on land and of torpedo-craft from every creek of the sea, and there would be no single friendly port before Malta. The same conditions

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would rule on the Atlantic coast, with cruisers and torpedo-boats issuing from the estuaries of the Sebu, the Bouregreg, the Oumerbeya, the Tensift rivers and from Walidieh, on the Atlantic coast, converted into another Bizerta, harassing our commerce. We should have no friendly port between the English Channel and Sierra Leone, a distance of over 2500 miles. The Tagus would seem an exception, and our vessels would no doubt be welcomed there at first, but, however well disposed the Portuguese might be, how long would they be permitted by France and Spain to extend to us any hospitality? Would not these allies bring immense pressure from the land side to bear upon Portugal to force her to close the Tagus against us?

The heights of the Spanish coast opposite Gibraltar would be heavily fortified, and Ceuta, fifteen miles away, also fortified, and, between heavy fire and a scarcity of provisions, Gibraltar might become untenable. What would be the fate of Malta and Cyprus, aye, and Egypt as well, in a sea to which our enemies held the entrance? What were our Ministers doing in 1881 to have allowed France to have appropriated Tunis on the pretext of the now admittedly non-existent Kroumir attacks? The lakes of Bizerta could hold the navies of the world. Was this a position to allow France to occupy? Nor was our

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Government without warning. Let us read what Lieutenant Spratt, of H.M.S. *Brecon*, wrote in 1881 of Bizerta :

“In the interests of the future peace of Europe, neither of the great naval Powers of Europe should become possessed of it, neither France, Italy, nor England, all having equal interest in its neutrality, and neither having the right stronger than the other to wrench it from the neutral Power now in possession, and in rightful possession, of it. Any transfer of it to either of the three naval Powers would at once place the balance of naval power in the Mediterranean in the near future in the hands of that Power, and it would be an irresistible incentive to that nation to devote double its energies to the development of its fleet and naval preponderance.”

“Situated as it is, at the threshold of the central Strait of the Mediterranean, if possessed by France or Italy it would become the most important strategic naval port within it, and would completely command the communication between the Eastern and Western divisions.”

“But we are told England has no direct interest in Tunis. People who make this assertion are unaware that there are 10,000 British subjects in Tunis, and that nearly all its import trade consists of our own Manchester goods.”

Then the Lieutenant goes on to predict an important rise in import duties in Tunis.

“When this does take place, many who view the present state of things with apathy will realise the error we have committed in shrinking from legitimate responsibility

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in declining to recognise our undoubted interests in a country with which we have entered into a series of advantageous treaties, and in failing to raise our voice against one of the most wanton violations of international law which has ever found a place in the pages of history. When we find ourselves rudely undeceived as to what France really intends, the plea of a too ready belief in French assurances will not secure the English Government from blame and censure.

“The conquest of Algiers should have furnished us at once with an example and a warning. Let our rulers, before it is too late, reflect on the words of Lord Aberdeen addressed to Lord Stuart de Rothesay under almost identical circumstances.

“‘If we could so far forget what is due to our Sovereign and to ourselves as to rest satisfied with vague explanations in a matter so deeply affecting British commerce as well as the political relations of the Mediterranean States, it is certain that the people of this country would not hesitate to pronounce the most unequivocal condemnation of our conduct.’”

If we substitute “Morocco” for “Tunis,” every word which Lieutenant Spratt wrote twenty-three years ago is applicable to the present crisis in Morocco. The Lieutenant knew in those far-off days that the tribe of Kroumirs were non-existent. It took us in this country many more years to make this discovery.

A work on Bizerta by the Archduc Louis Salvator is brought to a close with these words of

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Baron de Comburg at a lecture at the "Société des études Coloniales."

"Tunisia is the jewel of North Africa. It contains a priceless treasure, the port of Bizerta, the finest port in the Mediterranean."

And this is the jewel and this the treasure which our Ministers quietly allowed France to appropriate in broad daylight in the year 1881.

We now hear that the French Government has decided upon making Oran another naval base. These bases increase apace; and in Bizerta, Oran, and Toulon we have a triangle of them. Our admirals will have all their work cut out for them in future wars in the Mediterranean.

What a warning to our present Ministers are the words of Lord Aberdeen. How they will apply to them if they allow the drama of Tunis in 1881 to be repeated in Morocco in 1904! Moreover, the consequences in this present case will be far more serious.

Now let us see what that veteran statesman, the late Sir John Drummond Hay, British Minister to the Court of Morocco, had to say.

We cull a few of his sayings and writings from his biography, edited by his daughter.

In 1858 he wrote :

"Morocco is ticklish ground, and it is here we might be exposed to a movement on the part of France, which

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might prove a severe check to us in our naval preponderance in the Mediterranean."

In 1885 Sir John, in a conversation with M. Feraud, the Minister of France to Morocco, said :

"I told him that there was no reason why there should not always be a perfect accord between us except on one point, viz., if either of our Governments desired to take possession of Morocco. 'Kick it (Morocco) out,' I said, 'into the Atlantic a hundred miles, and then the sooner Morocco was colonised by a civilised people the better.'"

Again he said :

"It would never do for us that France should hold the Straits, the gut of commerce, the passage to India and the East. It is far more likely to be dangerous than if she held the Canal. As a sentinel of the Straits I fire my gun, as a warning, when I know of a move to obtain that object."

Wise words these from this country's most famous representative at the Court of Morocco. Throughout all his writings he appears worn out by his constant efforts to thwart France and keep her hand off Morocco, and now, are the results of all his labours, of all his anxieties to be thrown away?

Again Lord Nelson said :

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“Tangier must either remain in the hands of a neutral Power, like Morocco, or England must own it.”

Thus Sir John insisted on the neutrality of the whole of the Empire, while our great admiral insisted on the neutrality of Tangier.

It is surely impossible that this nation will allow these wise injunctions to be unheeded.

It should not be left to civilians alone to dwell too long on the strategical side of the question. Let our Admirals and Generals and our Navy League take up the question and raise their voices to prevent our position in the Mediterranean from being thus jeopardised.

If they neglected so to raise their voices in 1881, to prevent our Government from calmly allowing Tunis, with its Bizerta, passing under the tricolor, let them take warning and not allow a similar lapse with regard to Morocco to take place in this year 1904. If they now take action, it will be at least a kind of reparation for past error. Let our shipowners, our Inverclydes, our Sutherlands, our Alfred Joneses, our Donald Curries, our Furnesses, and others bestir themselves before it is too late and represent to our Government the vital importance of a free waterway into and out of the Mediterranean and on the Atlantic and an inviolate coast and Hinterland of Morocco in the interests of our commerce.

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So imbued are our French neighbours with the idea that they and they alone are to have an exclusive hand in all parts of Morocco, and this too at the very moment when this country is showing them a most unaccountable complacency, that the very thought of our even holding Tangier is repugnant to them. Lately, in a sitting of the Chamber, M. Gauthier de Clagny asked M. Delcassé to tell England frankly that the friendship of France could not stand the strain of a seizure of Tangier by England. If France with her insignificant merchant marine, a marine which requires much fostering with bounties to prevent its dwindling away to vanishing-point, is so solicitous about the freedom of way through the Straits as to begrudge us the possession of Tangier, with how much more insistence should England, with her immense mercantile marine, oppose any arrangement which might in the least endanger the neutrality of this most important waterway?

In insisting on the freedom of the Straits, England, as their sentinel, would be fighting not for her own hand alone, but for the commerce of the world at large. In the year 1902, 3837 steamers and sailing-vessels measuring 4,366,154 tons entered the port of Gibraltar.

Of this number the figures are as under :

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| | | | Tons. |
|---------------------|---------------------|-------------------|-----------------|
| Great Britain . . . | 2115 | vessels measuring | 2,953,481 |
| Germany | 275 | „ „ | 606,452 |
| Spain | 631 | „ „ | 177,783 |
| Norway and Sweden . | 172 | „ „ | 119,885 |
| France | 152 | „ „ | 113,738 |
| Denmark | 117 | „ „ | 65,439 |
| Holland | 73 | „ „ | 62,725 |
| Italy | 76 | „ „ | 74,880 |
| Austria | 60 | „ „ | 68,187 |
| Greece | 41 | „ „ | 59,627 |
| Russia | 46 | „ „ | 38,909 |
| Belgium | 6 | „ „ | 7,414 |
| Portugal | 63 | „ „ | 4,405 |
| Other countries . . | 10 | „ „ | 13,229 |
| | <hr/> 3,837 vessels | | <hr/> 4,366,154 |

The imagination fails to realise the vast amount of wealth carried by these vessels. Do not such figures constitute Great Britain as interested a neighbour of Morocco as France, if not more so?

Gibraltar is but fifteen to twenty miles distant from the opposite coast of Morocco and thirty-five miles from Tangier.

And what about the other nations represented at Gibraltar by 1570 vessels of 1,298,935 tons, which, added to the tonnage of British vessels, form a total of 4,252,416 against France's share of 113,738 tons?

Or let us take the number of vessels which passed through the Suez Canal in 1902: 3708 vessels, measuring 15,694,359 tons.

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Of this number the figures are as under :

| | | | Tons. |
|-----------------|---|------------------------|------------|
| Great Britain | . | 2165 vessels measuring | 9,333,996 |
| Germany | . | 480 " " | 2,371,046 |
| France | . | 274 " " | 1,174,036 |
| Holland | . | 218 " " | 727,943 |
| Austria Hungary | . | 139 " " | 569,345 |
| Russia | . | 110 " " | 472,946 |
| Japan | . | 61 " " | 331,562 |
| Italy | . | 85 " " | 252,091 |
| Spain | . | 30 " " | 133,157 |
| Norway | . | 41 " " | 100,730 |
| America | . | 21 " " | 67,996 |
| Denmark | . | 14 " " | 55,702 |
| Turkey | . | 38 " " | 57,863 |
| Greece | . | 14 " " | 25,370 |
| Sweden | . | 7 " " | 8,824 |
| Egypt | . | 6 " " | 6,274 |
| Portugal | . | 3 " " | 4,306 |
| Siam | . | 2 " " | 1,172 |
| <hr/> | | | |
| 3708 vessels | | | 15,694,359 |

Even in France's great Mediterranean port Marseilles the proportion of tonnage of foreign vessels entering the port with cargo exceeds the amount of tonnage of French vessels, the figures for 1902 being:

| | | |
|---------|---|----------------|
| Foreign | . | 3,196,155 tons |
| French | . | 3,018,918 " |

Of the foreign vessels Great Britain's share was 1,626,378 tons.

This, too, in spite of the coastwise trade

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between port and port in France and between France and her Algerian and other colonies being confined to vessels flying the French flag, to the total exclusion of those of foreign nationality.

Thus, taking into account France's total shipping, it will be apparent that the whole of her wealth on the Mediterranean is so small in comparison with that of other nations that it would be the height of folly to grant her any possible influence, present or future, over one more mile of coast-line than she already possesses in this inland sea, which bears all this colossal wealth of all the world.

The 1300 miles of Moroccan coast-line form the only safe guarantee to the nations of the world for the undisturbed use of the neighbourhood of the Mediterranean, the sea upon which more treasure is concentrated than on any other sea in the world.

How jealously then ought they to strive to keep this coast-line inviolate !

CHAPTER II

THE COMMERCE OF MOROCCO

Now, as to the commercial aspect of the Morocco question.

All safeguards imposed by Lord Lansdowne notwithstanding, be they bound with triple bars of steel, as sure as France, if granted one fraction more influence than Great Britain, will one day overrun any neutral zone which may be marked off on the coast-line (in the same manner that her generals in Algeria are at the present moment chafing to burst across the frontier of Morocco), so surely will means be found to gradually close in our faces the commercial door of the Empire.

It is not in the nature of things that the result should be otherwise. Our neighbours secure colonies for the exclusive fostering of their commerce in order to shield their own traders from outside foreign competition. They impose differential duties in favour of their home and colonial products (and we cannot blame them, who are about to do the same ourselves), and the greater

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part of their intercoastal trade is reserved for their own shipping, to the exclusion of that of all other flags.

Their colonies swarm with Government officials, for the position under Government, with its contingent pension, is dear to the heart of the thrifty Frenchman.

In the case of countries which remain under their Mahommedan rulers, and in which all nations are treated alike, Great Britain usually has the lion's share of the trade. Where those countries pass under the tricolor, the trade of Great Britain is strangled almost to extinction.

Let us take Morocco and Algeria, two neighbouring countries, as instances of this.

The total value of goods exported to Morocco by all nations in the year 1901 amounted to £1,714,262. Great Britain's share of this was £929,781, or more than half of the total.

The total value of goods exported to Algeria by all nations in the year 1901 amounted to £13,250,000. Great Britain's share of this was £422,056. But in this figure are included shipments of coal amounting to £364,480. It leaves but £57,576 for the value of all other goods from Great Britain to Algeria. Had France coal of her own to spare, we should ship none to Algeria.

The total of Great Britain's exports to Morocco in 1902 amount to £1,042,097 ; whereas Great

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Britain's shipments to Algeria in 1902 amount to £419,543; deduct the value of coal shipments, £324,485, there is left only £95,058 for the value of all other British goods.

Thus, in the two years 1901 and 1902 Morocco took from us £1,971,878, while Algeria, eliminating coal (and we send no coal to Morocco), took from us £152,634.

Great Britain's shipments of cotton goods :

| | |
|---|---------------------|
| | £ |
| To Morocco in 1901 | amounted to 606,580 |
| To Morocco in 1902 | „ 657,110 |
| To Tunis in 1902 | „ 219,090 |
| To Tripoli, with only 300,000 population in 1902 | „ 75,467 |
| To Egypt in 1902 | „ 2,563,114 |
| To Algeria in 1901 | „ 11,336 |
| To Algeria in 1902 | „ 13,987 |
| To Turkey in 1901 | „ 4,971,841 |

France's shipments of cotton goods :

| | |
|---|-----------------------|
| | £ |
| To Turkey in 1900-1901 | were 99,450 |
| And the total of French trade to Turkey in 1901 | amounted to 1,894,000 |
| Against Great Britain's trade | 6,960,984 |
| The total value of cotton goods from all nations shipped to Alexandria in 1901 | „ 2,458,124 |
| Of this value Great Britain sent | 2,257,419 |
| Leaving for all other nations, including France | <u>£200,705.</u> |

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These figures speak for themselves and bear out our contention that Mahommedan countries, when left to themselves, prefer British goods.

It will be acknowledged that it is not very generous treatment on the part of our neighbours to place such restrictions on the importations of our cotton goods into Algeria as to make the 1901 imports amount to £11,336, and those of 1902 to £13,987. We find, on referring back, that in the year 1891 we sent cottons to Algeria to the value of £217,072.

But Great Britain's shipments of cotton goods to Morocco in this same year, 1891, were only £471,973, where they now stand at £657,110. It is therefore to be inferred that, had our cotton goods trade remained untrammelled with Algeria, it should stand to-day at £300,000, in place of £13,987.

And Great Britain is France's best customer. In the year 1902 we took from France and her colonies £52,200,941; and France and her colonies took from us £23,788,954; leaving a surplus taken by us of £28,411,987. So that surely we deserve better treatment at her hands.

Here is a most glaring situation for Mr. Balfour to correct when this country shall place retaliatory powers in his hands.

The present situation of trade in French North Africa will suggest to the reader the truth of the

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saying that history repeats itself. For it appears that Protection of a very drastic form was rampant at this same spot 2400 years ago.

In the year 509 B.C. a treaty was signed between Carthage and Rome, in which it was stipulated that Roman vessels were not to pass Cape Bon, the idea being to exclude them from the Spanish markets, with which Carthage enjoyed a large commerce. Again, in a later treaty, Rome was debarred from trading with Africa and Sardinia. Thus, the difference is one of degree only.

In those days, total prohibition obtained; in these days, it is a case of preferential duties.

But the results are nearly the same.

It is not hazardous to forecast that if France should be allowed the least preponderance in Morocco, she may probably, about the year 1930, allow us to ship a quarter of a million pounds annually to the Empire out of a total import trade, which by that time may have reached fifteen million pounds sterling, and of our quarter of a million of imports into Morocco probably more than half will consist of coal.

Let us now revert to France's methods in her colonies, and to how they may be applied to Morocco. Should French *corps d'armée* have to be called into Morocco to suppress real or imaginary insurrections, will not the expenditure

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incurred be proclaimed as intolerable by our neighbours, seeing that they will be bound by treaty to give to foreign traders the same treatment accorded to their own people? Will they not, once having a footing in the land, chafe under these restrictions, restrictions non-existent in any other of their colonies? In a few years they will come to consider Morocco as a colony of their own *de facto* if not *de jure*. Will they not clamour for a revision of such treaty and claim more exclusive rights for their own Government and for their own traders in return for these sacrifices?

Should this country and other nations refuse their assent to these demands, France would find means to enforce them without infringing treaties. It would be within her right to raise very considerably the import and export duties at all the Moroccan ports, with the ostensible object of providing revenue to meet army expenses, but with the real object of crippling the Morocco trade, bringing her own traders in that country under the like treatment, and so disarm remonstrances from foreign Powers. In this manner she would divert the trade to her ports of Nemours and Oran in Algeria to the north, and to Senegambia on the south, and from these ports she would flood the Morocco markets with goods by means of her railways, benefiting these

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latter to a degree never dreamed of when they were constructed, and also benefiting her northern and southern colonists.

The exports from Morocco would be similarly diverted by rail and shipped from Algerian and Senegambian ports.

Let us now devote a little study to the commerce of Morocco. The volume of this trade is fast approaching an annual amount of four million pounds sterling. Of this amount Great Britain's share is roughly one half.

Our own traders appear to rest satisfied with Lord Lansdowne's assurances that he will protect their interests, so that the errors of Tunis and Madagascar shall not be repeated.

Let us bear in mind, while on the subject of Madagascar, that the French general in command there warned the natives, at their peril, against being seen wearing British cotton fabrics.

It is possible to point out how, in spite of all safeguards, French trade will receive preferential treatment.

In the proposed reconstruction of Morocco, quite apart from the ordinary commercial imports into the country, there will be needed immense quantities of plant purchased with the resources of Morocco itself, such as steel bridges, mountains of cement for the construction of breakwaters at the ports, machinery, rails, locomotives,

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railway carriages, and trucks, Barrages will have to be constructed. Dredgers will be required for the removal of silt from the bar ports and for deepening the existing harbours. Steam launches and lighters will be needed for the eight Moroccan ports. Lighthouses will have to be erected along the coast. Clothing, arms, ammunition, and artillery will be in demand for the use of the native troops. It is quite probable that for many years to come the value of all this imported material may equal, or even exceed, the total value of Morocco's present commercial imports and exports.

These works for the improvement of the country will, of course, be undertaken by the French Government or farmed out to their own subjects, and for this preference who could blame them?

Now, is there anybody so simple as to anticipate that any portion of these orders for three or four million pounds sterling annually will be placed in Great Britain? Does anybody believe that Sir John Aird, or any other British contractor or engineer or shipbuilder, will be called in to erect barrages, or build dredgers or launches, lighters or lighthouses, or steel bridges?

Would it not be safer to make up our minds from the outset that every ton of material will be purchased in France, every franc expended in that country, particularly as no one could take

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exception to France so favouring her own engineers and manufacturers?

If we adopt the dual control suggested in these pages, then would this country get her fair share of these millions of pounds worth of orders; and these are days when every million pounds worth of orders is of great consequence to Great Britain. Otherwise, the sight of French activity alone would rankle in the hearts of Englishmen, and they would come to bewail their apathy in the year 1904 in handing over to France so fair a country as Morocco. This regret would gradually lead to estrangement between the two nations, where to-day the cry is to draw them more together. All this would be obviated were the two peoples to set themselves to work loyally together in a dual control for the benefit and advancement of Morocco, for the benefit of the commerce of both nations, as also of that of the nations of the world at large, giving to Algeria a peaceful neighbour in place of, as at present, a turbulent one.

Perhaps it is too much to hope to enlist the sympathies of Mr. Chamberlain in this crisis, seeing how that statesman is otherwise occupied with his fiscal campaign. He is fighting for the principle of the open door. Let him call to mind the tale of the philosopher, who, while gazing intently at the heavens, fell into a pit on earth

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which he had not observed. Among the many doors in his mind which need to be kept open, let him turn his thoughts to that of Morocco, not for the sake of its limited trade of to-day, but rather for the sake of the vast dimensions to which it will undoubtedly attain in another generation, and then let him raise his powerful voice against what we hear is contemplated. This door is in grievous peril.

Mr. Chamberlain has served his country well in South Africa; would that he had the time and could be induced to visit the north-western corner of that continent! On his way thither he would touch at Gibraltar. Standing high on that rock, and casting his eyes around, his thoughts might revert to the years of the great siege from 1779 to 1783. To the north he would see the mainland of Spain, the land of one of our besiegers during those four years, and to the southward he would behold neutral Morocco, ever a friend, a comfort, and a storehouse for the last two centuries to our garrison on the rock; and, pondering over the present proposal to hand over—for it will virtually and eventually come to this—this neutral Empire to that other nation, which assisted Spain in that memorable siege, it would serve him as a valuable object-lesson, and he might then return home and possibly advise his countrymen that this contemplated deal should not take place. He could

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explain to them that it would be henceforth consigning our sentinel fortress to desolate solitude and isolation, with the flags of Spain and France floating all round the horizon, the open ocean thirty-six miles away, and no friend nearer than our ally on the Tagus, with Malta far to the eastward, and Gambia and Sierra Leone to the south-west. What a fitting pendant would such be to the Right Honourable gentleman's successful labours in South Africa!

Reverting to the trade of Morocco, and taking into consideration the very unfavourable conditions now obtaining in that country, it is simply marvellous that its volume should have reached such dimensions as it has done to-day.

It has to contend with an entire absence of roads and railways; its rivers are not utilised for transport, the camel, the horse, the mule, and the ass being the only means of carrying merchandise.

In the case of grain, only that portion which is grown in the belt of country a few days' distance around the vicinity of the seaports, can afford the cost of transport to the coast for shipment. Add to this a most disorganised currency, in the shape of native silver coin, minted in Europe, but not available for remittance thither for the discharge of the country's indebtedness.

The roads in the interior are very unsafe at times; there is an almost entire absence of bridges

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over the rivers. These and other disadvantages that need not be recapitulated here stand in the way of a greater development of commerce.

If, then, in spite of all these drawbacks, this Morocco trade is approaching a total of four million pounds sterling, what may we not anticipate for it in the future, say after a couple of decades of Anglo-French control, with all these disadvantages removed or remedied, and when vast improvements shall have been introduced into the country? Algeria, with a much smaller area of fertile land and only one-half the population, with scarcely a river worth the name, with the Atlas Mountains attaining a height but little more than half of their height in Morocco, and consequently affording far less protection from desert winds, sands, and locusts, can boast to-day of an annual trade of the value of twenty-five million pounds sterling. What may we not expect from Morocco, with her superior natural advantages, under good and stable government? Would it be extravagant to forecast for this trade, after the next twenty years, an annual value of thirty-five to forty million pounds?

Is this a trade which this country can afford to ignore? One false step in this present year 1904 may lose for the future generations of Britons all but an infinitesimal share of a trade so colossal.

Morocco possesses a soil of wonderful fertility,

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and six or seven fine rivers flow down from the Atlas through the land: the Moulouya, the Sebu, the Bouregreg, the Oumerbeya, the Tensift, the Wad Sus, and the Wad Draa, the first of these falling into the Mediterranean and the rest into the Atlantic.

Apart from these, the land is intersected by numerous tributary streams.

The Sebu approaches to within a few miles of Fez and could easily be made navigable from the sea to that capital. The Tensift reaches almost to the southern capital, Morocco city.

The Oumerbeya penetrates into the almost unknown region of Morocco, past Zayan, Beni Meskin and Tadla. This district of Tadla, at present all but unknown, will probably hereafter prove one of the richest regions of Morocco, rich in agriculture and rich in minerals. All these rivers facilitate the irrigation of vast expanses of the country.

Barrages erected on the lower slopes of the Atlas for the storing of the winter torrential rains, preserving them for the spring and summer time, would help to flood the parched plains at the proper seasons and so assure luxuriant crops.

On the southern side of the Atlas there are a certain number of patches of fertile land which require irrigation, but there is no doubt that more water finds its way down their southern

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slopes than is required for this agriculture, consequently running to waste in the sands.

In years to come it should not be found difficult for engineers to tap these waters, diverting a greater portion of them from the watershed to the northern, or Morocco side, thus increasing the volume of the rivers and adding to irrigation possibilities. What vistas present themselves to the imagination, of mills and factories erected on the slopes of the Atlas, utilising the numberless mountain streams for the driving of turbines.

The writer, while approaching Fez on one occasion in the early days of April, has ridden for two consecutive days between wide expanses of wheat and barley fields extending as far as the eye could reach, seas of golden grain ready for the sickle overflowing the plains and climbing to a considerable height up the mountain sides, and all this for the provisioning of the two capitals Fez and Mequinez. We were told that similar fields surrounded the Fez district on all sides, growing these two grains as the staple food for man and beast.

One might have imagined himself in the Manitoban cornfields. None of this grain finds its way to the seaports for shipment. Had this been possible, an even greater area would have been sown, but the cost of transport to such distances is prohibitive.

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How all this will be changed when the Sebu river can be made navigable for large lighters to convey all this wealth of grain to the sea coast !

The rivers of Algeria, such as the Chelif, the Seybouse, the Oued Agrioum and the Oued El Kebir, are not navigable even at their mouths for anything but flat-bottomed boats, and then only for short distances. Two or three miles from their mouths they have a depth of only one or two feet.

In winter they are torrents, too dangerous for navigation, and, owing to their deep beds, they are unsuitable for irrigation.

We would ask the reader to ponder on the unique situation of Morocco, that pearl upon the north-western shoulder of the African continent. Its coast-line is longer than its Hinterland, and its advantages of climate and rainfall are unique ; these facts alone should bring home to the most apathetic the value of this favoured land.

Morocco can be roughly compared to a triangle, with Tangier at its apex. One side, about 300 miles in length, faces the Mediterranean looking north ; the other side, nearly one thousand miles in length, facing the Atlantic, looking west towards the setting sun and enjoying breezes which have passed over 3000 miles of ocean.

The land consequently draws moisture from both those seas. The northern and colder winds

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from the Mediterranean meet the warmer, moisture-laden winds from the west and south-west, causing these latter to condense and precipitate their precious burden on the land. We must bear in mind that Algeria has the Mediterranean alone from which to draw its moisture. Any moisture, which might approach it from the far off ocean, is tapped by the high mountains of the Riff country. The base of this triangle is the Atlas Mountains, which stretch along the back of the Empire from Cape Ghir on the Atlantic, right through to Algeria and Tunis. The German traveller Rohlf, however, denies that the chain in the two latter countries is the true Atlas, which, he considers, ends in Morocco.

The length of this chain in Morocco is about 600 miles.

Morocco is, as it were, a large tract of luxuriant land, thrown up from the tropics by some gigantic upheaval of nature into the temperate zone, thus bringing the tropics to the very feet of Europe.

The chain of the Atlas, rising to a height of from 9000 to 13,000 feet above sea level, serves as a rampart, effectually screening the land from sandstorms, hot desert winds and locusts. Its cold upper peaks break most of the rain-laden clouds from the Atlantic, condensing and throwing back on the plains of Morocco their precious water, feeding the rivers that flow through the land

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and preventing a great portion of this water from being carried over and wasted in the sandy region of trans-Atlas.

This rampart of the Atlas is a veritable wall encircling a lovely garden hundreds of thousands of square miles in extent. To give an idea of what mischief these desert winds can do, it appears that in the year 1892 nearly the whole wheat crop in Egypt was burnt up by them, and large quantities of wheat had to be imported from Syria and India to prevent a famine. Egypt may well envy Morocco her possession of the Atlas. In the emporium city of Ghadames man has been compelled to build a high wall to prevent the entrance of the desert sand. If we would realise what Morocco would be but for this beneficent rampart, we have only to note the vast expanse of sand south of Cape Ghir, where the Atlas ceases, as also on the southern side of the range, where the sand reaches to the edge of the sea-coast.

The sirocco or desert wind in Algeria blows at all times of the year. In the early part of the present year it blew for four days, from 15th to 19th February.

During the summer months it blows from three to nine days at the time, scorching up all vegetation and sending the thermometer up to 45 degrees Centigrade, equal to 113 degrees Fahrenheit, in the shade on the coast.

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The rainfall in Algeria is very irregular.

During the past twelve years there have been only two really good years for cereals. Farmers, when they sow, never know what they will reap. The climate is very variable. From May to October no rain is to be looked for. From October to April are the wet months. In the interior and high lands snow falls and remains for two or three months. On parts of the coast the cold is very severe from December to February.

For many years the French medical faculty was puzzled as to the cause of the excessive infant mortality in the south of France bordering on the Mediterranean, and extending as far back as Auvergne and l'Isère, the excess being for this region some 15,000 deaths annually over and above the mean average for the rest of France. The doctors could not bring themselves to believe that the lovely blue Mediterranean exhaled any noxious vapours, until at last the two Bertillons suspected the cause to lay in the hot, unhealthy winds of the Sahara blown across the sea.

To give an example of the clearness of the atmosphere of Morocco, we may mention that some of the highest of the snow-laden peaks of the Atlas are at times plainly visible from the housetops of Mogador, 130 miles away.

Thus has nature favoured Morocco with a lavish hand, and, had its people but seconded her

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efforts, instead of denuding the land of almost all its forests and trees, droughts would never have been known. But when foreign control shall be introduced into the Empire, re-afforestation will be resorted to, and then not alone will the rainfall become more assured and regular, and large tracts of waste land be brought under cultivation, but timber and other fine woods will come to be added to the long list of Morocco's varied products for export. There are even at the present day some very highly prized woods in the country. We can quote here the valuable testimony of Sir J. D. Hooker, formerly Director of the Royal Botanic Gardens, Kew, who visited Morocco and the Atlas Mountains in the year 1871. He says: "The evergreen oak, which might produce much valuable timber, is the chief indigenous tree of the country." He then speaks of the Arar wood (*Callitris quadrivalvis*). This the Romans prized so highly that Cicero paid the equivalent of £9000 for a table about four feet in diameter and three inches thick, made from two semicircles of this wood, so skilfully put together that they had the appearance of being one piece. He says further :

"The beauty of this wood, if it were allowed to attain its proper size, would always secure a ready market, even though it never reached the extravagant price which under the name of Citrus wood it obtained in the days of

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Imperial Rome. It might become a source of great wealth under good government. Its only use at present is to produce gum sandrac."

He says again: "The forests of the Atlas would, if saved from wanton destruction, be a further important source of national wealth."

Among trees which, in our opinion, could be advantageously acclimatised in Morocco would be the *Acacia decurrens*, the blue gum of Australia, which, after fifteen or twenty years growth, yields a valuable bark, which, giving the pale yellow tint to leather so highly prized by saddlers, realises a high price in the market.

We note that Algeria exported in the year 1902, 17,000 tons of timber and 15,000 tons of corkwood, of a combined value of £600,000.

The sunflower, flourishing as it does in the South of Europe, could be extensively grown in Morocco, and a most valuable plant it would prove itself. It grows in almost any climate; the seeds serve as a food for cattle; a good edible oil is expressed from them, yielding fifty gallons to the acre; the leaves form good fodder for cattle; the stems serve as fuel. The late Dr. Leared, writing of Morocco, said:

"The Empire presents such variety and excellence of climate and soil in hills and valleys, woodland and open plain, watered by rivers and numerous small streams that

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almost every plant under the sun might be raised within its limits. Even with the application of ordinary industry, at least five times the present population might be supported. Almost the entire surface of the land, except that of the mountains, is covered with a rich soil, often of a surprising depth. A considerable amount of wheat and barley is grown on the magnificent plain of Morocco, yet so vast is its expanse that to those passing over it, it seems hardly cultivated at all. Here the steam-plough might run for miles without interruption, and cotton might be grown to perfection."

Captain Warren, R.N., wrote in 1882 : "Two crops, and sometimes three crops of potatoes have been grown in the year and supplied to Gibraltar."

Hemsö describes the climate of Morocco thus : "The climate of all this region is amongst the most salubrious and finest in the whole world."

Lemprière says : "Although Mogador is so far South, it really belongs to the temperate zone."

Mr. Richardson says :

"Whoever travels through Morocco and will but open his eyes to survey its rich valleys and fertile plains will be impressed with the conviction that this country, cultivated by an industrious population, and fostered by a paternal Government, is capable of producing all the agricultural wealth of the North and South of Europe, as well as the tropics, and of maintaining its inhabitants in happiness and plenty."

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We add here another extract from Sir J. D. Hooker's book, referring to the facilities for irrigation in the land :

“ The unfailing streams from the Atlas serve to a limited extent, but the area of productive land might by intelligent management be very largely increased. We have seen an estimate of the quantity of water discharged by the five principal streams which fall into the Atlantic north of the Atlas, which fixes the amount at 9000 cubic feet per second ; and if to these were added the Moulouya, which falls into the Mediterranean, and the Siss, the Draa, the Assaka, and the Sous we should probably double the above estimate, an aggregate amount sufficient to irrigate three millions of acres. With an almost unequalled climate, there is scarcely any one of the productions of the warmer temperate and sub-tropical zones that may not be obtained. Besides grain, the country now supplies large quantities of olive oil, dates, oranges, almonds, with a little cotton. The latter may be largely increased ; and there seems no reason why coffee, tea, sugar, indigo and other valuable exotic produce should not be raised in the southern provinces.”

This much from so high an authority.

We have already in this volume endeavoured to enlist the sympathies of our admirals, our generals, and our steamship owners, as also of Mr. Chamberlain in this question. Let us now appeal to the Lancashire manufacturers, and ask them to ponder on the statement of Sir J. D.

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Hooker as to Morocco being a field for the growing of cotton.

The supply of this most valuable fibre from the United States seems likely to fail us at a critical moment in the near future.

It is at present subjected to violent fluctuations in price, caused by reckless speculators who seem to care as little for the ruin of their cotton manufacturers as for our own, so long as they can fill their pockets with gold. Is it not time that we should seek our cotton from more peaceful regions, and so put a stop to our millowners being made shuttlecocks for the bull and bear battledores of Wall Street, Chicago and New Orleans? One day it is wheat that is cornered; the next day, pork; another day, cotton; and, as for oil, that is perpetually in the corner!

If any chemist would show some of these Trusts a process by which the oxygen of the air could be cornered and doled out to a panting world at their own price, his fees would be so colossal that they would enable him to start a radium factory.

Let these Lancashire millowners bring all their influence to bear upon our Government to prevent this possibly large cotton-growing field from falling into the hands of our neighbours across the Channel. We may depend upon it that, with a Government more paternal than ours, in the event

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of a cotton famine, not one single bale of cotton grown in Morocco would be permitted to reach Liverpool until the entire requirements of Rouen and their other manufacturing districts were fully satisfied.

We recommend this phase of the question to Mr. Chamberlain. There is not the slightest doubt but that Morocco could supply large quantities of cotton of a very superior class. During the American Civil War Morocco grew very fair quantities of cotton, which realised in the Liverpool market from 2s. 6d. to 4s. per pound.

Morocco could supply millions of quarters of grain for European consumption.

That its exports of grain are not larger at present is in part due to the want of economic inland transport, but chiefly to the excessive export duties, in some cases equal to nearly the prime cost of the grain, a range of duties established half a century back, when grain was double its present value, and not since revised.

In Morocco, the orange, the lemon, the citron thrive to perfection.

Speaking of Tetuan, Sir J. D. Hooker says : "The best oranges in the world grow, along with figs, almonds, peaches and all our common tree-fruit."

Grapes of excellent quality grow in abundance, and but wait development and extension

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of cultivation to cause them to be largely exported.

They could reach the London market within ten days of being cut from the vine, as could also the peach, the nectarine and the apricot, the latter growing in profuse abundance. Melons, the quince, the mulberry, the fig, the walnut, the pomegranate, dates, of which the Tafilat kind is the best in the world, are all indigenous, or at any rate well established. To these add wheat, barley, beans, maize, peas, chickpeas, millet, lentils, canaryseed, cummin seed, fenugreek seed, carraway seed, linseed, coriander seed, gingelly seed (yielding a fine edible oil), esparto, olive oil, almonds in great abundance, tobacco, at present of rough quality, but capable of great improvement.

Gums of many varieties, gum sandrac, gum Arabic, gum senegal, gum ammoniacum. The products also include beeswax, hides, goat-skins, sheep-skins, and wool. Hemp is largely grown for home consumption. It has been shipped to this country, and could be again. The cattle, sheep, horses, mules, asses and camels are all capable of improvement in breed. What a field for horse-breeding and for the improvement in the breeding of sheep and improvement in the quality of the wool!

In the year 1902, 27,000 head of cattle were shipped from Tangier, of a value of £108,000.

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Maltebrun, in his geography (1847), gives the following statistics of the animal wealth of Morocco, figures rather difficult to estimate with absolute accuracy, but probably in many instances close to the mark :

| | | | |
|-------------------|-----------|---------------------|------------|
| Camels | 500,000 | Cows and cattle . . | 6,000,000 |
| Asses and mules . | 2,000,000 | Goats | 12,000,000 |
| Horses | 400,000* | Sheep | 45,000,000 |

We have checked the number of goats with the number of goat-skins shipped annually, and find that Maltebrun's estimate of 12,000,000 to be wonderfully correct. Cork forests abound in the Atlas and in the neighbourhood of Larache, and cargoes of corkwood were formerly shipped.

There is no reason why these forests should not with proper care produce large quantities of corkwood for the European market, where, on account of consumption being greatly in excess of production, prices have been gradually rising during the last five or six years. Those who have travelled on the opposite coast by the Algeciras railway to Ronda will recall to mind the endless cork forests through which that train passes and the thousands of bales of corkwood lying by the side of the line.

The soil of Morocco needs but to be scratched to produce wonderful crops.

* This we should say is below the mark.

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Here are no steam ploughs, or, for the matter of that, no European ploughs. Every implement used in agriculture is almost the same as those of Biblical times. There appears to be no limit to the country's power of production.

Let us take, for example, the article linseed. This seed has been exported from Morocco in small quantities any time during the past century, but more attention has of late been paid to its cultivation. Our Consul at Casablanca, Mr. Allan Maclean, draws attention to its wonderful development.

The exports of this seed in the year 1900 were 64 tons; in the year 1901, 1500 tons; in the year 1902, 9000 tons.

These figures show a marvellous increase in three years, and linseed appears to have a fine future before it, especially if European methods should be called in to improve its growth and preparation for the market. The land also will have to be properly manured, as it is an exhausting crop.

Under outside control many of the slipshod modes of preparing produce for market will disappear, and greater care will be imported into all industries. Yet another illustration of the capabilities of this Empire, so long dormant, is furnished by the egg trade. For years the shipments of this valuable article of food were restricted

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chiefly to Tangier, whence comparatively small quantities were shipped to Gibraltar and the adjacent Spanish ports. At the present time, such has been the development of this trade, the annual exportation of eggs is fast approaching a value of a quarter of a million pounds sterling, the actual figures for 1902 being £202,313, which shows an increase of £20,000 on the export of 1901. Eggs now head the list in value of all Morocco exports.

Sugar was extensively grown in former days in the vicinity of Tarudant and largely shipped to Europe. How many sugar refiners in Great Britain who still use cane-sugar have ever given a thought to the possibility of Morocco, but a thousand miles from London, supplying their wants! If any one should doubt sugar growing in these regions we would ask him to visit the neighbourhood of Malaga, just opposite the Morocco coast, and but a few hours steam from Tangier, and there he would note smiling fields of sugarcane waving in the breeze and supplying large quantities of cane for the sixty-nine refineries now established in Spain.

In the year 1900 Spain produced 33,000 tons of cane sugar, and 60,000 tons of beet sugar; in the year 1901 she produced 28,000 tons of cane sugar, 58,000 tons of beet sugar; and any plant which can grow in Southern Spain can equally well grow in Morocco.

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Our colony of Jamaica is not so prosperous but that it could spare experts to re-introduce the plant into Morocco, and also skilled labourers, if required, from its 600,000 black population.

The Austrian traveller, Lenz, writes that in the sixteenth century large quantities of sugar-cane were grown near Tarudant, with large mills erected for crushing it ; and so important was the trade that the Sultan, in order to provide a port from which to ship it, laid siege to the port of Santa Cruz (Agadir) in the year 1536 and took it from the Portuguese ; and from it large quantities were shipped to Europe.

The indigo plant has been cultivated for centuries in the neighbourhood of Fez, the indigo manufactured being used for dyeing cotton-stuffs.

Experts could be brought from India and South America to develop its cultivation.

The tobacco grown in Morocco is of an ordinary quality, chiefly used for snuff-making ; here, again, experts could be brought from Cuba and elsewhere to cultivate it scientifically and improve its quality to fit it for exportation.

Surely if Algeria can export in one year 5500 tons of tobacco worth £238,000, Morocco should in time be able to export double this quantity. It is true that tobacco to the value of £110,000 was imported into Algeria, but even this leaves a large balance for native growth. The bulk of the

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Algerian tobacco crop is used by the Government for mixing with the Maryland tobacco sold by the Régie in France.

Silkworms have been reared, and silk produced, and used in home manufactures in both Fez and Morocco city. The dying away of this industry is doubtless to be attributed to the import duties on foreign silk being as low as 5 per cent. *ad valorem*, whilst all other imports pay 10 per cent. With little protection the systematic rearing of silkworms might soon attain large dimensions.

It might even be possible to acclimatise rubber trees in some of the hottest and most sheltered parts of Southern Morocco. Cape Bojador, in this vicinity, is but three degrees north of the tropics. The west coast, lower down the continent, ships 50,000 cwts. of rubber to England alone.

It would be an experiment worth trying with the assistance of experts.

Our rubber manufacturers might import their raw material from a source only a ten days' journey from England. Nature has placed this almost tropical region almost within sight of the British Channel; and we, blind to its advantages, appear to be taking steps to hand it over to our more astute neighbours.

While the gold mines of South Africa are certain one day to become exhausted, this Empire of

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Morocco will for all time be producing great agricultural wealth.

It would indeed be difficult to point out any product that could not be grown in this lovely land.

We have the high authority of Sir J. D. Hooker as to the possibility of growing here tea, coffee, indigo and other exotic produce.

In the course of time, with a general improved system of irrigation from the rivers and barrages, and from artesian wells sunk all over the country, Morocco will in all probability successfully compete with the Canary Islands and Jamaica in the growth of a banana of superior quality. The fruit has been tried, but so far with little success, probably owing to a scarcity of water. Excellent potatoes, grown in the vicinity of Mogador, have been exported with good results to the London market. Our Vice-Consul at that port speaks hopefully of Mogador becoming a future field for the growth of potatoes, onions and green peas of excellent quality also coming to perfection in our New Year, six months before the appearance of our English supply, in fact earlier even than the Algerian crops. In a word Morocco will become a large kitchen garden to England at her very doors. The possibilities for asparagus should also be great, as it requires that partially sandy soil of which Southern Morocco has an inexhaustible supply.

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The Carob tree, producing locust beans, is cultivated in Morocco, but only small quantities of these beans have been exported. It would be well worth while to give this tree attention and extend its cultivation, as, apart from export, its beans would form excellent cattle food for consumption in Morocco. Algeria, in 1902, exported 7000 tons of these beans, to the value of £31,000.

It appears that the French Government, in order to encourage the planting of this most useful tree, accords a gratuity to those who undertake it. This is the kind of fostering encouragement which Morocco has never had, but so sadly needs.

Crin végétal, or vegetable hair, is another product of Algeria, being a fibre from the leaves of the dwarf palm. Numerous works in Algeria are employed extracting this fibre. It is of great use in stuffing furniture, mattresses, and carriages, and this is considered one of the most flourishing of Algerian industries. In 1900, 3200 tons of this valuable hair were shipped from that colony.

Is there any dearth of dwarf palm-trees in Morocco? We think not.

Yet another industry which might be introduced into Morocco is ostrich farming. It is known in that country that the ostriches which roam over a sandy stretch in the vicinity of the sea (called Sahel in Arabic) produce feathers of a quality

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infinitely superior to those from birds which inhabit the uplands in the interior. One can foresee large farms established on the expanse of sand just south of Agadir and within sight of the sea.

In the year 1899 Algeria exported 11,000 tons weight of French beans, peas, artichokes and tomatoes, and 3800 tons of grapes, and in 1902 it exported 15,000 tons of young potatoes.

As to fish, the southern coast off Cape Juby teems with all kinds, and a German trawler, belonging to the "Nordsee" Company, recently returned to Nordenham with so satisfactory a catch from her trial trip on the Morocco coast that a number of German trawlers are now destined to work those prolific grounds. Thus do we, the greatest fishing nation of the world, let opportunities slip through our fingers.

Diego de Herrera, lord of the Canaries, established a fishing-station on this coast in 1476, where Puerto Cansado now stands. This station lasted until 1524. Incidentally, it may be mentioned that Algeria in 1902 shipped to France £81,000 value of fish.

There are also possibilities of Morocco becoming in a modest sense a manufacturing country.

Besides supplying its native population with various articles, such as woollen and silk garments,

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carpets, &c., the country exported in 1902 goods to other Mahommedan centres to the value of £100,000. Capital introduced into the country might develop this branch of trade.

Before proceeding with our subject we must here make a short digression, in order to expose the tactics of a section of our neighbours on the other side of the Channel, who, fearing some hitch or some sudden change in Anglo-French relations, and impatient to have a treaty relative to Morocco duly signed, suddenly waft a message across the Channel which partakes of that bluff which has been so skilfully used of late years to accustom the world at large to look upon France as heir presumptive (or presumptuous) to the Empire of the Shereefs. We do not credit any French Minister as the sender of such a message ; rather do we trace it to some member of the Colonial Party, that indefatigable body of men, who, more far-seeing than many of their countrymen, are fighting for their country's expansion.

The message is hurled at us through the medium of a correspondent of the *Pall Mall Gazette*, in its impression of January 1, 1904. In fact, an *étrenne* of the *jour de l'an* from France to England, and the paragraph runs thus :

THE "ENTENTE."

"At the moment of writing, M. Cambon, the French

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Ambassador in London, is here, and has just had a long interview with M. Delcassé. It is natural to suppose that the conversation had largely to do with the negotiations between London and Paris. I can only say that on this side of the Channel there is just as ardent a desire to speed the *entente* as there can possibly be on yours. It has been pointed out to me that to leave the fishing rights on the Newfoundland and Labrador coasts unsettled is to expose England to great danger. Assuming a sudden change in Anglo-French relations, what is to prevent this nation from transferring her rights to some third Power, such as the United States? It is just as important a question to England as Alaska was to her neighbours on the American continent."

Before replying to this message, we think it right to say that, in our opinion, the United States would not entertain the offer of these islands, remembering, as they would, the manner in which Great Britain had stood by them during their war with Spain against United Europe. We would ask our friends in France, the authors of the above message, to have some respect for our feelings in this country and for the feelings of our Canadian cousins, when they throw out such threats with regard to the Islands of St. Pierre and Miquelon being passed over to the United States. We would recommend them to pause and think how it is in our power to retaliate. There is one small island called by the French Aurigny. We call it

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Alderney, and it is just ten miles west of Cape La Hogue. Would our French colonial friends like us to lease this island to Germany for a term of years? Its rental might be a welcome addition to our Budget, and our friends would then witness the German flag floating almost within sight of Cherbourg, as they now threaten us with the Stars and Stripes in sight of the shores of Canada. The bare contemplation of such a possibility would send a shudder through the breasts of the worthy members of the Colonial Party, and the possibility might teach them a little consideration for the feelings of Britons and Canadians when they feel inclined to launch such impudent threats.

CHAPTER III

THE MINERAL POSSIBILITIES OF MOROCCO

As already remarked, we are told by geologists that Morocco was once joined to Spain at the Straits. The configuration of the two countries is the same. Spain is a country rich in minerals, iron, copper, zinc, quicksilver, lead, argentiferous lead, &c. Is it not fair to assume that minerals such as are found in Spain must also be lying hidden in the mountains of Morocco? Is it likely that nature should have decreed that there should be immense mineral wealth in the land north of the Straits, and an almost entire absence of such wealth to the south of the Straits?

The value of minerals mined in Spain in 1899, given in our Government's Statistical Abstract Cd. (1796), is 167,000,000 pesetas; these, calculated on a basis of 25 pesetas to the pound (although the real exchange is 34.45 pesetas), makes their total value close on seven million pounds sterling.

The Mineral Possibilities of Morocco

If we take our stand at Tangier, looking northward across the Straits, we are almost in sight of the famous copper mines of Rio Tinto and Tharsis ; further north, are situated the famous lead mines of Linares ; still further northward, we should find the Almaden mines, which produce over three million pounds weight of quicksilver ; and at last we reach, in the extreme north, Bilbao, from which over four million tons of iron ore are shipped every year. The exports of iron ore from Spain to the United Kingdom in 1899 exceeded six million tons. Who would assert that Spain had a monopoly of these riches ? We may rather rest assured that the mineral wealth of Morocco is but awaiting the prospecting and mining engineers, as also the introduction of European capital, to set vast works in operation and to employ hundreds of thousands of tons of shipping to convey the ore to the smelting works of Europe, until such time when smelting works shall be erected in Morocco itself.

The run from the shipping port of Agadir to Swansea would occupy but eight days.

It is positively known that gold, silver, copper argentiferous galena, antimony, nickel, iron, and manganese all exist in Morocco.

And why should we not be justified in suspecting the existence of phosphates, seeing that in the year 1901, 270,000 tons of this fertiliser were

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raised in Algeria? Let us here quote a few authorities as to the existence of minerals in Morocco.

Leo Africanus wrote : " Great stones of copper and iron near Guzzulu are digged out of the mines, and here are brazen vessels made which are carried into the country to be sold."

The traveller Rohlfs, on his way to Wad Draa, mentions that the country in that region is everywhere rich in minerals. He says : " I found pieces of pure antimony on the road near Tesna an inch and a half thick."

Lemprière says : " There are copper mines near Tarudant. Tarudant is forty-four miles from Santa Cruz (Agadir), all the way level country. Santa Cruz owes its importance to the large quantity of copper mines in the neighbourhood of Tafilat."

Mr. Stutfield mentions the existence of copper mines in Tadla.

Of coal it must be confessed very few traces have been discovered in Morocco.

Mr. Budgett Meakin, in his " Land of the Moors," mentions a Tadla mine as furnishing 20,000 quintals a year of copper for export to France.

He continues : " In 1741 a French 'tartane' was taken by the privateer *Revenge* while conveying copper from Agadir."

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Erckmann, a former French artillery officer with the Sultan, quotes Campon, who says: "Rich copper ores, gold, and antimony have been brought from the vicinity of the town (Tarudant); nickel also is said to be plentiful in the neighbouring Atlas; and at Gondaffy, not far from the source of the river Sus, is a rich vein of silver."

In one quarter of Morocco city there are several streets where the hammers of the coppersmiths are perfectly deafening from morn till evening, hammering copper utensils for domestic use all over Morocco, and almost every pound weight of this copper is from the native mines. It would be easy to construct a tramway on the forty-four miles of flat road between Tarudant and Agadir for the carriage of thousands of tons of copper ore to the export vessels. The copper zone in Spain has a length of about 125 miles and a width of $15\frac{1}{2}$ miles. The ore in Spain has an average of 2 to 3 per cent. of copper, which is low; but, as it occurs in such large quantities, it can be profitably worked. We have reason to believe that the copper ore in Morocco would give much better results. In the year 1891 the late Sultan Moulay Hassan sent to the writer five samples of ore for analysis.

Messrs. Johnson and Matthey analysed these, giving the following percentages:

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SAMPLES.

| | No 1. | No. 2. | No. 3. | No. 4. |
|------------|-------|--------|--------|---------------------|
| Iron . . | 19.50 | 3.30 | 4.00 | 10.50 in 100 parts. |
| Lead . . | 8.90 | 8.95 | 6.40 | 14.30 „ |
| Copper . . | 6.50 | 13.60 | 13.70 | 8.80 „ |

These results of 6.50, 13.60, 13.70, and 8.80 per cent. of copper compare most favourably with the 2 to 3 per cent. of the Spanish ores.

The above samples were also found to contain the following weight of silver per ton of 2,240 lbs. weight of mineral :

| | No. 1. | No. 2. | No. 3. | No. 4. |
|------------|--------|--------|--------|--------|
| | ozs. | ozs. | ozs. | ozs. |
| Silver . . | 11.10 | 24.75 | 22.75 | 18.25 |

The fifth sample was galena, giving the following analysis :

| | |
|-------------|---------------|
| Lead . . | 86.01 |
| Sulphur . . | 13.54 |
| Iron . . | 25 |
| Silver . . | 20 |
| | <hr/> |
| | 100.00 parts. |

In these analyses we obtain some insight into the quality of the minerals of Morocco.

Saltpetre is abundant near Morocco city. The Moorish Government uses it in the manufacture of gunpowder, importing the sulphur from Sicily. Formerly many cargoes of this saltpetre were shipped to Europe.

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Traces of petroleum have been seen near Cape Juby.

Thus, in addition to serving Morocco as a screen against the blasts of the Sahara, the whole chain of the Atlas may be found to contain untold wealth.

As Agadir may play a great part in the future from which large cargoes of copper ore and sugar may, as in the past, be shipped, we may here quote Rohlfs, who says : " The River (Wad) Sus empties itself into a bay within a short distance of Agadir. This bay is the finest on the whole coast. There could be no more favourable spot for trade than Agadir."

This opinion is confirmed to the writer by Captain Taylor, commodore of Messrs. Forwood Bros. fleet of steamers trading with Morocco.

Rohlfs adds, again speaking of Tarudant :

" Then how rich the mines in the neighbourhood must be whence the natives, with their primitive mode of mining, get their copper. According to the natives not only do their mines produce copper, but also gold, silver, iron, and magnetic ironstone in large quantities."

Mr. Vice-Consul Scratchley, at Philippeville, Algeria, writes :

" I would like to draw attention to the marbles that can be obtained in this country. The quarries at Chemtoll produce the most beautiful onyx marbles in the world. The interior of the new town hall at Constantine is

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decorated with them ; the grand staircase and *salle des fêtes* are lavishly adorned with the most delicately-veined and coloured onyx. It is a great pity that these marbles are not better known."

Who shall say that Morocco does not possess equally fine marbles ?

As a matter of fact, there are some fine green marbles at Tebessa, which were brought from Morocco.

CHAPTER IV

MOROCCO AS A FIELD FOR EUROPEAN COLONISATION

It will strike the reader, after noting the foregoing descriptions, that Morocco would offer a fine field for immigration from Europe. With a salubrious climate, almost perfect, the heat never very oppressive, except in the far interior, the thermometer rarely ever falling below 45 degrees Fahrenheit, the coast-belt tempered by Atlantic breezes, it is indeed an ideal country.

Here are no volcanoes, no earthquakes, no floods, or blizzards, or cloud-bursts ; droughts are of rare occurrence, and these will disappear with the re-afforestation of the country ; nor is there any swampy ground to speak of.

At the moment of penning these lines, accounts are just to hand stating that copious rains have fallen all over Morocco in their due season, and bringing the promise of a year of plenty.

There are few wild animals on the plains and few venomous snakes. Locusts appear to have

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been exterminated from the land, at least for the present. Some years back the Moorish Government ordered the destruction of the eggs and young locusts, and nearly two thousand tons weight of these were taken out to sea and destroyed. Fevers are not frequent. There is no yellow fever, such as decimates every few years the population of French Senegambia, some six hundred miles south of Cape Bojador. Morocco is a land where tuberculosis is all but unknown.

With this salubrity of climate, and with all this agricultural and mineral wealth within sight, as it were, of the English Channel, can any one doubt its adaptability for colonisation from England and Europe generally, particularly from those centres, where great congestion of populations exists?

And as proof that there is ample room, let us compare the density of its populations with those of other countries :

| | Square miles. | Popula- tion. | Inhabitants per sq. mile. |
|-------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------------------|
| France . . . | 204,321 | 39,000,000 | 190.7 |
| Great Britain . . | 121,371 | 41,488,721 | 341.6 |
| Egypt proper . . | 33,600 | 9,734,405 | 750.05 |
| Algeria . . . | 184,387 | 4,739,331 | 25.70 |
| Morocco . . . | 300,000 | 10,000,000 | 33.30 |

With only 33.30 of population per square mile, Morocco could comfortably maintain a million or more colonists gradually introduced. Our neigh-

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bours across the Channel do not lend themselves to colonising as we do. Why should they? Their people love France and object to be expatriated. They possess one of the loveliest, most fertile, and most advantageously placed lands in the world, with three seas from which to draw moisture and healthful breezes, a land nearly twice the area of Great Britain and Ireland, and with two and a half millions less of population, with a soil producing annual wealth in agriculture of a value of over five hundred and fifty million pounds sterling, against Great Britain's production of less than three hundred millions.

What incentive has such a nation to leave such a land?

After drawing on her people for her large army, her navy, her officials, and other occupations, France has need of all her sons to remain at home and till her fertile fields. There are four million heads of agricultural establishments with three millions of labourers and servants; and these, with their families, make a total of nearly eighteen millions of French people dependent upon agriculture.

France produces yearly about £50,000,000 value of milk alone, which is not far short of half the total value of coal and minerals which Great Britain extracts from her mines. It has taken the nation seventy-three years to spare 318,137 of

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French settlers in Algeria. Still, with a stiffening of British colonists scattered over Morocco, it might be an inducement for a fair number of Frenchmen to settle in the land, living together amicably with those of another race, and almost within sight of their beloved France. Morocco is not as Australia or New Zealand, away at the Antipodes, or even as South Africa, a voyage of twenty days' distance. It can be reached within seven days by sea, or four days overland, from London, and three days by sea from Marseilles, or overland through Spain. A long sea voyage can be avoided. In the overland route there are but four hours' sea journey from England and three hours from France. The British colonist would be almost within sight of Gibraltar, and the Frenchman but twenty hours from Nemours or Oran in Algeria.

What facilities there would be for yearly visits home! what facilities for the colonists to send their children to schools in their native lands! No expatriation this; no severe winters as in Canada; no torrid heats as in the United States; no such sudden changes of temperature during the twenty-four hours as in America! And with a joint Franco-British control the lives and property of the colonists would be safe. What a garden Morocco would become, with British and French farmers working side by

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side in good fellowship, each teaching the other his methods of colonisation and agriculture! This would work for the good of both nations. Our neighbours are clever. We can learn plenty from them, as they can from us. When they first went to Algeria, that country was so unhealthy that the death-rate was eighty per thousand. They drained the marshes; the country is now free from malaria; and the death-rate has fallen to fourteen per thousand. They drained Lake Halluck, reclaiming 34,000 acres of good land for growing the finest quality of cotton; and at one stroke they banished both ague and mosquitoes.

What could not be made of Morocco with, say, half a million British and French farmer colonists tilling the land? They would introduce European implements and European methods of cultivation, setting the natives an example of intelligent husbandry.

Mr. Vice-Consul Scratchley, of Phillipeville, remarks that the richer Arabs are now realising the advantages to be got by using the French plough. Sixty ploughs were forwarded from Phillipeville to sixty different addresses and all Arabs. What a vista is opened up of cotton-fields, tobacco-fields, sugar-cane estates, indigo plant growing, with experts brought in to assist the colonists in their management! Natives from the Southern States of America for cotton-growing,

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from Cuba for the cultivation of tobacco and sugar, from India and South America for indigo planting and manufacture, and, later on, from Brazil or the West Coast of Africa to conduct the experiment for the introduction of the India-rubber tree. Here the pine-apple could be grown under glass without artificial heat, as in the Azores, or even probably in the open. What a field for improving the breed of horses, mules, cattle and sheep, for the improvement of wool and goat's hair, introducing the Angora breed and other high-class animals! Seventy years back the wools of the Cape of Good Hope were about on a parity of price with those of Morocco. While these latter have remained stationary as to quality, those of the Cape have been scientifically improved by breeding, and now realise prices far above those of Morocco.

Our French neighbours are very skilful in the sinking of artesian wells.

In a report entitled "*Les Forages Artésiens en Algérie*," published by the Government at Algiers in 1903, there is much interesting information as to the work carried out in this artesian well-boring. It appears that in the province of Constantine alone, between the years 1856 and 1902, the total borings equalled in depth some 38 kilometres or about 24 miles, producing about 67,000 gallons of water per minute. On the

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River Ghir the result of these borings led to an increase of nine villages doubling their population in this period, with an increase of 271,212 date palms, and 50,000 other fruit-trees. The total number of date-palm trees in this oasis being 630,000, of an estimated value of 10,000,000 francs. But the numberless streamlets and small tributary rivers in Morocco, not to speak of the large rivers, would materially assist the colonists in irrigating their estates.

Our French fellow colonists could develop the growth of the grape, and there are years of shortage in France when they can absorb all that they can obtain. The exports of wine from Algeria to France in 1902 were valued at £2,300,000.

Morocco would be the one country in the world where Frenchmen and Englishmen would be living together side by side under a dual control of their respective Governments, and working for one common object. It would be an admirable experiment.

It would be an excellent site for our leading horticulturists to establish branch Jardins d'Essai, where they could rear forests of palms and other exotics for the English market, and where they could conduct experiments with all tropical and sub-tropical plants, flowers, seeds, &c.

Colza could be extensively grown.

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Experiments might be made with the Cacao theobroma, which produces the cocoa of commerce. This has been introduced further down the West African coast, and it might flourish in Southern Morocco.

There is a fine Jardin d'Essai outside the city of Algiers, but the climatic conditions there are not equal to those of South Morocco, which is three or four degrees nearer the tropics.

Mr. Stutfield, who visited Morocco in 1883, thus recommends British colonisation in the land :

"We should have the nucleus of a colony in Morocco, which would expand under our genius for colonisation until we had at our very doors a corn-producing country, which would render England, with even a doubled population, independent of the rest of the world. The bulk of our corn now comes from India and America, of which the nearest is 3000 miles, whereas Morocco is but four days' sail from our shores. We could make three voyages to Morocco for one to distant parts, and there would, in time of war, be less risk of capture."

"That Morocco will ever become a British colony seems hardly within the bounds of possibility, though a more valuable one she could not possess . . . and pressure could more effectually (this referring to our exchanging Gibraltar for Ceuta) be brought to bear on the Sultan to induce him to institute those internal reforms which are so urgently needed."

"England, the great civilising agent of the world, could surely be engaged in no worthier task than taking the lead

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in getting this magnificent country opened up to European enterprise and capital."

An additional reason for the need of introducing European colonists into the country, if its agricultural possibilities are to be fully developed, lies in the fact that the native agriculturist, so soon as he makes a modest competency or effects a saving through a few years' exemption from taxation, refuses to work as he formerly did, even abstaining from supplying the centres of population with the necessary produce for the people's consumption. He prefers to invest his savings in the purchase of horses and rifles.

We have given extracts from writers who oppose our relinquishing our hold on Morocco—we feel bound in common fairness to give the opposite views of others.

Sir J. D. Hooker says :

"The one reasonable prospect of improvement in the condition of Morocco is to be sought in its passing under the control of a civilised State strong enough to overcome speedily the inevitable resistance of the Moorish ruling class, and advanced enough to consult the welfare of the people it undertakes to govern. If we ask what European State is by character and circumstances best fitted for such an undertaking the answer must be France. The French are not successful colonists, nor have the economic results of the annexation of Algeria been as brilliant as might have been expected. But in Morocco colonisation is not to be sought or desired."

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To this Captain Warren replies :

"With every respect for so high an opinion as that referred to I believe that colonisation is what Morocco requires. France does not disguise from herself that she has lamentably failed in her fifty years of colonisation in Algeria, which has been a source of expense and trouble without a corresponding benefit to herself or to nations at large, and it is to England I would assign not the conquest but the colonisation of Morocco."

We agree with Captain Warren's views, but we also have to confess that, since he wrote twenty-three years ago, the French have greatly improved and developed their colony of Algeria, though more in the interests of their own people, it is true, without developing a corresponding improvement in the status of the native population.

In fact, they have profited by studying our methods of colonisation ; and if Morocco should now become colonised, as we have suggested, by British and French settlers, the latter will still further improve by coming in contact with our expert colonists. As to Sir J. D. Hooker's opinion that France should take up the regeneration of Morocco, we can only regard it as the result of that distinguished botanist's absorbing labours at Kew preventing his devoting more of his lifetime to so complex a study as Morocco.

It grieves us more to see another advocate for France being allowed to dominate in Morocco.

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In a late number of the *National Review* Mr. W. B. Harris, the *Times* correspondent at Tangier, recommends this country to delegate this mission to France, provided we can safeguard the passage of the Straits.

All of us who have the pleasure of Mr. Harris' acquaintance hold him in the greatest respect. Many of us who have visited many parts of the Empire look upon him as a most intrepid traveller, venturing into corners of the land where we have never penetrated. He has risked his life in these wanderings on more than one occasion; and his dangerous visit to Sheshawan, and the still more venturesome journey to Tafilat, his delightful account of a visit to Agurai, the renegade settlement near Mequinez, all increase the respect for him of his more modest fellow travellers in the land; but we regret his giving such advice to his countrymen, advice which, considering his experience of Morocco and his position in the country, might be accepted by them as judicious. Mr. Harris has never given his mind to commerce, but it is inexplicable to us how he proposes to safeguard the passage of the Straits. He is, comparatively speaking, a young man, and we cannot but think, should his advice be acted upon, that he may live to see the day when he will repent having taken this side of the question.

CHAPTER V

A MOROCCO RIVIERA

WE have reviewed the political, the strategical and the commercial sides of the Morocco question, and we have studied the agricultural and mineral resources of the land, as also its suitability as a field for European colonisation. It has struck us that it has great possibilities of becoming a health resort for Europeans for both winter and summer residences.

France and Italy possess their Riviera on the northern coast of the Mediterranean. Algiers, Cairo and Malaga are also much frequented health resorts. Why not an Atlantic Riviera?

What a fine stretch of coast, of, say, three hundred or four hundred miles, Morocco offers for this purpose, washed by the Atlantic and fanned by ozone-laden breezes coming over three thousand miles of ocean! It would be a Riviera habitable the whole year round; not like that of the Mediterranean, where, owing to excessive heat, invalids are unable to live for seven or eight months of the year.

A Morocco Riviera

Its only rivals in the neighbourhood would be the Canary Islands and Madeira. The latter is a journey of but a day-and-a-half from Mazagan, on the Morocco coast ; but the space in all these islands must be limited. There are scarcely any roads in Madeira, and the climate is relaxing to the healthy. The Canary Islands in the colder months have a daily range of temperature from 10 to 17 degrees. In Morocco no such wide variation takes place within the twenty-four hours, the temperature being more equable. Moreover, a sea voyage lasting five or seven days is necessary in the case of Madeira and the Canaries, whereas, as already explained, with the overland journey to Morocco but three or four hours of sea are needed.

On the Morocco coast, the most refreshing north-east trade-winds prevail throughout the warm summer months from April until October, appreciably tempering the heat ; and during the winter months, the warmer south-west trade-winds help to maintain an equable warm temperature.

England has no Riviera in southern climes north of the equator.

Do not let us miss this opportunity of being partly interested in this magnificent Atlantic resort, which may become one of the finest in the world, and not landlocked as those in the Mediterranean.

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What a sanatorium it would become for the jaded officers and men of our armies, and of those of our French neighbours, men who uphold the honour of their countries in climates so pestilential as those of Senegal and French Guinea, and those, but little less unhealthy, of the Congo, Sierra Leone, the Gold and Ivory Coasts, Dahomey, Ashantee, Uganda, and the malarial climates of the countries bordering on the Central African rivers!

What a change for our steamers, which now pass up and down the Morocco coast, at night, in a darkness as that of the pit, to steam by town after town brilliantly lighted with electric arc lamps!

As to desert winds, Morocco, especially on its coast belt, is wonderfully free from them.

We cannot do better, while on this subject, than again quote Sir J. D. Hooker, who, being a medical man as well as a renowned botanist, is entitled to our respect when talking on matters of climate and health.

Speaking of Mogador he says :

“The mean temperature in the hottest year, 1867, was 68.65° Fahrenheit.

“The mean temperature in the coldest year, 1872, was 65.75° Fahrenheit.

“Highest temperature observed, 87.8° Fahrenheit.

“Lowest temperature observed, 50.7° Fahrenheit.

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“Mean temperature for eight years (still speaking of Mogador) :

IN SUMMER.

| | |
|-----------------|------------------|
| “June | 70.8° Fahrenheit |
| “July | 71.1° „ |
| “August | 71.2° „ |

IN WINTER.

| | |
|-------------------|-------------------|
| “December | 61.4° Fahrenheit. |
| “January | 61.2° „ |
| “February | 61.8° „ |

“Showing a difference of only 10° Fahrenheit scale between the hottest and coldest months.”

Sir J. D. Hooker continues :

“If the climate of Mogador be compared with that of such places as Algiers, Madeira (Funchal) and Cairo, which have nearly the same mean winter temperature, it will be found that in each of those places the mercury is occasionally liable to fall considerably below 50°, and that the summer heat is greatly in excess of the limits that suit delicate constitutions, the mean of the three hottest months being 80° at Algiers, about 82° at Funchal, and 85° at Cairo. It will help to complete the impression as to the Mogador climate to say that rain falls on an average only forty-five days in the year, and that per 1000 observations the proportions are :

785 clear; 175 clouded; 40 foggy,
a fog appearing in the morning, but disappearing before mid-day. The desert wind is scarcely felt at Mogador, on an average it blows on about two days in each year, and on these occasions it has much less effect on the

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thermometer than it has in Madeira, doubtless owing to the protective effects of the chain of the great Atlas.

“When one comes to consider how it happens that a place possessing such extraordinary natural advantages has not become frequented by the class of invalids to whom climate offers the only chance of recovering health and prolonging life, the obvious answer is that invalids cannot live on air alone, and that few persons in that condition have the courage to select a place where they may reasonably expect much difficulty in procuring the comforts and even the necessities of life, competent advice, and some reasonable opportunity for occupation and amusement. . . .”

These words of Sir J. D. Hooker were written twenty-five years ago. To-day there are several medical men residing in Mogador. As to the drawbacks and inconveniences, these will all be remedied when the improvement of Morocco shall be taken in hand.

Should some invalids have a predilection for the Mediterranean as a health resort, there would be for them the port of Tetuan, belonging to Morocco in that sea, and a town more romantically situated it would be difficult to find anywhere.

Sir J. D. Hooker, in speaking of the currents on the coast of Morocco, also says :

“It is clear that in this continual flow of cool water from the north-west we have a cause which cannot fail to produce its effect on the climate of the adjoining coasts. . . . It must be noted that although the summer tempera-

A Morocco Riviera

ture of the interior of Morocco is much higher than that of Mogador, it yet falls far short of what is found in places lying in the same latitude in North Africa and Asia. . . ."

Then, speaking of Tangier, he continues :

" Its nearness to Europe has made it the residence of the representatives of the principal civilised powers, and its admirable climate has attracted invalids from Gibraltar and elsewhere. . . . Nothing is more rare than to find a country where neither the natives nor foreign visitors have any complaint to make against the climate, and in that respect Morocco is unique."

CHAPTER VI

THE CAUSES OF THE PRESENT CRISIS IN MOROCCO

THE present volume has been written mainly with the object of opening the eyes of the people of this country to the value, present and potential, of the Empire of Morocco—a value much enhanced by its position as a land of almost tropical luxuriance, situated at no great distance from the mouth of the English Channel.

It has also been written with the object of endeavouring to raise public interest in this question, so that not the slightest preponderance in the management of Moroccan affairs be conceded to France alone.

Whether the operations resulting from this contemplated concession lead to “pacific penetration” or “sphere of influence,” the result will be the same, and the consequences to this country and to the other trading nations of the world will be equally disastrous. If it be true that immediate foreign intervention has been decided on, we

The Causes of the Present Crisis

consider that we have made out a case for the nations to insist on the association of Great Britain and France in the administration.

Having done this, we were under the impression that we had finished the task. But it has been pointed out that our plea would be incomplete without a brief reference to some of the causes which have brought about the present crisis in the affairs of Morocco.

This we feel disinclined to do in any detail.

It would ill become us, after many years of connection with the Moorish Court, to refer to such instances of maladministration as may have come under our notice, whether or not they contributed to bring about the present trouble in Morocco.

Mr. A. J. Dawson, writing in the *Fortnightly Review* of January of the present year, discussed many of these causes, and, if all he sets down has been truly reported to him, as to the exploiting of the Shereefian Treasury "by foreign commercial attachés and a scheming tribe of European adventurers of all sorts and grades, many of whom have reaped a rich harvest," then all we have to say is that we do not envy these people their conscience when they look round and contemplate the havoc they have wrought and their share in the wreckage of a dynasty dating back some three hundred years and of an Empire nearly a thousand

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years old. No doubt, the presence of these foreigners at the Court must have roused resentment in the minds of the natives, who maintain that if the Treasury is to be depleted, it is they themselves who should be beneficiaries. They seek to justify this contention by the argument that whatever sums they may themselves absorb from the Imperial Treasury, these remain in the land and are circulated for the benefit of the population, whereas whatever is taken by the foreigner is invested abroad and is thus lost to Morocco for ever.

Morocco they say is poor and has need to retain its own, while Europe is rich and does not therefore need to impoverish Morocco. The recourse to loans from Europe, referred to by Mr. Dawson, confirms their complaint as to the impoverishment of the Empire, and adds to the general discontent.

Only on one former occasion had a loan been contracted, in the year 1862, for half a million sterling, for the purpose of ridding the land of the presence of the Spanish troops in the occupation of Tetuan.

We prefer to leave these matters to Mr. Dawson, and refer those readers who desire further information on the subject to his article in the *Fortnightly*.

But to our mind there is one further cause

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which has roused the fanaticism of the natives and to which we will confine our remarks with all the less reluctance because the adoption by the ruler of the land of the policy which has brought about such discontent redounds greatly to his credit, if not to his insight into the conservative characteristics of his people, and of the insidious opposition he would have to encounter from France.

This dates back from the year 1901, when that needless and costly Embassy of El Mnibhi was accredited to the Court of St. James.

Rumour has it that our Foreign Office impressed upon the ambassador the vital importance of forthwith introducing various material improvements into Morocco—advice most commendable, but fatal in its precipitancy. The British officials in the suite of the ambassador should have explained to Lord Lansdowne that Morocco was not yet ripe for the sudden introduction into the land of the railroad, the locomotive, the electric telegraph, and other modern improvements. They should have pointed out that there were many more pressing internal reforms to be taken in hand, many abuses to be removed in order to pave the way for the subsequent introduction of these modern European institutions, just as the agriculturist has to prepare the land upon which he proposes to raise his crops. No crop can

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possibly flourish if sown in fields overgrown with weeds.

This precautionary course was not adopted, and the Ambassador El Mnibhi, well intentioned, but inexperienced, returned to Morocco primed with zeal to carry out the reform programme.

He found a ready and willing coadjutor in the person of his master the Sultan, a young, enlightened, and well-meaning ruler, certainly far ahead of his people in his appreciation of the advantages of modern civilised methods. Every emporium of the West had, for years past, been ransacked for objects novel, useful, beautiful, or costly, for the delectation of the young Sovereign, and it is not to be wondered at if the contemplation of these marvels of European handicraft should have awakened in him a desire to introduce improvements among his own people in order to raise their status among the nations.

The desire was most laudable ; it was in the mode of carrying it out that his advisers were at fault.

Any wise counsellor near the throne would have suggested a more cautious policy, but unfortunately such counsellors just then were lacking. It may be that these two zealous reformers, the Sultan and his Minister, all powerful as they were in the land, had some misgivings as to what would be the probable effect upon the fanatical population

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of the Empire of the introduction of these innovations and reforms, and even to a greater degree upon that nation, France, which alone among the nations of Europe had for the last half-century opposed the projection of any reforms which would have tended to place Morocco on the upward grade of progress. If any such doubts passed through their minds, they would probably have comforted themselves with the idea that, as the line of action they were about to follow was the outcome of recommendations made by the British Foreign Office, they might certainly reckon upon the moral support, if nothing stronger, of the British Government in carrying out the programme and on some measure of protection from any selfish opposition on the part of France. This conviction was, as a matter of fact, openly stated in the precincts of the Court.

Former rulers of Morocco had always resisted the introduction of reforms, which, it must be confessed, were pressed upon them in a more judicious manner than in the present case, and well would it have been for Moulai Abdelaziz had he followed the example of his predecessors with a similar *non possumus*.

The proper and wiser course for him to have pursued would have been to address a note to the Powers of Europe, affirming his earnest and sincere desire to introduce genuine reforms into his Empire

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slowly and judiciously ; but in view of the need of overcoming the fanaticism of his subjects, he appealed to the Powers to strengthen his hands, and to afford him co-operation and support, and impressing upon them the need, which was even of greater importance, of unanimity on the part of all the Powers without exception in their attitude on this question. He knew full well, and the representatives of the Powers in Morocco also knew full well, though he could not give it expression, the scarcely concealed opposition for the last half-century offered by France against all proposals to introduce improvements into the land.

Those of our readers who have any doubt as to this obstruction should read the life of the late Sir John Drummond Hay, where they will find ample evidence of the fact. Had the Sultan adopted this course, and had Europe generally consented to assist so willing and well-meaning a ruler in this praiseworthy work, it is scarcely to be imagined that France would have stood out against it, and so brought down upon herself the censure of the nations of the world.

The writer of the present volume when at the Court at Fez in the year 1895, recommended in a modest manner the adoption of various reforms to the Regent Ben Moussa, who received the advice most enthusiastically. Subsequently, however, he stated that owing to the opposition to such reforms

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by the representatives of another European Power (which he thought it wiser not to name), he found it impossible to adopt them, and found himself helpless in the matter, especially as it had been pointed out to him that the writer had no official mandate from the British Government.

When about again to proceed to the Court at Morocco city in 1899, the writer took the precaution of communicating with the late Lord Salisbury explaining the obstructions he had encountered in 1895, and suggesting a plan by which, on his approaching visit, his hands might be strengthened when again recommending reforms.

Lord Salisbury kindly communicated with the British Minister at Tangier, requesting him to render what assistance he could in the matter, and on his arrival at the Court the writer found that the bare knowledge of this semi-official assistance had the effect of removing a great portion of any obstruction, and the Regent faithfully promised to forthwith carry out many of the recommendations, amongst which was one that the Sultan should make an appeal to all the Powers, enlisting their unanimous co-operation and support with respect to his taking steps to introduce reforms into his Empire.

Unfortunately the fates were not propitious, for the Regent died early in 1900, and so the opportunity was lost. It is to be noted that while the

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Regent Ben Moussa feared the opposition to the introduction of all improvements on the part of France, the French in their turn feared his power, for it was only in December 1899, when his days on earth appeared to be numbered, that the French troops advanced on the oases of Tuat, Gourrara, and Tidikilt, although ten years had elapsed since Lord Salisbury had recognised those regions as being within the French sphere of influence.

When the reforming spirit had infected the Sultan and his minister, our neighbours across the Channel became alarmed. They could not with indifference see the obstructive policy of fifty years thwarted at the eleventh hour, and all the obstructive tactics of the Ordegas and Ferauds and others become stultified.

A reformed Morocco was not to their taste, and it was not to be tolerated, for it would prove fatal to their designs. Mr. Budgett Meakin gives an account in his "Moorish Empire" of how France succeeded in wrecking the British mission under Sir Charles Euan Smith.

Something had to be done in the present case. An insurrection was fomented from Algiers, possibly not by the Government, but by some of the societies bent on the absorption of Morocco.

An obscure master of legerdemain, the Pretender, was found, and made to raise the standard of rebellion.

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This man paid his way with French gold and silver, a currency long absent from the Bazaars in Morocco, but which in certain districts was now found to be circulating very freely. Report has it that his troops were officered by Europeans, the very name of the chief officer was mentioned and the European military tactics pursued by him warrant this report.

The armies, which the Sultan found himself compelled to raise in order to oppose the rebellion, further depleted the Shereefian Treasury, and increased the unrest in the Empire.

Rumours were industriously disseminated throughout the land of the approaching advent of the railroad, the locomotive and the electric telegraph.

The Pretender raved about the introduction of these devices of Sheitan, he raved against the presence at the Court of the hordes of Europeans. Poor tool! as if his instigators, should they ever become installed in the land, would not themselves be the first to introduce those "abominations": abominations only so long as their introduction was conducted under British auspices, but "salutary improvements" when introduced under the auspices of France. And really, if Loyola's doctrine, that the end justifies the means, is to be accepted, then in the event of our Government handing a preponderating influence in Morocco

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over to France, our neighbours will seek to justify their unrighteous obstructive attitude of the last half-century as having been the means of securing to them the magnificent heritage of this most desirable Empire.

For who can doubt but that Morocco would now be in a prosperous and peaceful condition, had all the Powers, including France, insisted years back upon the improvement of the Empire?

There would, in that case, have been no necessity to introduce outside control into the land beyond the mandate of Europe insisting on its behests being carried out. There would be no question now of granting any preponderating hand to France, or to any other Power. The danger to the Straits and their free navigation would never have been threatened.

It is scarcely credible that our Government will betray the young Sovereign who was so willing to place himself under the tutelage of Great Britain. His readiness to adopt all the suggestions of the Foreign Office has resulted in bringing his Empire into the *impasse* in which it now finds itself, and this is just the time that the British Government should stand by him and afford him strong moral support instead of abandoning him to France, whose officials will ever remember against him his predilections for Britain and for everything British. If this cruel desertion of the

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young Sultan should take place, well might Moulay Abdelaziz exclaim, "Save me from my friends."

We will now endeavour to show how the senseless proposals to introduce at once the railed road, the locomotive and the electric telegraph into the land, have gone far towards arousing the fanaticism of the population and increasing the unrest in the Empire. We would ask the people of this country to suspend any inclination to judge harshly the people of Morocco for their opposition to the introduction of these modern appliances of civilisation, until they study the subject in all its bearings. We would ask them to remember the doings in Lancashire at the end of the eighteenth century when Hargreaves and Arkwright for inventing the spinning jenny and the spinning frame had to fly for their lives from Lancashire to Nottingham from the incensed operatives of the former county, nor were the operatives alone in their hatred against all innovations—for at the burning of Arkwright's mill later on, the military, the police and the magistrates looked on apathetically without moving a finger to stay the mischief.

We ask them to recall to memory the fierce opposition in England to George Stephenson and his locomotives between the years 1820 and 1830. Let them read in the Creevy Papers the hatred with which even cultured men regarded the first locomotive and the fears aroused by a speed of

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twenty miles an hour. Had the machines of Hargreaves and Arkwright at their first introduction possessed the power which they have reached to-day, and had Stephenson's engine, when first introduced, the speed of sixty miles an hour, the riots in the land would have been far more serious.

Here then is the error of these ardent reformers in proposing at once to introduce into Morocco these contrivances in their present high state of development. There is not a single decent road worthy the name in the whole of Morocco, all being bridle-paths beaten down by the tread of animals, yet the conservative Moors are asked to leap from these primitive tracks to the railed road. With the exception of a few in the possession of the Government, for the carriage of military stores, and travelling at the pace of some six miles an hour, there are no wheeled vehicles in all the land, yet the people are asked to at once pass from pack animals to the locomotive, from wheels revolving at the rate of six miles an hour to those revolving at a speed of sixty. These intending reformers, who have so aroused the hostility of the people of Morocco, should set themselves the task of gradually educating them from small beginnings to greater things. Let them first construct proper roads and place upon them wheeled vehicles, drawn by horses and

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mules, for the carriage of passengers and merchandise.

Later on, they can place upon these roads the motor-car and the traction-engine. Let it be borne in mind that the French had been established in Algeria for forty years before they opened the first railway in the Colony.

Above all let them postpone the laying of the rail and the suspending of the telegraph wire until the very last. In a poor country under misrule these rails and wires would offer great temptation to the poorer class of natives.

When we consider that a couple of rails torn up from the track or a couple of dozen yards of wire torn down from the telegraph poles, taken to the nearest farrier would be the means of providing both the culprit and the farrier with sufficient provision for the wants of their families for weeks, we had almost said months, so modest are their requirements, it will be conceded that such a country is not yet ripe for these innovations.

The breathing-time for which we are pleading would, when the improvement of the country under joint control had proceeded apace, increase both the demand for labour and its wages from the miserable pittance of to-day, and so remove the temptation for evil-doing to which its poorer inhabitants are now subjected.

It might be thought that the tearing up of rails

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or the cutting down of wires would be a somewhat difficult operation beyond the power of unskilled hands. Let the reader disabuse his mind on this score, for there will always be European traders on the coast, ready to import the necessary implements, and to assist the nefarious in such unlawful work. Forty years ago, a sudden demand sprang up in Morocco for three-eighth-inch link iron chain for the tethering of horses and other animals at night. The Arab found that the horse-dealer could stealthily cut the tethering cords, and make off with the animals in the dead of night without being heard. It was suggested to him to replace the hempen cords with iron chain, the clanking of which latter would be sufficient to awaken the owner of the animals and to foil the thieves.

Orders poured into London for hundreds of tons weight of these chains, but in time the demand fell off as suddenly as it had arisen. The mystery was soon solved; some low-grade European trader on the coast had imported an implement suitable for cutting the links of these chains with the greatest silence, and the hempen cord was again adopted, and so the horse-stealer came again by his own, of which the device of chains had threatened to deprive him.

Let these reformers who endeavour to prevail on the Sultan to carry out their untimely sugges-

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tions find vent for their zeal in advising the construction of bridges over the rivers.

Caravans of merchandise, as well as travellers, have often to remain in idleness for weeks in winter time by the side of a river, waiting for the waters to subside, often spoiling the goods, and nearly invariably losing their market.

No mountaineer would raise his gun against the builders engaged in such bridge construction, even were they Europeans. If these people are really anxious to improve the country, let them agitate for more lighters and steam-launches in the eight busy ports of Morocco.

On some occasions there are in these ports more steamers than there are lighters for unloading and loading them.

In the important port of Larache there are only five lighters, each with a carrying capacity of ten tons. During the early months of the present year, there were stored in Gibraltar, weather-bound, some three thousand tons of merchandise, destined for this port of Larache, awaiting transshipment on the first appearance of fine weather. In order to discharge this amount of tonnage, the five lighters available would each have to perform sixty journeys to and from the importing steamer.

Let these reformers press for the construction of more store-room at the water-ports, for the convenient housing of imported goods from abroad,

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and for the 'storing of the country produce, sent down for shipment preparatory to the expected arrival of the outgoing steamer. Such is now more often than not stored in the open, exposed to possible rains, which in the case of grain and perishable goods, means serious deterioration, if not total destruction.

Thus, water coming in contact with eggs renders them useless. We could continue giving a long list of pressing needs in the country, but we might weary the reader.

The wonders of Nature, wireless telegraphy, the Röntgen rays, radium, and other marvels, are being unfolded every year, startling the peoples of Europe. Do not let us startle too suddenly the simple folk of Morocco.

They might not bear it so well.

Another cause which in a measure is accountable for the impoverishment of the Imperial Exchequer, is the non-payment for the last two years of the internal taxes levied on the agricultural population. The older mode of collection was based on Koranic law, and was no doubt administered with great injustice.

This was changed for a more equitable manner of collection, but the absence of religious sanction appears to have induced the peasantry to evade payment. In common fairness it must be confessed that the new system suggested by the

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reformers and adopted by the Sultan was most beneficial and judicious, its object being to put a stop to the extortions of the country Governors. But, however well meant, it has encountered at the hands of the fellahin the same reception that awaits all attempts to ameliorate the condition of the population in this backward land. It is also whispered, although it appears almost incredible, that some foreign influence has been at work to ensure the failure of this beneficial measure, though it passes human understanding to account for any reason for such action.

But if a Dual Control be introduced, all these sinister and underhand obstructions must be abandoned, else the Powers of Europe will have to intervene.

This chapter cannot be more appropriately closed than by quoting Lord Salisbury's words in a speech delivered at Glasgow, in May 1891 :

"But with respect to all these Islamic populations, we must always remember that they are Mahommedans. We must not attempt to impose on them the development or the exact growth of the West.

"They will develop in their manner and after their nature. If you have got a good larch tree you cannot by any contrivance make it grow like an oak, and you will only spoil your larch and cover yourself with ridicule if you attempt it.

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“Their growth is different from ours, and it is only by suffering them to follow the law of their nature in all legitimate lines that we can hope for the greatest perfection of which that nature is capable.”

CHAPTER VII

SPAIN

IN the *National Review* of February 1904, there is an article on Morocco by his Excellency Senator Eugenio Montero Rios, President of the Spanish Senate. This is practically a reply to an article in the same Review of the previous July entitled: "The Colonial Controversies between France and England," by Eugène Etienne, Vice-President of the Chamber of Deputies, President of the group of Foreign and Colonial Affairs. That Spain, on whose behalf Señor Montero Rios makes a passionate appeal, should consider herself entitled to a voice in any movement for the regeneration of Morocco is perfectly intelligible. The two countries are all but contiguous.

Their histories are interwoven for a period extending over twelve centuries. It needs but little discrimination on the part of any one travelling in the country to distinguish at a glance between the Gothic and Moorish type of Spaniard.

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The Spanish language abounds in Moriscan words, much more so than does Arabic with Castilian. The reason for this may be attributed to the Moors having held sway for seven or eight centuries over the greater part of Spain, thereby grafting much of their language on that of the country, whereas the rule of Spain in Morocco has been confined to the coast towns only. It is greatly to the credit of Spain that she has held tenaciously to her possession of Melilla since the year 1496, about the time that her adopted son fared forth to add a new world to her crown, and also to that of Ceuta since 1580, that land having been taken originally by Portugal in 1415, on which occasion Prince Henry, the Navigator, son of an English mother, so distinguished himself. Spain held Ceuta in spite of the many sieges which it had had to withstand, notably one of twenty-five years' duration by the Sultan Moulai Ismael. Her persistence in this respect contrasts most favourably with the unwise abandonment of Tangier by England after only twenty-three years occupation. It is a sad page in English history, the giving up of that valuable strategic point at the gate of the Mediterranean, only in part compensated by the capture of Gibraltar twenty years later.

Spain has within the past year and a half lent £300,000 to the Sultan of Morocco, France and

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England having each lent a similar amount. The Spaniards are a chivalrous nation, and it is to be regretted that the relations between them and the people of Great Britain are not of a more friendly character. Señor Montero Rios refers to the greater sympathy shown by Frenchmen towards his country in comparison with the

“asperity bordering on hostility which characterises the attitude of a section of the British public towards Spain. While France flatters us, English publicists never let an opportunity pass of manifesting towards us a type of ill-will.”

Señor Montero Rios quotes the following passage from the French paper, *La France* :

“As far as we Frenchmen are concerned, we prefer to see Tangier and the whole Empire of Morocco in the hands of our neighbours on the other side of the Pyrenees than in those of our neighbours across the Channel, or in the hands of our enemies of Berlin.”

The English would rather see Tangier in the power of Spain than in that of Germany or France. But, for all this flattery, Señor Montero Rios points out that the Spanish nation has its suspicions that these French protestations are not so disinterested as they appear on the surface. He quotes Señor Canovas del Castillo as saying: “If ever we have to defend our Moroccan frontier the defence will

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be made at the Pyrenees." In refusing to accept a recommendation made by Señor Ordega, the French Minister to Morocco, that Spain should occupy the Riff coast and Tangier, Señor Montero Rios says :

"Spain maintained an attitude of prudence and correctness, not only because she had taken to heart the phrase, 'Timeo Danaos et dona ferentes,' but for the reason that in any adventurous territorial expansion in the neighbourhood of our African possessions, which we were urged to make, the French Republic, or some other Power, would indubitably obtain for itself a corresponding increase of influence which would compromise the integrity of the Empire of Morocco, and possibly have a deciding influence on future developments."

Doubtless Señor Montero Rios must know what has happened in the hinterland of those four hundred miles of the Rio d'Oro coast belonging to Spain between Capes Bojador and Blanco.

In the whole of that hinterland there is but one fertile region worth having, namely, the Sultanate of Adrar. Nearly all the rest is sand.

This country of Adrar is for the greater part indisputably in the hinterland of the Spanish coast line, yet France has stretched forth her hand and has claimed it as being within the French sphere of influence. She has taken the kernel and left the shell for Spain.

So much for the friendship of France !

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Señor Montero Rios deprecates a leaning either towards the French Republic or towards the United Kingdom, as being equally disastrous to Spanish interests. He says :

“If our heart and our blood impel us in the direction of France, our head and our interest would make us turn towards England.”

He scouts the idea of a Dual Control or Protectorate, owing to the fact that

“the interests of France and England in Morocco are antagonistic and incompatible, and that the existing harmony must unavoidably end in discord if and when one of these two great Powers take steps to secure a position of preponderating authority which must ultimately imply the establishment of a commercial monopoly and the acquisition of a controlling influence in the Mediterranean.”

Here we reply that, as Trustees of the Empire on behalf of United Europe, France and England should sink their respective interests and not permit them to intrude in the work of regeneration of the Empire.

The nations are aware that France's interests lie in the direction of ultimate possession of the country, and of, in time, closing its doors against the commerce of the nations. They also know that England does not covet one square mile of the Empire, and that her interests and her anxiety

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are all bound up in maintaining its independence and the open door for all time to the commerce of the world; and for these reasons England is the country best suited to guard the interests of United Europe and therefore to be appointed France's co-trustee in the land.

Señor Montero Rios adds that a mere suspicion of the intention of a European Power to establish a Protectorate over the descendants of the Prophet would involve a general rising of the Believers, the fall of the Sultan, civil war and anarchy.

After weighing the various alternatives Señor Montero Rios comes to the conclusion that we must fall back on the *status quo*, and the maintenance of the integrity of the Empire. But he continues :

" It must be a *status quo* modified by a certain progressive tendency which will lead in the direction of freedom of trade, of the neutralisation of Tangier, and of a gradual development of civilisation in Morocco, which neither can nor ought to be initiated nor controlled by one Power alone, but must be under the guidance of all the Powers acting in concert with Spain, as she deserves to be in the place of honour, in the van of the march of civilisation."

Part of this last sentence bears out the contention advanced in these pages, that the control should not be in the hands of one single Power. Whether it is to be dual or triple, by

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the inclusion of Spain, would be a matter for arrangement.

The term Protectorate has not been suggested in these pages. All that is advocated is a joint controlling agency for the purpose of assisting the Sultan in the better ordering of his finances and the more efficient administration of his Empire.

We would ask of Señor Montero Rios to indicate, in face of the threatened rising of the Moors which he predicts, how he proposes to obtain the modifications he desires in the *status quo*, such as progress, the freedom of trade and the development of civilisation. Does he imagine that these improvements are attainable by mere representations sent to the Moorish Government by courier from the Diplomatic Corps or by the proposed Controllers from Tangier? He surely cannot have this mode in his mind. For the members of the Diplomatic Corps, with the exception of those of France, a nation that has never been zealous in the introduction of improvements, have been clamouring for such reforms any time during the past half-century, and have never succeeded in obtaining them.

Señor Montero Rios further adds the confession that "alone and unassisted we" (Spaniards) "can do nothing and attempt nothing."

For all right-minded people it is galling, as it must also be to Spain, to see so gallant a nation

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apparently ignored in these negotiations. It is a nation that has held territory at various points on the Morocco coast for close on five hundred years, and still holds a portion. England held Tangier some two hundred and twenty years back, and has been closely interested in Morocco ever since; while France's possessions in North Africa extend back but seventy-four years, a mere yesterday in the march of time.

Without exactly conceding that Spain should take the foremost place in any regenerative movement in Morocco, although her aspirations in this direction are comprehensible, her feelings might at least be studied, and she might be conciliated by admitting her to a share in the negotiations. Her claims are more sentimental than practical, and should therefore be the more easily satisfied. She has never, like France, utilised her positions on the coast of Morocco to further her own trade at the expense of that country. Outside Melilla the Sultan has had from time immemorial a custom house, where duties are collected upon all imports into and exports from Morocco. Surely some means could be devised to satisfy Spain's *amour propre*.

Let France make restitution to her of the Adrar Sultanate, placing it under the Spanish, in place of the French, sphere of influence, and let both England and France assist Spain in

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developing, in the interests of civilisation, commerce on her Rio d'Oro Protectorate south of Cape Bojador.

Let France for once, so far as this coast is concerned, stay her policy of strangling the commerce of a neighbour with its hinterland and with the Sahara, a Sahara to which France lays claim for exclusive rights.

The Sahara was once a sea ; and all nations claim equal rights to navigate all seas. The fact of its waters having evaporated and its sandy bed being exposed should make no difference. It should remain the neutral highway for all nations whose territory it touches, and who, in place of vessels, use the camel, the ship of the desert.

The word "wash" cannot be appropriately utilised here, but it can be said that the sands of the Sahara trench on many countries : Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Tripoli, Egypt, Erythria, Abyssinia, British East Africa, Congo State, French Congo, German Cameroons, Baghirmi, Bornu, Sokoto, Ashanti, Senegambia, and the Spanish Rio d'Oro ; and yet this vast expanse, free communication upon which should belong to all these States bordering on it, is claimed by France. It is a fitting corollary to the legend : the Mediterranean a French lake ; the Sahara a French extinct sea !

"Hinterland" is a word used in the sense that

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a nation owning a coast-line is entitled to that which lies behind. This principle is recognised by France where her own coast-lines are concerned, but she denies it in the case of those of other nations.

She persuaded the late Lord Salisbury in 1890 to acknowledge as within her sphere of influence all the lands south of her Mediterranean North African possessions. But she denies our Gambia and Sierra Leone the possession of their hinterlands. She is slowly burrowing and absorbing the hinterland of Morocco ; she has appropriated Ghadames in the hinterland of Tripoli, Adrar in the hinterland of Rio d'Oro ; and she may one day claim the territory about the Zambesi as being in the hinterland of Algeria. In short, Great Britain is the champion of the open door ; France of the back door.

Spain is concentrating her energies on the improvement of her country ; she is straining every nerve to regain a portion of that prominent position which she once held in the world ; and it should be to the interest of France and England, and of Europe generally that this nation of twenty millions of people should be encouraged by every means possible to take her proper place among the comity of nations. Her endeavours to regain this position would be as clearly facilitated by some recognition on the part of France and England in

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the way of encouraging her aspirations, as they would be retarded if a policy of snubbing and discouragement continue to be the keynote of their policy towards her. Such a policy of encouragement would raise her own self-respect, and induce her to redouble her efforts to continue on the upward grade of progress. A prosperous Spain should be welcomed by the nations of Europe as an additional asset to their number. Europe is confronted by ever-growing populations in the New World, both in North and South America, all prosperous, all in possession of rich territories with marvellous resources, which they are straining every nerve to develop. In number of population Spain stands seventh among the nations of Europe, and possesses a fertile land, rich in minerals, awaiting extended development. In all probability, Spain may, in the not far-off future, be re-admitted to a place among the great Powers of Europe.

Let any nation imagine itself in Spain, with thirty-eight millions of Frenchmen pressing on her land from the north, and with the prospect of another France rising on the south, within almost touching distance, and with populations of twenty to thirty millions under her sway.

It will be conceded that such a position is far from being an enviable one, and therefore Spain's anxiety during the progress of these negotiations

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with regard to Morocco can readily be understood.

Let us hope that the proposed visit of our peace-loving King to King Alfonso at Madrid will have for result the paving the way for a better understanding between the two peoples !

CHAPTER VIII

FRANCE

THANKS are due to Señor Montero Rios for calling attention to the article of M. Eugène Etienne in the *National Review* of July 1903 ; for, whereas in these pages all has hitherto been conjecture as to the basis of France's claims in Morocco, M. Etienne has here clearly set them forth. A summary of the most salient paragraphs from his article are here given :

“(1) First, the opinions I am about to set down are “purely personal ; not only (as I need hardly say) do “they affect in no way the responsibility of the Government of my country, but they are not even to be held as “expressing the unanimous sentiment of the Colonial “group in the Chamber. I am speaking solely in my “own name, and upon my own responsibility. . . .

“(2) I call myself a Moderate, and an Opportunist— “using this last word in the sense in which my great “master, Gambetta, used it, meaning that it is necessary “to sacrifice somewhat if one is to attain one's goal in a “prompt and practical manner.

“(3) France, facing as she does the Mediterranean,

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"upon which she has so large a littoral, and the ocean,
"upon which her Breton capes stand out like sentinels of
"Europe, France could never be confined to a policy
"merely continental. The country has not always under-
"stood the nature of the part she has to play in the
"world. She has suffered defeats, and she has had
"moments of despair, and from either England, by the
"grasp and continuity of her foreign policy, has profited.
". . . I may say, for my part, that I think we need have
"no desire for further territory over-seas. Not that we
"should remain indifferent to what goes on abroad, espe-
"cially in the neighbourhood of our own colonies. Any
"country boasting an active foreign policy should tend to
"make its influence felt and to extend it everywhere.
"There are, moreover, certain zones (of which I shall
"treat more particularly in a moment), where we should
"insist that that influence must be, if not exclusive, at
"least predominant.

"(4) There is such a thing as the Egyptian question.
"No one in France forgets it, and I am willing to believe
"that no one forgets it in England either, for no declaration
"has denounced the formal assurance given again and
"again by the authorised representatives of the Govern-
"ment that the occupation of the country by British troops
"was but provisional, and that the protective mission
"assumed by England was but temporary. France, which
"would have participated intimately in this task, had
"Gambetta's advice been followed, has had to content
"herself with promises alone. She has awaited, and is
"still awaiting, the fulfilment of those promises with a
"patience in striking contrast to the common reproach
"that she is a nation possessed by envy and by feverish
"ambition. . . . As for the formal promises which were

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"mentioned above, it is not for me to say when or how
"they may be carried out ; that is England's affair, and
"England will not break her word. My only business is
"to point out that fulfilment of this kind falls under no
"law of prescription, and that the Egyptian *status quo*
"cannot last for ever.

"(5) Hence, doubtless, arose those fallacious
"schemes for a triple or a quadruple partition, to which I
"alluded above, and which, for my part, I repudiate as
"illusory and dangerous. They are dangerous because
"combined action on the part of France and Spain (the
"common theme of these plans) would immediately by
"way of counterweight produce the occupation of Tangiers
"by England ; and it seems to me inadmissible that an
"English fortress should be permitted to arise on the
"other side of the Strait as a support to Gibraltar. They
"are illusory because a dual protectorate in Morocco
"could breed nothing but anarchy. They are also
"illusory, because this kingdom, disintegrated as it now
"is, and so little obedient to the authority of its nominal
"sovereign, cannot consolidate, or be pacified or de-
"veloped, on its economic and commercial side, save by
"the conservation of that keystone which alone forbids
"the fall of the whole edifice : I mean Religion, and the
"respect which attaches to the sacred person of the
"Shereef.

"Now even supposing that Spain, should she desire to
"take up the *role* of eventual legatee to this 'sick man'
"of the West, did not by so doing undertake a task
"beyond her powers, how could she discover in the
"conditions of her own past and the yet living memories
"of her secular struggle against the Moor and the Saracen
"those lessons and that necessary experience which would

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“lead her to practise in Morocco the supple, tolerant,
“and fruitful policy which is necessary in dealing with
“Mussulmin.

“(6) The events which are taking place at this hour
“in the Shereefian Kingdom owe their gravity to the fact
“that ill-advised counsellors, by the influence they have
“acquired over the young Sultan, have pursued the very
“opposite of such a policy.

“Those events help one to foresee that Europe, within a
“brief term perhaps, will have to occupy herself not with
“any thorough revolution in the state of society existing in
“Morocco, not with forcible intervention, but with the
“assurance that there shall be re-established by judicious
“measures an order and security, without which the com-
“mercial interests of Europeans will quickly fall into ruin.

“France alone can fulfil this task, and Europe should
“confide it to France.

“(7) In the Shereefian Kingdom the only solution
“which can save us from the worst of complications is the
“maintenance of the *status quo*. . . .

“The solution of the question which I put aside is that
“of a partition of Morocco. The solution which I advocate
“is the consolidation of the Sultan’s power, which is just
“now so shaken. I advocate the reform of his adminis-
“tration not by an armed intervention, but by more
“sober efforts which shall be accepted by the Sultan
“himself. . . .

. . . “it would seem incontestable to any impartial
“observer that our country possesses in Morocco a posi-
“tion, whence proceed rights and duties superior to those
“of all other nations. . . . As a Mediterranean power,
“France cannot dissociate herself from whatever takes
“place upon the shores of that inland sea, whereon her

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“ fleet and her sailors occupy so great a place. That is a claim which Spain and Italy might also advance, and England too; but France has a special claim arising from the proximity of Algeria, from the common frontier which runs for 750 miles between our great Moslem colony and that quick centre of Islamism represented by the holy cities over which the Shereef rules. . . .

. . . “ the marauding tribes astride of our vague frontier kept our troops perpetually on the alert.

“ France and Algeria have the right to expect some return for the sacrifices they have made during the occupation of the advanced posts towards the south, and the opening up of roads which will soon have other than purely military interests; they have a right to expect a return for these sacrifices in the form of a peaceful development of their commerce. France has not the first place in the imports and exports of the *ports* of Morocco, but her total trade is greater than that of England, if the overland trade by the Algerian frontier be added to the sea-borne.

“ The full total for 1901 was 41,000,000 francs as against 35,000,000 francs of English trade (these figures are taken from the ‘Statesman’s Year Book’ for 1903), and of this 41,000,000 francs the overland trade with Algeria constitutes close upon 17,000,000 francs.

“ (8) The task which France would have to undertake, (not in a day or a year, but through a wise and prudent advance), the task she would undertake were she entrusted with the confidence at once of the Sultan and of Europe, would be the introduction to the people of Morocco of those economic advantages with which she has endowed Algeria and Tunis.

“ She would develop the wealth of a soil which these

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“people now leave fallow ; she would fortify the authority
“of the Sultan by a better organisation of his army. She
“would put some order into his finances and administra-
“tions. She would give the country roads.

“(9) Would such an action benefit France alone ?

“Naturally enough, I count the advantage of my own
“country first. I will not call myself a Quixote, and I
“discover such an advantage. From the political point of
“view this policy would suppress upon the flank of Algeria
“a focus of conspiracy, of unrest, and of intrigues hostile
“to our well-being.

“The necessity of this solution strikes me with so great
“a force that I do not hesitate to say that any other
“arrangement, such as might exclude France from the
“influence she should exercise, and which she alone can
“exercise, seems to be inadmissible.

“The commerce and the industry of my country would
“gain by the agricultural and economic transformation of
“Morocco; I believe my country would take her share of it,
“but she would not be the only one to benefit by the change.
“England, Germany, and the other countries of Europe
“would certainly discover such a change to be to their
“advantage.

“That guarantees should be demanded of France I take
“for granted. There should be liberty of commerce; there
“should be no differential tariff; Tangier should be neu-
“tralised, and become the emporium of European trade.

“Such conditions would be just, and I would subscribe
“to them in their entirety.

“I repeat, the solution of the Moroccan question, as I
“see it, lies in the integrity of Morocco; in the maintenance
“of the sovereignty of the Shereef; in the giving of a
“mandate to France to strengthen the country, and to

France

“protect it against its own weakness; in the neutralisation of Tangier and in the guaranteeing of commercial freedom.”

In these nine paragraphs M. Etienne gives the principal reasons why Europe should confide to France, and to France alone, the task of regenerating the Empire of Morocco.

It is assuredly a most unpleasant and distasteful duty to reply properly to M. Etienne at a time like the present, when there is harmony between our two nations. But if his pleas for French exclusive preponderance in Morocco are to be satisfactorily controverted, there must of necessity enter into the field of argument reminiscences of many previous occasions on which our neighbours vanquished us by their astuteness and laid the methods of British diplomacy open to the ridicule of the nations.

Moreover, the task devolving upon us in this chapter is the more unsatisfactory and ungrateful, seeing that it is likely to bring down denunciation from all quarters, as well from our neighbours as from the people of this country, for daring, at such a moment of all others, to fling a stone into the placid stream of international good relations flowing between the two peoples. But the arguments of M. Etienne compel the stultification of the conditions laid down in an earlier chapter, that nothing unpleasant should be

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written about the political methods of our neighbours.

To remain silent at such a crisis would be to give away the whole contention of these pages, that England should be associated with France in a joint undertaking to do for Morocco all that M. Etienne prefers should be carried out by France alone. It is particularly to be desired that the remarks in this chapter may be taken as addressed to M. Etienne alone, and to no one else ; for he tells us that the opinions he has advanced are his own, written on his own responsibility, and in no way affecting the responsibility of his Government, or even expressing the unanimous sentiment of the Colonial Group in the Chamber. It is recognised that the *mot d'ordre* has gone forth that nothing shall be said or written on either side of the Channel that may tend to ruffle the susceptibilities of either nation, bent as each is on maintaining good relations with the other. There may, however, arise vital questions—and in the opinion of many this Morocco question is one of the most vital which this country has to face—which require most careful and serious handling.

It is not a question which has arisen since the revival of the *entente*. It is a question half a century old, if not older. Surely it cannot be laid to England's door that, in continuing a policy

France

towards Morocco which she has consistently pursued for so many years, she is wilfully introducing a matter entirely and aggressively new. M. Etienne himself bears witness to the continuity of England's policy.

Friendship between nations may be cemented one day and dissolved the next ; but the Mediterranean question stands for all time.

A change of Ministry on either side of the Channel might any day undo the good work of its predecessor in office. What will be the feelings of the people in this country if, in order to maintain the present *entente*, we take a step which many feel confident will lead to ultimate absorption of Morocco by France, only to find France drawn away from our side in a few months by some new grouping of the Powers ?

The vision of the Yellow Peril is being designedly flashed before her eyes for all it is worth. She is encouraged to fear that a victorious Japan would constitute a real danger to her Indo-China possessions, as if Japan would dare, with the sure disapproval of her ally, Great Britain, to challenge such a Power as France ; France, besides, is Russia's ally and also her creditor to the extent of four hundred and fifty millions of pounds.

It will be remarked that, whereas M. Etienne emphatically scouts the idea of the feasibility of a

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dual control in Morocco, he expresses his regret that France threw away her chance of co-operating with England in her control of Egypt, which, he reminds us, she would have done, had Gambetta's advice been followed. Is M. Etienne consistent here? If such divided duties be feasible in Egypt, why not also in Morocco?

Seeing that M. Etienne reminds England of her unfulfilled assurances with regard to Egypt, exhorting her to fulfil them and quit the land, it surely can give no offence if we here recall the similar position of France in the cases of Algeria, Tunis, and Madagascar, countries in which she is now installed for all time.

In challenging this country to redeem its assurances and quit Egypt, adding that England will not break her word, M. Etienne unwittingly pays this country a great compliment. He evidently considers England to be the more honourable in this single case of Egypt than France has proved to be in the three instances here quoted.

It is conceded that three wrongs do not constitute one right; but France, of all the nations, should be the very last to require of England the redemption of promises made regarding Egypt. Save as a matter of sentiment, and in the loss of posts for some of her officials, France in no way suffers materially from England's occupation of Egypt; on the contrary, the interests of her bond-

France

holders have considerably benefited, and it is a question whether this section of the French public desires the retirement of England from the land. French commerce enjoys the same freedom in Egypt as does British.

If French and Algerian exports to Egypt constitute but one-fourth of the value of British exports, it is because the people of Egypt have a preference for British goods. It is a fair field and no favour. This equality of treatment to French commerce, which extends to England and all her colonies, stands out in glaring contrast with the treatment of British commerce in Algeria and Madagascar, where it is studiously and designedly strangled. As for Tunis, the probability is that when the fifteen years of respite which Lord Salisbury secured for British trade shall expire, this Tunisian trade also will go the way of the others. Had Algeria remained to this day under its Mahommedan rulers, the inference is, basing our calculations on the analogy of Morocco, that the volume of British trade with the Regency would amount to nearly three quarters of a million pounds, in place of its present value (eliminating coal) of £57,576.

Were England to evacuate Egypt, we should in a very short time have M. Etienne and his party clamouring for a French occupation, seeing that it appears to be French policy that all Mahom-

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medan rulers in the Mediterranean must be under European tutelage. Even if disorders should not break out after the English evacuation, methods would be found to foment them, so as to afford our neighbours a pretext for intervention and occupation. France has ere this set her armies astride Egypt, with the avowed object of cutting us off from our East Indian Empire.

The fact of the matter is that these assurances, given by the Powers that their occupation of any land is to be but provisional and temporary, ought never to be given.

As time proceeds, their interests in the country so occupied increase. There may have been fighting and bloodshed; they may be committed to the carrying out of great schemes and to large expenditure in introducing improvements; they are carried away by the force of changed circumstances, until, in the end, they find it impossible to redeem their earlier engagements to retire.

These assurances are given to allay the anxiety of other Powers. It would be better from the outset to avoid giving them, and to come to some arrangement in order to avoid future complications.

But as France has thrice sinned and caused great damage to England's material interests, while England has sinned but once, and that without causing the least detriment to French

France

commerce, it is surely for France to set the example of righteousness before she invites England to do so.

It is this impossibility of redeeming such assurances, which indicates in our mind the inability of Lord Lansdowne to frame any conditions which would for all time restrain France from taking up a more than tutelary position in Morocco.

This, then, is the *raison d'être* of the dual control which we recommend. With England associated in the work, the nations of the world would be relieved from all anxieties as to any future danger, political or commercial, in the Straits, in the Mediterranean and in the neighbouring ocean. Great Britain would act as their trustee.

Taking Algiers first, we have among the Parliamentary papers the whole of the correspondence from March to July 1830 (relative to the French Expedition) between the Earl of Aberdeen, our Foreign Minister, and Lord Stuart de Rothesay, English Ambassador at Paris; also copies of the letters written by the Prince de Polignac, in the name of the French King, to the French Ambassador in London, the Duc de Laval Montmorency. These letters are, of course, too long to quote *in extenso*, and indeed a few passages from them will serve the purpose of this argument.

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On March 5 Earl Aberdeen wrote to Lord Stuart de Rothesay :

"But the formidable force to be embarked appears to indicate an intention of effecting the entire destruction of the regency rather than the infliction of chastisement. This probable change in the condition of a territory so important from its geographical position cannot be regarded by his Majesty's Government without much interest, and it renders some explanation of the intention of the French Government still more desirable. I have communicated these sentiments to the Duc de Laval, and have received from his Excellency the most positive assurances of the entirely disinterested views of the Cabinet of the Tuileries in the future disposal of the State of Algiers. . . . I have thought it right to instruct you to bring the subject under the notice of the Prince de Polignac."

On March 26, Lord Stuart de Rothesay wrote to the Earl of Aberdeen :

"I went to the Prince de Polignac. . . .

"His Excellency further observed that, since France seeks no territorial advantage in case the present Government of Algiers shall be overturned, the arrangement for the settlement of the future system by which the country is to be ruled will of course be concerted with the Sultan, and being executed under his authority, will imply due consultation of his rights."

On March 12, at the time that preparations were in progress for the invasion of Algiers, the Prince de Polignac, in writing to the Duc de Laval, gives the intention of the King thus :

France

“And if in the struggle which is about to take place, it should happen that the existing Government at Algiers should even be dissolved, in that case, M. le Duc, the King, whose views on this important question are perfectly disinterested, will concert with his allies for the purpose of deciding what shall be the new order of things which may be substituted with the greatest benefit to Christendom, for the system which has been destroyed.”

Again, on May 12, 1830, Prince Polignac addresses the Duc de Laval, again inviting in the King's name a concert of the Powers :

“It would be the object of this concert to discuss the new order of things which might be expedient to establish in that country for the greater benefit of Christendom. His Majesty thinks it right at once to assure his allies that he would enter into those deliberations prepared to afford all the explanations which they might still desire, disposed to take into consideration the rights and interests of all parties, himself unfettered by any previous engagement, at liberty to accept any proposition which might be considered proper for the attainment of the object in question, and free from any feeling of personal interest . . . the King now invites his allies to furnish their own ambassadors at Paris with contingent instructions upon the subject. You will have the goodness, M. le Duc, to make this proposition to Lord Aberdeen, and if that Minister wishes it, you will give him a copy of this despatch.”

On July 16, Lord Stuart de Rothesay, in writing to the Earl of Aberdeen, says :

“I saw M. de Polignac; I told his Excellency that so

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soon as I heard of the complete success of the expedition against Algiers, and the attainment of the avowed object of the undertaking, I came to offer him my congratulations, in the conviction that they will keep their faith with my country, and that, notwithstanding all that has been said to the contrary, they will not take advantage of the moment of success to fall from the assurance he has given me, in the name of his Sovereign, that the expedition was undertaken for the sole purpose of vindicating the national honour, and not with views of acquisition or conquest.

"His Excellency assured me by declaring his readiness to repeat his former assurances, from which he declared that their late success gives the French Government no inclination to depart."

In light of subsequent happenings it can be seen of what little value were these repeated assurances of French disinterestedness in the chastisement of the Algerines.

Let us now turn to Tunis. It might prove interesting to give here the following conversation recorded in the minutes of the Conference of Vienna on August 26, 1855. Prince Gortchakoff said :

"A territorial stipulation being once guaranteed (referring to the Turkish Empire) should we not extend it to the most distant points, as, for instance, Tunis, and make a *casus belli* of all attacks on the outlying portion of the Ottoman Empire ?"

To this the French plenipotentiary, M. Drouyn de l'Huys, replied :

France

"I would point out that France not only promises to respect the independence and integrity of the Ottoman Empire, but has engaged to cause the principle to be respected by others. So far as I am concerned, I see no difficulty in extending to that country (Tunis) the operation of this Treaty. I am ready to subscribe."

This Treaty was signed among others by M. Drouyn de l'Huys, and by Baron de Bourquenet on behalf of France, and twenty-six years later France established a Protectorate over Tunis.

General Menabrea, the Italian Ambassador, wrote calling Earl Granville's attention to French designs on Tunis.

Lord Granville replied on April 6, 1881, thus :

"M. l'Ambassadeur, I have on several occasions repeated to your Excellency the assurances which I have at different times received from the French Government to the effect that while France claimed to exercise the influence over Tunis which is necessary for a powerful civilised neighbour, she did not desire in any way to interfere with the rights of foreign residents or traders in Tunis, and that she had no intention to annex Tunis. I have received no intimation of any change in the policy on the part of the French Government. I observe that the declaration in the Chamber yesterday speaks only of the brigands, and makes no complaints against the Tunisian Government."

Letter from Lord Lyons to Earl Granville :

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"Paris, 6th April, 1881.

"M. Barthélémy St. Hilaire repeated the assurances so often given that he considered the annexation of Tunis to France would be a mistake and a misfortune. M. Barthélémy St. Hilaire spoke of the operations as if they were to be confined to the neighbourhood of the frontier and to be directed only to the punishment of the lawless frontier tribes."

On April 7, 1881, Earl Granville wrote to Lord Lyons thus :

"M. Challamel Lacour, the French Ambassador, called. I took note of the assurance that there was no intention on the part of France to annex Tunis, and I hoped that while they obtained redress from the particular incident, they would not exaggerate an affair which might create a certain amount of irritation in other countries.

"M. Challamel Lacour repeated that there was no intention of annexation."

These disclaimers of any designs on the integrity of Tunis were made as late as April 6 and 7; and on May 12, thirty-five days later, the Treaty of Kassar Said was signed, establishing a French Protectorate over Tunis.

The question of Madagascar is much simpler.

Mr. Bryce, Under Secretary of State, replying to Sir Robert Fowler on February 25, 1886, said :

"Distinct assurances have been given by France to the Powers that the Treaty will make no change in their existing treaties with Madagascar."

France

There are two Declarations, both signed by Lord Salisbury and M. Waddington, dated August 5, 1890.

The one runs thus :

“In conformity with the request which has been made by the Government of Her Britannic Majesty—the Government of the French Republic consents to modify the arrangement of March 10, 1862, in regard to the Sultan of Zanzibar, and engages consequently to recognise the British Protectorate over the islands of Zanzibar and Pemba, as soon as they shall receive notification of the same.

“It is understood that the establishment of the Protectorate will not affect any rights or immunities enjoyed by French citizens in the territory in question.”

The other declaration runs thus :

“The Government of Her Britannic Majesty recognises the Protectorate of France over Madagascar, with its consequences, especially as regards the *exequatur* of British consuls and agents, which must be applied for through the intermediary of the French Resident General.

“It is understood that the establishment of the Protectorate will not affect any rights or immunities enjoyed by British subjects in that island.”

The especial attention of M. Etienne is called to the last paragraph in each of these Declarations, stating that the rights and immunities of French citizens in Zanzibar and Pemba and the rights and immunities of British subjects in

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Madagascar are not to be affected by the Protectorates established by either of these Powers in these respective countries.

It is suggestive to note how the terms of these particular clauses have been carried out by England in Zanzibar and by France in Madagascar.

While French imports into Zanzibar under the British protectorate maintained a steady annual average of £23,505 during the five years 1897-1901, British imports of cotton goods, our chief import into Madagascar, figure as follows :

| | £ | | | £ |
|----------|---------|--|----------|--------|
| 1896 . . | 151,072 | | 1900 . . | 12,400 |
| 1897 . . | 169,329 | | 1901 . . | 5,564 |
| 1898 . . | 28,852 | | 1902 . . | 7,022 |
| 1899 . . | 25,587 | | | |

Total imports in 1902 from all countries were £1,691,561.

And France imports from Zanzibar the whole of the copra produce, of a value of £132,929. Of the total import trade into Algeria of £12,539,300 England's share is (eliminating coal) £57,576. Of the total import trade into Madagascar, £1,691,561, England's share is (eliminating coal) £28,626. These figures for Madagascar are taken from the Consular Reports, No. 3087, to the Foreign Office, September 1903, from Mr. Consul Sauzier, who adds the following remark :

France

"Subsequently, however, modifications were made in the general tariff of 1892, so that [the duties on cotton goods and drills, &c., have been so increased that foreign importation is almost prohibited."

In the year 1897, 11,973,000 yards of British cotton goods were shipped to Madagascar, and in 1898 they fell to 354,700 yards.

Do not these figures afford M. Etienne food for thought as to the contrast between the generous treatment accorded by England to Frenchmen in her colonies, and the strangling policy of France towards Englishmen who claim the hospitality of French colonies?

We appeal to the sense of justice of M. Etienne and we ask him, when studying these figures, if he considers his country's treatment of British commerce a fair one. Can he wonder at our contemplating with anxiety any French colonial expansion? Can he wonder at our fear of his country ultimately closing in our faces the commercial door of Morocco?

Is it possible that he can look with equanimity on his country's unjust treatment of us in Madagascar contrasted with our fair treatment of his country in Zanzibar and elsewhere? The Declarations regulating the fair treatment of each other in Zanzibar and Madagascar were, let him recollect, signed simultaneously by Lord Salisbury and M. Waddington on August 5, 1890.

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In an earlier chapter it was shown that Great Britain takes from France and her colonies yearly goods to the value of £52,200,941, while France and her colonies take from us only £23,788,954.

Are we not entitled to receive at France's hands some consideration in exchange? We allow French tissues and silks, wearing apparel, agricultural and dairy produce, her small wares, her wool and a number of other articles to enter the United Kingdom free from all duties. Other nations levy duties on all these imports from France.

Germany takes annually from France but £17,750,000, and France takes from Germany £16,000,000, and Germany taxes heavily most articles that she imports from France.

Is it then right that these two countries, England and Germany, should be placed by France on the same footing? But M. Etienne will reply that his country is debarred from making any concessions to Great Britain by the 'most favoured nation clause' in its commercial treaties. Then it appears to us that this 'most favoured nation' clause is an iniquitous clause, forcing, as it does, a nation to accord one and the like treatment to those who deal generously with her and to those who treat her unfairly.

It is just the awakening to these unjust condi-

France

tions in international commerce which is at the present time agitating Great Britain.

She has for over fifty years treated all nations most generously with her system of Free Trade, in the hope that they would in time reciprocate. They have failed to do so. On the contrary, they have met her generosity with greater restrictions on her trade, thereby forcing a large section of the British people to advocate the imitation of these foreign methods and to introduce them into our own fiscal system, thus flattering these nations by confessing that their systems have after all been the right, and our own the wrong.

Here is a passage in a letter from one of the largest British firms engaged in the Madagascar trade :

“The Treaty allows us the most favoured nation clause, and for some time after France was given a free hand in Madagascar she adhered to the arrangement, then she got in the thin end of the wedge by allowing French cottons in free whilst charging 10 per cent. on foreign cottons. Then, when she found that England made no protest, she increased the difference, until now English cottons have to pay from 40 per cent. to 120 per cent. duty over and above French manufactures. Consequently the trade is absolutely killed.”

The members of this firm may think that no protest was made by our Government ; but the

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fact is such a protest was made, and no doubt ignored, for on March 22, 1897, Mr. Curzon in the House of Commons, replying to Mr. Joseph Pease, said :

“ Under a decree published in the *Journal Officiel* of August 8 last, French imports are admitted into Madagascar free of duty, while foreign imports continue to be subjected to the *ad valorem* duty of 10 per cent. sanctioned by previously existing treaties. Her Majesty's Government have addressed representations to the French Government.”

Seeing that the only reply to these representations has been an increase in the scale of duties from 10 per cent. to 40 per cent., and even 120 per cent., it is very clear that the French Government treated the protest made by Her Majesty's Government with contempt.

This will bring home to the minds of the people of Great Britain that the only remedy for the contumely with which other nations treat us in tariff measures will be Mr. Balfour's scheme of retaliation. Had such policy become law in 1897, the French Government would have thought twice before ignoring the representations of the British Government, knowing full well that this latter was armed with corrective powers and could raise very considerably the import duties on many articles contained in the £52,000,000 worth of produce annually imported from France into

France

Great Britain. As things stood (and even as they stand to-day) those representations were flouted, knowing as France did that we were powerless in the matter. So British trade with Madagascar has been virtually killed.

On February 8, 1898, in replying to Lord Kimberley's remarks on the Queen's Speech, the late Lord Salisbury spoke as follows, and this reading is most pathetic, as we see the venerable Minister virtually compelled to confess to the deceit practised on this country by our neighbours.

The case of Tunis is this :

"There was a Tunis Treaty, that was a very good treaty, but it depended for its life on the life of the Regency of Tunis, and that is as bad a life as any political life I know.

"The noble Earl stated accurately the rule of International Law. I think it has received a general concurrence that when a Government has disappeared the Treaties it has made disappear with it, and therefore we thought it was a very good bargain which exchanged a Tunis Treaty that was precarious for a French Treaty which was stable. The French Treaty will last, and the French Treaty had the additional advantage of giving for a certain number of years a great advantage to our staple industry and commerce. I conceived therefore that the bargain was a good one."

The case of Madagascar was this :

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"The French Government in the first instance invaded Madagascar. They did that when the noble Lord was in office under the Ministry of Mr. Gladstone. Mr. Gladstone did not take any step to prevent the invasion and conquest of Madagascar. I do not blame him, but that is the exact distribution of responsibility which it is just to make. Then, two years ago, the French Government resolved that they would enforce the protectorate which had existed ever since the invasion and which they had set up. They announced that they were going to reinforce and strengthen the protectorate. The French Ministry made that statement in the most clear and manifest terms, and the armies of France invaded the island avowedly with the intention of maintaining the protectorate.

"If they had carried out the intention of maintaining the protectorate our Treaties would have been safe. We had Treaties with the Queen of Madagascar, of which the principal point was a favourable tariff of 10 per cent.

"If we had desired to prevent the French from invading the island, the time for us to interfere was when that expedition was about to start. When that expedition was about to start the noble Earl was himself in office.

"He did not raise any objections because the French Minister announced in the very clearest terms that it was to reinforce and strengthen the protectorate that the expedition was made.

"When the French Government were in possession and absolute masters of what they would do they suddenly announced that they would change the protectorate into an annexation, and with it all our Treaties had fallen. The real truth is, I think, we have some grounds for discontent at the treatment which we have received in this matter at the hands of the French Government.

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"We have protested against it strongly, and we conceive that the adverse tariff now being inflicted upon us is a tariff which the French Government, according to the ordinary rules of international comity, are not entitled to enforce. I do not know whether the noble Lord would blame me for not having gone a step further—the only step that could have been taken. I do not think he does. I do not in the least conceal my impression of the interpretation which the French Government have put upon their rights, or in the manner in which they have set aside their clear pledges when the expedition was begun."

Lord Kimberley added that when Lord Salisbury pressed M. Hanotaux for an answer, M. Hanotaux replied that there was no *locus standi* at all for the British Government, because it is a well accepted principle of International Law that when a territory is annexed by another Power the previous Treaties fall to the ground.

It is not an agreeable task to criticise a speech uttered six years ago, the more so since the lamented and honoured speaker has passed away.

Lord Salisbury considered a Treaty with France, which secured a fixed tariff of 5 per cent. on British cottons for a period of fifteen years, preferable to a Tunis Treaty which levied a 10 per cent. for all time. It is to be feared that traders will not agree with this. At the expiration of the fifteen years France will no doubt consider herself

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entitled to increase the duties on British cottons to 40 per cent., or even 120 per cent., as she has done in Madagascar.

There is one point in this speech which is confusing.

Lord Salisbury, in speaking of Madagascar, pointed out that, had the Protectorate in that island been maintained, our Treaties would have been safe, but when annexation took place our Treaties fell to the ground.

But the protectorate in Tunis is being maintained, and annexation has not taken place. Why, then, were our earlier Treaties with Tunis not safe? Where was the necessity for a fresh Treaty with France, to last fifteen years? But the mischief is done, unfortunately, and at the expiration of the fifteen years France, to remove all further obstacles, may annex Tunis, and will then be able to do what she likes.

This speech distinctly bears out the contention already expressed in these pages, that the assurances given by one Power to the other Powers of the world, when it is about to invade a country, that the interests of their subjects will not be affected, should never be made or accepted, for they are not worth the paper they are written on. Any Power can give assurances, and, after establishing a protectorate, it has but to change it to annexation, in order to free itself from the

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burden of all pre-existing Treaties possessed by other nations.

Therefore the inclusion in these declarations of the paragraph stating that the rights and immunities of the foreign subjects will not be affected, becomes a farce.

It seems incredible that our Ministers to-day can deem it possible to safeguard the interests of Great Britain in Morocco for all future time, when they read the disastrous record of defeat which our diplomacy has had to suffer on three analogous occasions at the hands of the same nation which now clamours for a preponderating influence in Morocco. Let the echoes of Lord Salisbury's speech ring in their ears, its language softened by the etiquettes of diplomatic courtesy, but its bitterness apparent in every line in which he had to lay bare before the Peers the story of deception. Let our Ministers call to mind how Lord Aberdeen in the affair of Algiers, and Earl Granville in that of Tunis, had both experienced similar treatment.

It was difficult for these honourable and upright Ministers to cope with the questionable methods by which they were confronted, methods which will not fail to recur later in the case of Morocco, if our Ministers should abandon that Empire to our neighbours. It would be an error difficult to condone, with the experiences of the

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past to warn them against exposing their country to the risk of a fourth diplomatic defeat, and with the prospect of much more serious results likely to follow than in the case of the other three.

The only remedy for this is to insist on our taking our part with France in the control of Morocco, just as M. Etienne tells us that France should have participated with us in Egypt, and as she would have done had she followed the advice of Gambetta.

M. Etienne says that France is ready to give guarantees. In view of former broken assurances, it may be asked who is to guarantee the guarantor.

He promises that there shall be no differential tariffs. France is the home of differential tariffs.

He declares that Tangier is to be neutralised.

We were under the impression that the whole of Morocco was to be neutralised, France merely entering the Empire on the part of concerted Europe to regularise the Government of the Shereef. Or is this a case of coming events casting their shadows before?

M. Etienne adds that it would not be France alone which would benefit by the proposed arrangement. "I believe," he adds, "my country would take her share of its commerce; but England,

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Germany and the other countries of Europe would certainly discover such a change to be to their advantage." It might be asked of M. Etienne if the share in the Algerian trade allowed to other nations to-day is to be taken as an index to the share promised them in the trade of Morocco?

Here are the figures for Algeria for 1900, and the shares which the several countries enjoyed in its imports :

| | Francs. |
|--|-------------------|
| Algeria imported from France to the value of | 259,977,000 |
| " " Morocco " | 16,107,478 |
| " " Tunis " | 5,761,404 |
| | <hr/> 281,845,882 |
| Algeria imported from all other countries as | |
| detailed below | 31,636,663 |
| | <hr/> 313,482,545 |

These foreign countries contributed the following proportions :

| | Francs. | | Francs. |
|--|-----------|-------------------------|-----------|
| Belgium | 652,000 | Austria | 2,104,256 |
| Great Britain (including coal) | 7,424,783 | Russia | 2,007,636 |
| Spain | 5,951,064 | United States | 4,093,657 |
| Italy | 2,520,142 | Brazil | 5,975,113 |
| | | Germany | 908,012 |
| Total imports from all countries, 31,636,663 francs. | | | |

From this it would appear that France monopolises 90 per cent. of the import trade and

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leaves the remaining 10 to all other nations. This is no very encouraging prospect for these latter as regards the Morocco trade in years to come.

M. Etienne points out that, including the overland Morocco frontier trade, the trade of his country totals up to 41,000,000 francs, whereas Great Britain's trade with the ports amounts to only 35,000,000 francs, making it appear as if there were an excess in favour of France of 6,000,000 of francs or £240,000.

His figures cannot, however, be reconciled with the statistics available, which are taken from our diplomatic and consular reports, the last published for 1903 being No. 3103 for Tangier by Mr. Consul H. E. White, and No. 3093 for Casablanca by Mr. Consul Allan Maclean. These show the following results :

| GREAT BRITAIN IN 1901. | | FRANCE IN 1901. | |
|------------------------|------------------|-----------------------|------------------|
| | £ | | £ |
| Imported into Morocco | 929,781 | Imported into Morocco | 426,745 |
| Exported from Morocco | 477,776 | Exported from Morocco | 237,039 |
| | <u>1,407,557</u> | Total port trade | <u>663,784</u> |
| | | Add M. Etienne's | |
| | | figures 17,000,000 | |
| | | francs for frontier | |
| | | trade . . . | 680,000 |
| | | | <u>1,343,784</u> |

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| GREAT BRITAIN IN 1902. | | FRANCE IN 1902. | |
|------------------------|-----------------|-----------------------|-----------------|
| | £ | | £ |
| Imported into Morocco | 1,042,097 | Imported into Morocco | 496,940 |
| Exported from Morocco | 700,156 | Exported from Morocco | 236,537 |
| | <hr/> 1,742,253 | | <hr/> 733,477 |
| | | Add frontier trade | 680,000 |
| | | | <hr/> 1,413,477 |

M. Etienne will thus see that, including France's frontier trade, British trade with Morocco still exceeded that of France in 1902 by £328,776, or over eight millions of francs.

The French organ of Tangier, *Le Maroc*, in its anxiety to show the preponderance of French over British trade with Morocco, contends that, while apparently the latter is larger, statistics do not fairly differentiate between British goods and those of foreign origin carried by British steamers, the whole of the cargoes being erroneously credited as of British origin. To this the reply is that since the establishment for many years past of two or three lines of steamers sailing regularly from Hamburg and Antwerp direct to Morocco ports there has been a great falling off in the shipments of continental merchandise *via* London. Again, shipments from Marseilles of merchandise and to Marseilles of Morocco produce by French steamers are all credited to French commerce, whereas it is well known that much of

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this trade, both import and export, is in transit from and to Italy and Switzerland and from many North and South German manufacturing centres.

But this is not the point to which attention is directed.

M. Etienne acknowledges that the frontier trade with Morocco amounts annually to 17,000,000 francs, and he further puts forward the plea that France and Algeria have the right to expect some return for the sacrifices they have made during the occupation of the advanced posts towards the South.

In reply to this it can be pointed out that his country has for years obtained a very fair return in the fact that French traders have enjoyed a trade of £680,000 annual value without a single franc of custom duties being paid to the Sultan on the frontier, and her traders have thus economised yearly £100,000 of export and import duties, which should have been levied by the Sultan's officials, had he possessed custom-houses on the frontier.

Whereas all nations, including France herself, have each had to contribute their proportionate share towards the £600,000 of custom duties levied by the Sultan on the sea-borne trade at the ports, France has thus enjoyed a volume of free trade on the frontier (untrammelled by any

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import or export duties) equal to one-fifth part of the whole sea-borne trade carried on by all nations. It is not to be expected that France should charge herself with the establishment of custom-houses on behalf of the Sultan ; but if M. Etienne will institute inquiries at Tangier he will learn that the Sultan's Government has approached the French Government with a view to obtaining its co-operation in the setting up of such frontier custom-houses, and it is to be hoped that France will raise no obstacles to so reasonable a request from her neighbour. One thing may be taken for granted, and that is that France, no doubt, takes every precaution that, among the goods imported over the Moroccan frontier, there shall not pass into her Algerian territory any of the hated and proscribed Manchester cottons.

The details of the frontier trade at present existing between Morocco and Algeria are here given. M. Etienne quotes them from the Algerian Custom-house Reports.

These may prove interesting to the commercial community in Morocco as showing the amount of free trade enjoyed by French-Algerian traders with Morocco in contradistinction to the trade at the seaports of the Empire carried on by all nations, and upon which the Sultan levies import and export duties.

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| IMPORTS FROM MOROCCO TO ALGERIA, 1901. | | EXPORTS FROM ALGERIA TO MOROCCO, 1901. | |
|---|-------------------|---|----------------|
| | Francs. | | Francs. |
| Sheep | Value 6,709,000 | Sugar | Value 234,000 |
| Oxen | " 6,357,000 | Other food-stuffs | " 108,000 |
| Horses | " 87,000 | Clothing | " 56,000 |
| Mules | " 128,000 | Silk stuffs | " 40,000 |
| Goats | " 88,000 | Cotton stuffs | " 39,000 |
| Tanned hides | " 594,000 | Woollen stuffs | " 23,000 |
| Raw hides | " 984,000 | Ornaments | " 37,000 |
| Clothing | " 597,000 | Fancy goods | " 23,000 |
| Stuffs and carpets | " 288,000 | Corn | " 17,000 |
| Furs | " 76,000 | Dyes | " 10,000 |
| Eggs | " 47,000 | Building material | " 9,000 |
| Lemons and oranges | 17,000 | Sundries | " 77,000 |
| Medicinal goods | " 45,000 | | |
| Wool | " 14,000 | | |
| Sundries | " 77,000 | | |
| | Francs 16,108,000 | | Francs 673,000 |

M. Etienne adds that in 1902 these exports to Morocco amounted to 1,000,000 francs.

How significant are these figures, as showing the methods of French preferential trade! This Morocco cattle, imported over the frontier into Algeria free from Moorish custom duties, can be shipped *via* Oran to Marseilles, and admitted into France free from all import duties. But where this same cattle is shipped from Tangier direct to Marseilles (paying the Sultan an export duty of 16 or 20 francs per head), it is met with so many restrictions as to make the trade almost prohibitive, and, even if admitted into Marseilles, the French customs levy an import duty of 50 francs per head.

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With regard to Madagascar, it has already been shown how seriously our exports of British cotton goods into that island have fallen off during the last seven years, from £151,072 in 1896 and £169,329 in 1897, to £5564 in 1901 and £7022 in 1902.

No amount of experience of France's commercial methods seems to have any effect in opening the eyes of the people of this country to her set purpose of especially ruining our cotton trade. In face of the above figures, what shall we say to the following prediction contained in a work entitled, "Five Years in Madagascar," by Colonel Francis Cornwallis Maude, written in the year 1895? In "stating that it is clearly our duty, and I believe also our interest, to give France a free hand in Madagascar," Colonel Maude gives, among several reasons,

"that the best way of disarming her (France's) hostility, is to assist the conquering nation to develop the trade and resources of the country, and thus to identify her interests, and those of her subject peoples, with those of international commerce, and consequently of international peace. It will also occur to every one's mind that the greatest, perhaps almost the only real danger, lies in the fact that France is *par excellence* a Protectionist country, and that her *raison d'être* in Madagascar may principally be to force her manufactures upon the people of that country, to the exclusion of those of foreigners. Nevertheless, it is quite safe to predicate that our trade with Madagascar

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will be larger at the end of the century than it has been in former years, and this should content us. The moderation of their (the French) demands, so far as they are known, has been admitted by the English press, as also the fact that our interests are in no way endangered by them."

Strange reading this, in face of the figures we have given of the virtual extinction of British trade in the island!

The total volume of our import trade with Madagascar in 1902 amounted to £42,252, of which coal figured for £13,626, leaving for all British goods, including cotton manufactures, £28,626.

This does not appear to be a fair share for Great Britain out of a total volume of imports from all countries into Madagascar of £1,691,561.

M. Etienne says that his country has not always understood the nature of the part she has to play in the world; that England has profited by her defeats, and that for his part he does not think that France needs any further territory overseas.

Seeing how dear colonisation is to the heart of M. Etienne, does he mean that the French nation, after losing many colonies, is to be blamed for not endeavouring to secure fresh ones?

If this be the meaning of the above pronouncement, may it not be that the French people are

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right and M. Etienne wrong? Has he taken proper account of the loveliness of his land, of its great expanse, of its climate and fertility, the fairest country in Europe, and but sparsely populated?

Can he not make due allowance for the reluctance of his countrymen to leave the certainties of such a land for the uncertainties of other lands distant from home?

Apart from going to Belgium and Piedmont for labourers, France's anxiety is equally great to obtain men from North Africa and the Soudan for her armies. M. Selve, a French officer, who afterwards became Solyman Pasha, and who was charged with the re-organisation of the army of Mehemet Ali, in speaking of a French protectorate in North Africa, said:

"By this protectorate, France also assures to herself not only a practical monopoly of commerce, but the possession of the Soudan as a recruiting-ground, from which no less than four hundred thousand men are obtainable."

Again, in a manifesto from France to Algeria, in an Article entitled "Les Turcos," there is this sentence: "But the most useful products which Africa can give France are her soldiers." M. Etienne should be thankful that France has the fairest portion of all Europe for her inheritance. Had she the area of Great Britain's

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colonies, where would she have found among her sons sufficient numbers to populate and develop those vast regions, which are better suited to peoples possessing redundant population at home than for those lacking in this respect.

Colonisation does not wholly consist in enclosing vast areas of the globe as with a girdle, with their populations entirely composed of natives, and with notices fixed up on their coasts and frontiers warning off all foreign manufactures, with an edict that any person found importing British cottons will be dealt with by the law.

The dead set made against British cotton manufactures by France is very remarkable.

While writing these lines, there comes a wail from Tangier, in the shape of an article "On the Commerce of Morocco," in the French organ *Le Maroc*, which is here roughly translated :

"There are 16,000,000 of francs value of cotton manufactures imported into Morocco, and, with the exception of 188,698 francs worth from France, and 72,604 francs worth from Germany, the rest, namely, 15,728,779 francs, are England's contribution, and even our small share is composed of Indian cottons manufactured in Pondicherry and not in France. It appears that England has here a monopoly against which it is useless to contend."

The editor adds that, even in Algeria, in spite of the favourable differential tariff accorded to French manufactures, it is recognised as useless

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to endeavour to compete with British cotton goods.

He urges French manufacturers to bring their machinery up to date, and to avail themselves of the contents of a Report recently sent to the Government officials in Paris by the French commercial attaché at Tangier, giving full details of the British cottons in demand in Morocco, accompanied by samples giving lengths and prices and complete details, urging French manufacturers to strain every nerve to compete successfully with this trade, at present a monopoly in the hands of British manufacturers.

Seeing that Great Britain's shipments of cotton goods to Algeria amount to only £13,000 annually we fail to see where the hopelessness of French competition comes in question as far as that colony is concerned. It only goes to show how severe must be the import duties levied on British cotton goods entering Algeria, when their import value is kept down to such a ridiculous figure as above quoted.

The remarks of M. Etienne with regard to the inability of Spain to exercise that tolerance in religious matters so necessary in Morocco, will not apply to England, seeing how this latter has sixty millions of Mahommedans under her rule in India in the midst of hundreds of millions of natives professing other creeds, amongst all of whom she contrives to keep order.

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In recording all that France would do for Morocco, M. Etienne describes it thus :

- (1) France would introduce to the people of Morocco those economic advantages with which she has endowed Algeria and Tunis, and she would develop the wealth of a soil which is now left fallow.
 - (2) She would fortify the authority of the Sultan and preserve the respect which attaches to the sacred person of the Shereef.
 - (3) She would promise better organisation for his army.
 - (4) She would put some order into his finances and administration.
 - (5) She would give the country roads.
- (1) With respect to the economic advantages with which France has endowed Algeria and Tunis, these are not disputed ; but what is asked is : Have the native populations of these two countries benefited proportionately by these improvements ?

It is said that they have not done so.

Seeing that a great part of the population of Morocco is in a state of poverty, resulting from misrule, and taking into account the material prosperity of Algeria under settled Government, it is certainly strange that we witness no burning desire on the part of the millions of people of

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Morocco to rush from their poor distracted country to the El Dorado across their eastern frontier. In the "Atlas Colonial," published under the auspices of the Minister of the Colonies, we find, out of a total population in Algeria of 4,359,578, there are only 17,022 natives of Morocco, and we have a shrewd suspicion that in this latter figure are included some 4000 natives of Tunis.

It is, moreover, worthy of note that, with all the material prosperity of Algeria, the native population is now less in number than it was at the time of the French occupation seventy-four years ago. This is in striking contrast with the increasing native population of Egypt during the last twenty-two years of British occupation.

In several cities in Morocco, notably in Tetuan, there are to be found the descendants of many wealthy Mahommedan families from Algeria, who, unwilling to remain under French rule, migrated to Morocco subsequent to the French occupation in 1830.

(2) As to fortifying the authority of the Sultan and preserving the respect due to his sacred person,

It is to be hoped that these promises will be faithfully adhered to, if, unfortunately, France alone should receive the mandate to control Morocco. For certainly the contemplation of the

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treatment meted out to the unfortunate Bey of Tunis at the present time is not likely to reassure those who wish well to the Sultan Moulay Abdelaziz. This unhappy Bey has at stated intervals to present himself before the French officials, weekly or bi-weekly, for the prosecution of public business, to keep up the fiction in the native mind that he still rules in the land. It would be wiser if this fiction has to be maintained, were the French officials required to present themselves at the residence of the Bey and wait upon him, instead of insisting that he should wait upon them.

(3) As to a better organisation of the Sultan's army, if this be really undertaken, it is to be hoped that it will give better results than has the artillery arm, which has for many years been organised by French artillery officers appointed by the French Government. In all the late engagements with the Pretender, we have not heard that the Sultan's artillery ever did mischief enough to the rebel forces to turn the fortunes of the day.

(4) As to putting in order the Sultan's finances and administrations, these departments would certainly benefit by this, and any Power loaning money to the Sultan should be entitled to supervise its distribution.

(5) As to giving the country roads, has France

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only just awakened to the necessity of roads and other improvements in Morocco?

She has never assisted the representatives of the other Powers, who, during the past half-century, have been clamouring for the introduction of many reforms in the Empire, including the making of roads.

Sir John Drummond Hay, in a letter dated May 20, 1884, said :

“Now I know not one single act of the French Government, or its representative in this country, which has been beneficial to the cause of civilisation, or which has introduced any reform or improvement in Morocco, and I defy any Frenchman to state them.”

We see nothing in this programme sketched out by M. Etienne that cannot be equally well carried out with England's co-operation. As for commercial freedom, it may be a telling watchword for the present, but we might as well look for the leopard to change his spots as to expect that commercial freedom would ever find a durable resting-place in any land under the tricolor. There is another paragraph in M. Etienne's manifesto which calls for remark.

M. Etienne says that a dual protectorate would breed nothing but anarchy.

If France, in co-operating with England, will agree to set aside her past methods of obstruction

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in Morocco ; if she will discontinue her system of sowing Protection broadcast among the natives, to the extent even of lifting a whole province, Wazzan, out of the Sultan's jurisdiction, granting its people immunity from taxation, and thereby undermining the Sultan's authority (which she at present poses as being so solicitous to maintain) ; if she will enter into this proposed partnership imbued with a genuine desire to do her duty disinterestedly towards the Concert of Europe, towards her partner in the control, and towards Morocco itself ; if, we assert, she will desist from covert intimations to the natives that Codlin's the friend, not Short, then much may be achieved. Mr. Balfour has pointed out the fatal consequences of a weak Power playing off each of two great Powers one against the other, and this is the system in which France has hitherto encouraged successive rulers of Morocco.

To continue, if France will appoint the pick of her services (*not* from among Algerian officials) and require of England the appointment of similar superior and unbiased officials to co-operate one with the other ; if she will cast aside all other considerations but the welfare of Morocco, and, as a co-mandatory from the European Concert, strain every nerve to co-operate honestly with her partner in the regeneration of the Empire,—then there will be no anarchy. M. Etienne must

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be well aware that a *mot d'ordre* issued from Algiers would instantly stay all further trouble from the Pretender, who pays his way in French gold and who avails himself of certain devices in battle, among others the digging of entrenchments in the field, devices with which we confidently assert that no untrained native generals or soldiers in Morocco are conversant.

But if France cannot cast off her old methods, then indeed anarchy, and probably something worse, will follow ; or else Europe, as M. Etienne himself suggests, will be compelled to intervene. France might then not find herself in so favourable a position as she is to-day.

Where would the Sultan's authority be to-day if two or three or more from among the other Powers represented at Tangier had each lifted a province to itself out of his dominions, granting immunity of taxation to the people ?

A word is here necessary about these constant raids of the frontier tribes of Tunis formerly, and of Morocco at the present day, into Algerian territory. Are we asked to believe that the natives of Algeria are all saints, incapable of raiding across their frontier into the neighbouring States ? As a matter of fact, it is known that the Algerian tribes did formerly raid into Tunis, and do raid across the Moroccan frontier to this day ; but all accounts of these incursions are suppressed,

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and the Sultan of Morocco has no organised bureaux, such as the "Bureaux Arabes" in Algeria, to report them. They are borne silently and uncomplainingly. Here is a copy of a telegram communicated to Earl Granville by General Menabrea, the Italian Ambassador, on April 9, 1881.

It is dated April 7, and runs thus :

"It becomes more evident that the Tunisian tribes, so far from having given cause for repressive measures, have been attacked by Algerians who have grievously ill-treated them, which weakens the motives alleged by France in justification of her aggression."

M. Etienne complains of the evil effects to France of the Declaration of August 5, 1890, as regards the territory between Say on the Niger, and Barruwa on Lake Chad. He says that the question has not received a solution which France can accept or England impose. This attempted repudiation of a Declaration fourteen years after M. Waddington had, with his eyes open, signed on behalf of France, does not augur well for the future adhesion of France to Declarations or Treaties signed by her appointed representatives.

M. Etienne requires a revision of this Declaration, and adds :

"It could never have been in the minds of those who

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negotiated in 1890, to raise up an impassable barrier between two points of French territory."

It may with equal justice be claimed, in respect of the same Declaration of August 5, 1890, that it could never have entered the mind of the late Lord Salisbury, when giving to France a free hand in the lands south of her Mediterranean possessions, to let France take Igli, and still less Zawiāt el Kenadsa, this latter being in the heart of Morocco, and but three days' journey from Aboam, the chief town of Tafilat.

Lord Salisbury must have had in his mind the region of Touat, Tidikilt, and Gourrara, but not Igli and Zawiāt el Kenadsa, this latter being barely (if indeed at all) within the meridian of longitude of the Algerian frontier at the River Kiss. This view is strengthened by the fact that the towns of Figuig and Oudjda, which lie to the eastward of this meridian, are still left to Morocco. Oued Kiss is $4^{\circ} 31'$ and Figuig only $3^{\circ} 26' 54''$ west of Paris.

These two towns are comparatively near the coast, and the taking of them might have been construed as a glaring misinterpretation of the Declaration on the part of our neighbours.

In conclusion, should our Ministers decree that a dual control would be the safest solution of this thorny question, let M. Etienne convince his nation that it is better to be Opportunist "in the

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sense in which his great master Gambetta used this word—the necessity of sacrificing somewhat if one is to attain one's goal in a prompt and practical manner."

If France makes up her mind to interpret her colonial policy in this sense; if, instead of playing on this country's momentary desire for an *entente* for all it is worth, she moderates her demands in North-West Africa, it will certainly be the better for the peace of Europe in the years to come.

From the article written by M. Etienne, which has been analysed in the foregoing pages, let us turn to the arguments of another champion of the French Colonial School, M. Lucien Hubert, a deputy who has just published a book on the colonial expansion of France, especially in the direction of her African Empire.

It appears that one chapter of this work is devoted to the question of Morocco, recommending the establishment of a French protectorate over that Empire, and demonstrating the best mode of carrying it out. And here, instead of ourselves refuting his pleas, let us adopt the easier and more interesting course of quoting a distinguished Frenchman, M. Méline, formerly Premier of France, and, as such, entitled to a respectful hearing. He has replied to M. Hubert in the columns of the French paper, *La République Française*, of March 28, 1904—a paper founded

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by Leon Gambetta. A translation is here given of the most important paragraphs of M. Méline's article :

"We cannot too earnestly invoke public opinion and the vigilance of Parliament to the campaign relative to the Morocco question which only slumbers for a time to incessantly burst out afresh, a fact which proves that it proceeds from a concerted plan of which the realisation is pursued with a tenacity which nothing seems to discourage. What is now passing in the far East ought to cool that ardour for invasion which possesses these Moroccans in France, and should give them food for wise reflection. We possess to-day a Colonial Empire sufficiently vast to satisfy our ambitions, one which already attains dimensions beyond our grasp, and which will require all we can do to defend, while of course not neglecting the defence of our own fatherland, which is of greater importance to us than is Morocco. Common sense would suggest to us the advisability of a policy of concentrating, and not further extending our power, of grouping together our forces and not scattering them. We owe this, first to France and then to our colonies, whose very existence we might endanger, through attempting to plant ourselves everywhere. . . . No doubt we have a grievance on our Algerian frontier, where we are exposed to difficulties to which we cannot shut our eyes. We have a perfect right to safeguard our Algerian frontier against assault by the wild tribes of Morocco.

"But we are at the present time taking all the steps necessary to this end, and we can afford to leave their carrying out to our Governor-General, M. Jonnart, who is conducting them with firmness, prudence and wisdom.

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This is the right way, and we should not go out of it. It requires but a limited effort on our part to constitute ourselves masters of our frontier. But this policy does not seem to satisfy our high-spirited Colonial Party, who ever advocate a forward policy, in order to cut the Gordian knot at one blow. . . . This policy is set forth in all its aspects in a volume which has just appeared, its author being M. Lucien Hubert, a Deputy and an apostle full of the fire of the Colonial Party, and especially anxious for the extension of our African Empire.

"M. Hubert devotes a very interesting chapter of his book to the question of Morocco, and our thanks are due to him for so frankly placing us in possession of the mode of intervention which he recommends us to adopt. He maintains that the ordinary means we adopt for the protection of our frontier are insufficient, and this protection, he says, can only be properly carried out by our being installed in Fez, which course he advises us at once to adopt if we do not desire to find ourselves forestalled by some of our rivals. M. Hubert does not disguise from himself the fact that these rivals are England and Germany. He acknowledges that they are at present firmly established in the Shereefian Empire, and that it will be no easy task to dislodge them or cause them to lose interest in it. He is uneasy with respect to English influence, which he says has greatly increased since the Embassy of El Mnibhi in 1901, from which period the Nicolsons, the Harrises and the Macleans have become paramount at the Court. As regards Germany, he says that country does not abandon its prey for a shadow, and that it confines itself to putting in practice in Morocco its general policy, which consists of possessing as few colonies of its own as possible, and of planting its commercial flag

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in the colonies of other nations, recognising that it is for her that other people pull the chestnuts out of the fire. Faithful to this ingenuous and lucrative policy Germany has since 1890 established two lines of steamers, subsidised by the Government, trading to Morocco and carrying not only passengers, but also large quantities of merchandise escorted by marvellous commercial travellers who penetrate throughout the Empire and who are found to be irresistible. Her commerce is consequently always increasing—there are nearly forty German firms on the coast—German medical men at Mogador and Casablanca ; German consuls everywhere ; and even meteorological stations have been established on the coast, supported by the German Government.

“ M. Lucien Hubert does not allow himself any illusions as to Germany's ultimate designs, for he informs us that the German Doctor Fischer, President of a society for the development of Germany's economic interests in Morocco, has just published a book in which he suggests the partition of Morocco on the following lines : England to have the Mediterranean coast, leaving to France the Riff country—Germany to take the Atlantic coast-line of Morocco, leaving to France the Atlas Mountains. In other words, M. Hubert says, England would possess strategic Morocco, Germany commercial Morocco, and France picturesque Morocco.

“ M. Hubert proclaims such a programme as impudent, and in this we agree with him.

“ But what we cannot comprehend is, how in the midst of these rival ambitions and this international covetousness M. Hubert, with all the coolness in the world, can propose that we should assume a protectorate over all Morocco, and instal ourselves imperceptibly in the Sultan's place

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. . . (M. Hubert then proposes the enlistment of a native gendarmerie under French officers and a French Resident-General attached to the person of the Shereef, to tender good advice and to fulfil French obligations towards the people of Morocco) . . . This system of a protectorate is only separated by a hair's-breadth from annexation, to which we should be driven by the force of circumstances. In this way France would find herself in a corner which would paralyse her for a number of years, even supposing, which is not at all likely, that Spain, England, and Germany, should remain indifferent and allow themselves to be effaced. But M. Hubert has discovered an infallible method of conciliating these nations and obtaining their consent to his plans. He would inform them that it would be for their sake only that France would take up this task—that it would be for their sake only that we should spend our money and shed the blood of our soldiers; that we would only instal ourselves at the side of the Sultan, that we would only inaugurate a gendarmerie, we had almost said that we would only undertake the conquest of that great Empire, for the sole purpose of opening up a vast market for the benefit of our industrial and commercial rivals, and from which policy they would reap all the profit. They would be enabled under the protection of our bayonets to penetrate into regions hitherto inaccessible, and there carry on their commerce in safety. M. Hubert continues with the greatest frankness: 'After giving these pledges of our pacific intentions, France would moreover undertake not to erect any fortifications in the Empire, she would moreover faithfully adhere to the principle of the open door—she would not insist on any preference being given to her own products, and would consent that the import and export duties at the ports should

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be the same for goods from whatsoever origin they came.'

" 'In this sublime combination,' M. Méline retorts, 'France is here duly warned of all that awaits her. While it is she who will defray all the expense, it will be other nations who will take all the profits.'

"France is to take the Sultan under her protection, and will defend him against his rebellious subjects, which will be no easy task. We shall have to fight foot by foot against a warrior race entrenched behind its mountains, and shed French blood in torrents. We shall find ourselves bound down just at the moment when we ought to have liberty of action, and for our reward we would have the satisfaction of witnessing English and German products invade, to our detriment, all parts of the Empire.

"For if it be a question of discussing the need for extensive military operations, there would be no question as to the results of the economic contest.

"Handicapped as are our French productions, we cannot attempt to compete successfully for cheapness with English and German industry. As it is, we are sorely put to it to defend ourselves against them in our colonies, in spite of a customs tariff favourable to us and by which we are protected.

"To deny us this protection in the markets of Morocco would be to make competition on our part impossible, and we should be in no better position than we are to-day. We might continue to ship sugar, candles, and farinaceous food-stuffs, and that would be about all. Our protectorate, once established under these conditions, would afford us a false market, and public opinion in France would never ratify such an adventurous policy, which would not even have the excuse of conferring upon us any material benefit.

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“ Our friends of the Colonial Party will do well to reflect before committing themselves to such an enterprise which might tend to bring about a reaction in our country against all colonial policy, and which we should be the first to deplore. It would not be France alone which would have cause to complain. Our great Colonies, for which we still have so much to do, and to whose development we should devote all our resources, would not pardon us for delaying such development, and for compromising our powers to defend them in exchange for the vainglorious ambition of attaching to our triumphal car an Emperor of Morocco.”

We have in this article of M. Méline a fitting reply to M. Lucien Hubert, and one which M. Etienne might also perhaps take to heart.

In almost every line M. Méline confirms the anticipations expressed in our second chapter, that, as time proceeds, France would chafe under the restrictions imposed by the principle of the open door, and would claim a revision of the Treaty. It may be all very well for M. Hubert to make generous promises, but to make them is one thing, to adhere to them for all time is another. We prefer to believe that this article of M. Méline represents the opinions of the more thoughtful section of his countrymen. He accentuates the line of argument adopted in these pages that France, in undertaking single-handed the burden of regenerating Morocco, would be overtaxing her strength. He adds that such an adventure might result in his country neglecting

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or possibly losing what she already possesses in other parts of the world. It is to be hoped that the wise counsel of M. Méline will bear fruit, and that it will have the effect, ere it be too late, of inducing M. Etienne to pause and ask himself whether France would not be consulting her best interests by seeking the co-operation of England in a dual control in Morocco. But M. Méline might ask in what way France's position is improved by this proposed dual control; how it will assist her to avoid the dangers to which he has drawn attention, or benefit her in any material way in return for all her sacrifices. In our opinion, the benefits would be incalculable. Such an arrangement would minimise, if not entirely dissipate, most of the dangers and difficulties which M. Méline forecasts. The warlike populations of Morocco, even those entrenched behind their mountain fastnesses, would recognise the overwhelming power of these two foremost nations, with vast populations and immense resources at their back.

The very fact of two nations being associated in this control in place of one only, would suggest to them that no ulterior ideas of conquest or annexation could possibly exist, and they would lose all fear of such a fate as has overtaken the two sister Mahommedan States lying to the eastward being in store for them.

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They would recognise that the *rôle* of these two nations would be confined to regulating the affairs of the Empire, and to giving to its people peace, prosperity and freedom from oppression.

On the frontier, French columns, assisted by properly trained soldiers of the Sultan, their operations no longer watched by the jealous eyes of other nations, would put down brigandage and assure peace in Algeria. There would scarcely arise the necessity for a show of force in any other part of the Empire, so long as a wise method of government be adopted from the outset.

We have before us the case of Tunis. What a contrast to the seventy years of trouble in Algeria, with its immense loss of blood and treasure, does the occupation of Tunis present!

Because France governs the country in the name of its own ruler assisted by his officials, the inhabitants of Tunis have quietly settled down to the new order of things, and the protectorate, after ten or fifteen years of French rule, has become self-supporting. There are those who considered that, had France retained the services of the Dey of Algiers and his officials to assist in governing the land, instead of shipping them out of the country during the first week of the occupation in 1830, she might have spared herself much of the blood and treasure which Algeria

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has cost her. If the two Powers enter into this compact with regard to Morocco, let them give it to be understood :

That the position of the Sultan Moulai Abdelaziz is to be paramount in the land, subject of course to advice being tendered to him. That his dignity is to be upheld, for Morocco is not Tunis, and the Mahommedan ruler of the latter country has but a million and a half of subjects, against the eight or ten millions under Moulai Abdelaziz, who, if not all submissive, still pray for him weekly in their mosques. That the religion of the Empire is to be respected.

That the mosques and Zawiat and other religious sanctuaries are to be inviolate, and that none but Moslems be allowed to enter them.

That all religious processions will remain unmolested.

That all persons, of whatever creed and station, are to be equal before the law.

That proselytising will be discouraged ; it is hazardous with Moslems. Drinking establishments will be prohibited, especially in the cities and towns of the interior, and, as far as possible, the importation of intoxicating liquors will be restricted. Absinthe drinking is much in vogue among the natives of Algeria, greatly to their detriment. Any sudden influx into the capitals

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of a great number of Europeans from the coast towns will be prevented.

Until such time as land and house property shall have materially risen in value, following on increased prosperity in the land, legislation will be introduced to protect the poorer class of owners from parting with their property to European speculators at ruinous prices, a state of things which would, later on, cause great discontent in the land.

That the currency of the country will be improved, and that the importation of the demonetised money of other countries will be prohibited under severe penalties.

Let the authorities stamp out vigorously the false coining, which is said to be still going on, and forbid the importation of arms and ammunition.

Let those in control place assessors in the custom-houses.

If all we hear be true, there is a certain section of traders who are favoured by their co-religionist administrators at the custom-houses, much to the detriment of the interests of traders of non-Moslem nationality. These latter find themselves between the upper and nether millstones. On one side, they have to contend with a large frontier free trade from Algeria, and on the other with an unfair assessment at the port custom-

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houses, which renders competition all but hopeless. When all these disadvantages are removed, there should be a prosperous future for all fair-dealing traders of all nationalities.

It is not to be anticipated that the cost of the proposed control will prove to be beyond the resources of Morocco, especially when prosperity begins to set in ; but should some deficiency at the commencement have to be made good, M. Méline will see that England would share the expense with France.

He will also see that, by this arrangement, a large portion of France's men and resources would be set free for the development, as also for the defence, of her colonies.

These colonies themselves, as well as those of Great Britain, would, by such a combination of these two foremost colonising nations, become safer. The partnership of these two nations in the regeneration of Morocco would have the effect of drawing them into closer ties of friendship and would incline them to stand by each other in a manner that no written Treaty might succeed in doing.

There are many who consider that longing eyes are being cast on the colonies of our two nations, and that fleets are being constructed by more than one Power with a view of later on wresting some of them from either or both of us ; but so

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long as we continue to work together, and so long as the civilian and military officials and colonists of both nations continue to fraternise, so long will our colonies remain safe.

With Spain conciliated, there would be quiet on the Mediterranean, at both its western and eastern extremities.

Even Russia approves of the *entente*.

The despondency of M. Méline with respect to the future of French commerce in Morocco is scarcely warranted.

M. Etienne maintains that it is even greater at the present time than that of England. In any case, the difference between them is only a matter of two or three hundred thousand pounds, one way or the other. M. Méline says France will continue to ship sugar, candles and food-stuffs. French trade is not quite so limited as this. Of candles she ships but few, but her trade in silk stuffs and raw silks amounts to a million of francs. We cannot see why France's proportion of the Morocco trade should not be maintained in the future, increasing by leaps and bounds with the expansion of trade which will be sure to follow in the train of good government in the land.

Were the Sultan a man of advanced years, strongly imbued with conservative ideas and fanatically opposed to all reforms, the task would be difficult and hazardous ; but fortunately he is

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a young man, fairly enlightened, intensely desirous of instituting reforms, and much ahead of his people in his ideas for their necessity. The task should therefore be rendered the easier of accomplishment.

It is not expected that the presence of European troops will be necessary in the land ; for the Sultan's forces, with the moral support of the two controlling Powers, should suffice to keep order between the several tribes in their internal conflicts. Should any unforeseen danger arise, necessitating the employment of European troops, Gibraltar and Portsmouth, Oran and Toulon are all in telegraphic communication, and not far away.

The regulation of the finances of the country should be the first to claim the attention of the controlling Powers.

Once these are put in order, the rest will be comparatively easy.

CHAPTER IX

THE ANGLO-FRENCH AGREEMENT

THE intelligence that the Anglo-French Agreement was signed by the Marquis of Lansdowne and M. Paul Cambon on Friday, April 8, 1904, came almost as a bolt from the blue. Surely undue haste was exercised in the carrying out of this Agreement, pregnant as it is with so much peril to the many nations of the world.

From the time when it was first mooted to its execution, barely nine months have intervened; and in less time than it takes Parliament to pass some Bill of only parochial importance, we find our Foreign Office abandoning a grand Empire, with a magnificent coast-line, into the hands of France. A vitally important Agreement of this nature could not possibly be discussed in all its bearings within less time than two or three years.

Every nation, every interest concerned in this Agreement, should have been consulted: England, Spain, France, Germany, Italy, so far as concerns Morocco; all the nations of the world, so far as

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concerns the Mediterranean ; Canada and Newfoundland, as regards the fisheries ; our Australian colonies, with reference to the New Hebrides (there will be trouble there yet) ; our Indian Government, respecting Siam ; and the trading communities having relations with Morocco and the Gambia. Our Admirals, our Field-M Marshals, our Generals, our shipowners and prominent traders should all have been asked their views on the subject. And what of our Diplomatic and Consular body in Morocco ?

Has our Minister, Sir Arthur Nicolson, with his nine years' experience in the land, been asked to furnish a report on the subject ? Have our two able Consuls, Mr. Herbert E. White at Tangier, and Mr. Allan Maclean at Casablanca, been asked for their opinions or for the opinions of the several Vice-Consuls under their jurisdictions in the other centres and seaports of the Empire ? These men are the successors of a long line of zealous public servants in Morocco, whose watchfulness for their country's interests for many past decades has been well known to all Englishmen residing in the land. They have ever been on the alert against French aggression, all being imbued with the spirit of watchfulness bequeathed to them as a tradition by Sir John Drummond Hay, that once sleepless Sentinel of the Straits.

If these men are not to be invited to the

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Foreign Office, and consulted at a time of crisis, such as we have been passing through, what is their *raison-d'être* on the Morocco coast at all?

The yearly commercial Reports sent to the Foreign Office by the two Consuls named are admirable, and compare favourably with any Reports sent by our Consuls from other quarters of the world.

But surely this function should not be the limit of their duties.

Had they been directed to contribute their experiences of Morocco, it is hardly to be inferred that that Empire would have been sacrificed by us and abandoned to France.

We have no means of ascertaining whether or not these officials have been consulted. We can only surmise that they have not, because there is not in this Agreement one single clause referring to Morocco which suggests a just appreciation of the situation. We may depend upon it that our neighbours have not so neglected the advice of their diplomatic and consular officials.

Should our surmise be correct, then it is an unpardonable lapse on the part of our Foreign Office. How is it to be expected, with the numberless threads in their hands of the interests of Great Britain the world over, that the authorities in that Office could possibly be in a position to

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disentangle, unaided, so knotty a question as that of Morocco? So far as appears on the surface, the only interests consulted were those of our authorities in Egypt, who, with their eyes fixed on the £10,000,000 of the Egyptian Debt Fund, which they were eager to obtain for improving Egypt, could not be expected to give any attention to the other interests of their country or of the various other countries concerned. It would be interesting to learn by what right England and France should constitute themselves the proper and competent arbiters to dispose of an independent Empire lying at the gates of Europe, and in which all the nations of the world are greatly concerned.

Why this hole-and-corner Agreement between only two among these many nations?

It were perhaps too much to ask that the rightful owner of that Empire should be consulted—rightful owners, not possessing fleets and armies, never are—although he has trusted implicitly to England, and has been grievously sacrificed by her. But why should a Concert of the Nations not have been summoned to settle the whole question? It will be remembered that M. Etienne, in his article in the *National Review*, used these words :

“France alone could fulfil this task, and Europe should confide it to France.”

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But Europe has not been consulted. It is England alone who has confided the task, and the nations of Europe sulk.

Why should England have tied her hands by signing this Agreement and leaving it to France to make separate arrangements as best she can with Spain, Germany, and probably other nations?

The peoples of those lands are displeased with this Agreement, as are also the trading communities having relations with Morocco and the Gambia.

We are told that this Agreement makes for peace, but it surely cannot be conducive to peace to give offence to so many nations.

And what if Germany should refuse to be bound by a thirty years' lease of the Morocco trade? What is to prevent France granting her a forty or a fifty years' lease, or even to agree to a perpetual open door to German commerce, while compelling England to abide by her thirty years' lease? There is no favoured nation clause in this Agreement.

Supposing France were to purchase Germany's assent by ceding to her a coaling-station on the Atlantic, would England be precluded from obtaining a similar concession?

It is well known that Germany has for years coveted a coaling-station at Fidala, between Rabat and Casablanca.

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As for Spain, the separate agreement which France is free to conclude with her may be pregnant with the greatest possible danger to the freedom of the Straits. While France is prevented—only so long as it may suit her, we feel convinced—from erecting fortifications on the southern coast of the Straits, what is to prevent her from aiding and abetting Spain to fortify their northern shore opposite Tangier?

By the terms of this Agreement France has obtained by a stroke of the pen more than she has striven for during the past half-century, and far more than in her wildest dreams she ever dared hope for, and in exchange for a set of avowedly worthless concessions. Thus, Lord Nelson's injunction to his countrymen that Tangier should either remain in the hands of a weak Power like Morocco, or be occupied by us, has been disregarded; and the strenuous effort made by the late Sir John Drummond Hay, during the best part of his lifetime, to keep France out of Morocco has been in vain. It will not be pleasant reading, neither will it be encouraging to British Ministers accredited to Foreign Courts, who may be, either at the present time or in the future, occupied in strenuously upholding the interests of their country, to contemplate the possibility of all the results of their life's work being undone at the stroke of a pen by officials at home. By the

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terms of this Agreement, France is enabled to consolidate her North African Empire, comprising about one-fourth of Africa, with a coast-line of 3200 miles, or one-fifth part of the total coast-line of that continent. Had the late Lord Salisbury been still living and in power, France would not have scored this triumph. In a speech of his delivered at Glasgow on May 20, 1891, he said :

“Morocco still remains the home of the worst abuses, of the greatest cruelty, of the greatest ignorance and backwardness in all that conduces to prosperity or humanity. It is there that we hear of the most terrible cruelties, and we have no power to prevent them, and some day or other—there is no danger threatening now, or I should not mention it—but some day or other Morocco will be as great a trouble to Europe, and will carry with it as great a menace to the peace of Europe, as the other Mahommedan countries farther to the east used to be twenty or thirty years ago.”

Do not these words suggest the immense value at which Lord Salisbury appraised Morocco, that he should predict an Armageddon whenever its dissolution should take place? But France has known how to bide her time, and when these giants among our countrymen have been removed from the scene, she recognised that her opportunity had come. It is an unpleasant task for those who keenly deplore the signing of this Agreement, to find themselves constrained to admire the tenacity,

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the astuteness, the methods of our neighbours (so long as such questionable methods in diplomacy are permitted and applauded), and to compare them with the incapacity of our own statesmen, who have thus played into France's hands and allowed her to put the finishing touch to her seventy-four years of aggressive policy, and to absorb the whole littoral of the Barbary States both in the Mediterranean and on the Atlantic. If this country considers it to be within the fitness of things that France should possess the whole of this littoral, why all those regrets and protests and heartburnings of Lord Aberdeen when France occupied Algiers, and of Lord Granville when she occupied Tunis and Bizerta? England frowned when those two minor Barbary States were taken, but she now smiles when the remaining State—and that by far the most important one—follows in the wake of the other two.

As if to add insult to injury, England in the present Agreement cancels all her protests—and almost apologises for ever having made them—against the unfair treatment meted out to her in Madagascar, a treatment so unfair as to have called forth angry words of resentment from Lord Salisbury.

Will any European, not a Frenchman, who has resided in Morocco, assert that France ever dreamed of possessing Tangier? For the past

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fifty years every Frenchman in Morocco, while maintaining that his country was the rightful heir to the Empire of the Shereefs, always conceded that Tangier would be occupied by England.

On this subject we here have the opinion of a French infantry captain, in a work entitled *Le Maroc*, published in 1895, Captain R. J. Frisch, in speaking of Morocco, writes :

“Does there remain anywhere so vast a field for cultivation, or a territory for peopling so fine and so near? Does there exist any strategical point more important, the appropriation of which will set Europe fatally by the ears? The question is about to be opened; how will it be solved? How many will be in at the death? To whom will the inheritance fall? England, a nation with a partiality for Straits, hankers after the choice morsel, the strategic pearl, Tangier opposite to Gibraltar. Spain, France, Germany, and possibly Italy will wrangle over the rest.”

Can any one, reading this quotation, fail to see that this worthy captain, but nine years back, had quite made up his mind that England would ultimately occupy Tangier, predicting that the other nations would come to blows over the remainder of the Empire? But he continues and invokes all the Powers to prevent this—and, speaking of Tangier, he says :

“In short, by its position on the Straits it commands the passage and could paralyse the influence of Gibraltar.

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If England considers Tangier as indispensable to the support of Gibraltar, we must in that case resign ourselves to the *status quo*. . . . This Strait, the natural passage joining the Atlantic and the Mediterranean, is a political and strategical factor of moment to all the maritime and colonial peoples. In view of the importance, present and future, of the Straits of Gibraltar, and unless the European Powers are content to renounce their maritime and colonial interests, it seems inadmissible that they can permit any one whomsoever from among their number to establish itself on the southern shore, on which works might be constructed which could at a given moment bar the great sea-way of the world. Now for England, a nation exclusively industrial and commercial, the free access to all sea-ways, especially those towards India, is a question of life or death."

M. Frisch, on the supposition that one among these nations should establish itself on the southern shore of the Straits, says :

"If nevertheless this should happen, it would not likely be international right which would be invoked to correct this state of things, but sheer force, that is, not only fleets but European armies."

To our mind these words of Captain Frisch are prophetic.

After another thirty years the closing of the door of commerce along 3200 miles of North African coast-line, as also the preparations which will no doubt be made for the sudden fortifying of Tangier and the Straits at any given moment

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in case of emergency, all this will become intolerable to the nations ; and then, as suggested by M. Frisch, fleets and European armies will be set in motion, not, as he conjectures, for the purpose of ousting the English from the Straits, but to oust therefrom his own nation. Our Foreign Office, by not accepting the offer made by M. Etienne for neutralising Tangier and the Straits, has done France an ill-turn.

As Alsace and Lorraine may for all time constitute a storm-cloud hovering over the French and German frontier, so will Tangier and the Straits become a perpetual storm-centre, and a hundred-fold more dangerous one, hanging over all the nations, who one and all will one day be called upon to eject France. It is the last straw that breaks the camel's back. Morocco will be the last straw in the present case. Better far, in her own interests, had France rested content with Tunis and Algeria, and not have undertaken, single-handed, the regeneration of Morocco.

She has over-reached herself.

What possible excuse can our Ministers make to the English nation to justify their action of giving to France more than she asked for? Let the reader remember the following passage, which we have already quoted from the article by M. Etienne in the *National Review* :

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"That guarantees should be demanded of France, I take for granted. There should be liberty of commerce there should be no differential tariff. Tangier should be neutralised and become the emporium of European trade."

M. Etienne thus formulated France's own conditions, which he considered it would be fair to impose upon her in return for her receiving a mandate to regenerate Morocco. He fixes no term for the determination of the commercial freedom or for the absence of a differential tariff; and yet, in spite of this, we find Lord Lansdowne cutting down France's offer in perpetuity to a period of only a thirty years' lease. Does any one who knows France now, after this Agreement is signed, anticipate that there will exist in Morocco either commercial freedom or freedom from preferential tariffs after the next thirty years?

Why was the offer of M. Etienne to neutralise Tangier not accepted? Why hand it over bodily to France with the one condition of not fortifying it? France has never asked for it.

We again quote Captain Frisch on this point :

"If the Suez Canal has greatly added to the importance of the Straits of Gibraltar, this importance will become unique in the world, because these Straits ceasing to serve exclusively for the transit of the Eastern Hemisphere will become the waterway in the great circumnavigation of the globe by way of the Isthmus of Panama, the construction

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of which has become incumbent on civilisation. . . . Whatever may become of Morocco, the question of the Straits is more irritating and more delicate. . . . Whatever attitude England may take up whenever the settlement of the Empire of Morocco should be taken in hand, and whenever the exchange of diplomatic views shall take place with a view of settling the question, the only manner of resolving it without prejudice to any one will be to neutralise the Morocco shore of the Straits, and further the other nations of Europe may consider, with abundance of reason on their side, that it will not be wise to stop short on so good a road, and that they should see that the entire length of the Straits be rendered accessible for all time to the fleets of all nations. This should be the only solution with a view to the interests of all concerned."

Captain Frisch may here advocate the neutralisation of the whole of the Straits with a view to including Gibraltar in them. This, of course, is inadmissible, but we have his admission that Tangier and the Straits in its vicinity should be neutralised.

Now that the Straits have been placed at the mercy of France, it would be curious to ascertain whether M. Frisch is still an advocate for their neutralisation.

But our authorities at the Foreign Office may retort that the terms contained in Article VII. of this Agreement are tantamount to a neutralisation of Tangier, of the whole of the Straits, and of the

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Atlantic coast down to the southern bank of the Sebu.

We think it will be an easy matter to disprove this contention. Article VII. runs thus :

“ In order to secure the free passage of the Straits of Gibraltar, the two Governments agree not to permit the erection of any fortifications or strategic works on that portion of the coast of Morocco comprised between, but not including, Melilla and the heights which command the right bank of the River Sebu. This condition does not, however, apply to the places at present in the occupation of Spain on the Moorish coast of the Mediterranean.”

Had Tangier and the Straits been neutralised, and had all the Powers been made parties to this Agreement, the duty of compelling France to respect such neutrality would have been incumbent on them all, and not, as at present, on England alone. Why should our Ministers gratuitously saddle this country alone with this duty? Are not all the other nations interested in the freedom of the Straits? Or, again, if war should break out between England and France, this latter Power would decide that a state of war relieved her from further compliance with the terms of Clause VII., and she would forthwith erect works at Tangier and the neighbouring coast to the detriment of our shipping.

This she would not be permitted to do by the

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other Powers, had they subscribed to the present Agreement in favour of neutrality.

Can the reader doubt, after these confessions of typical Frenchmen, that Lord Lansdowne had it in his power, had he so willed it, to have obtained France's consent to the neutrality of Tangier and the Straits in the vicinity of that port? We can well imagine the astonishment of M. Etienne, of Captain Frisch, and of all Frenchmen at the turn affairs have taken.

Elated with their easy victory, and relying on the spirit of lavish generosity and ready compliance with all their demands, which has been shown them by our Foreign Office, the French have taken heart, and are actually reviving the question of the construction of a Channel tunnel, a scheme which we thought had been buried for ever. They cannot see that this country has no desire to be linked with a Continent of unrest.

We should be thankful that we still have among us Lord Wolseley, a strenuous opponent of this scheme.

Here is an appropriate quotation from one of Sir John Drummond Hay's letters :

"Should France annex or establish a Protectorate over Morocco, the port of Tangier might be made a safe and well-fortified harbour for torpedo vessels and the like craft, and other harbours could be formed likewise to the eastward between Tangier and Ceuta. France and Spain

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would probably be allied in case of war, and our shipping would only pass by running the gauntlet. Gibraltar must fall, or come to be of little value as a harbour of refuge. It is our duty, it is the duty of all the Powers, who desire the maintenance of the *status quo*, to take a more active and decided part than they have done hitherto, in requiring the Sultan and his Ministers to introduce reforms and improvements, and that the people of this country (Morocco), who can be almost seen from the shores of Europe, should not be allowed to remain in their present degraded state, a disgrace to civilisation. But this is a totally different view of the question from that of allowing France to become mistress of the great gut of commerce, where all our shipping must pass when bound for the East and for India, and to say to us 'ne plus ultra.' It must be remembered that Lord Nelson used to say our naval success in the South of Europe would depend on the friendship of Morocco, or on our obtaining possession of Tangier. He foresaw that any great Power established on a sure footing on the North African coast would practically command the passages of the Straits for seventy miles."

With this injunction from the immortal Nelson confronting our successive Governments, they have permitted France to creep along and establish herself on nearly the whole of this North African coast. Captain Frisch styles Tangier the strategic pearl. Baron de Combourg, whom we have already quoted, called Tunis a jewel and Bizerta a priceless treasure. And our Ministers scatter with lavish hands these pearls, these

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jewels and these priceless treasures into the lap of France!

Ill fortune appears to dog this country's footsteps in many of its dealings in the Mediterranean. The easy occupation of Algiers by our neighbours was undoubtedly facilitated by Lord Exmouth's bombardment of that city in 1816, which paved the way for our neighbour's success in 1830. Tangier, for the second time, has slipped through our fingers. In 1684 we lost it, owing to religious feuds; in 1904, through unwise and inexperienced statesmanship. It was an ill-fated day, March 7, 1684, when the *Grafton* left the port with the remainder of the English garrison. There were wise men in those days who were more far-sighted than the ruling powers in office. It appears that Samuel Pepys, of diary fame, in his capacity of Secretary to the Navy Board, proceeded to Tangier to superintend its evacuation. A friend of his, a merchant in Cadiz, whose name, Charles Russel, deserves to be perpetuated, wrote to Pepys, congratulating him on his arrival at Tangier:

"I had rather," he writes, "you and all that came about the design had tarried at home. The prize, Tangier, from old till then, had always been considered how it helped the Romans in their progress in Barbary, was no less useful to the Moors in their conquest of Spain. The French covet it for trade, the Spaniards and the Dutch dread it,"

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Lieutenant-Colonel John Davies, who quotes this letter in his history of the 2nd Queen's Royal (afterwards the Queen's Royal West Surrey) Regiment, adds :

"But the restored Monarchy, with their religious jealousies, were not to be appeased; the sacrifice of Tangier is not one of the least of the injuries done to the State and Commonwealth by the surprising unpatriotic religious jealousies of those times."

Then referring to the various English governors of Tangier, he adds :

"Many of them had only looked to present profit, and not patriotically to the welfare of the kingdom of which it was so valuable an outpost."

It is a thankless task, and one which requires a certain amount of moral courage, to raise a dissentient voice against this Anglo-French Agreement, in face of the overwhelming approval with which it has been greeted by the people and the press, with but few exceptions, of this country. A speech of Lord Salisbury delivered at Glasgow has already been quoted.

In the *Times* of the day following its delivery there are these words in its leading article commenting on the speech :

"The truth is that incapacity at the Foreign Office is a national calamity of the first magnitude. It can neither

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be criticised nor left alone without grave injury to national interests."

We, however, have the courage to give it as an opinion that the signing of this Agreement will carry with it most fatal consequences to the interests of this country, and that before the year 1934 be reached, the people of Great Britain will come to look back upon Friday, April 8, 1904, as one of the blackest Fridays in the annals of this Empire. There was a black Friday in 1866, with consequences far-reaching and disastrous; but those were only financial, whereas in the present case the consequences will be far more disastrous, strategically, politically and commercially. While England effaces herself in Morocco in favour of France, France proclaims that her political interests and rights in Egypt still remain intact. She retains the right of fishing in the coast waters of Newfoundland. She may purchase bait, a privilege hitherto denied her. She still holds the islands of St. Pierre and Miquelon, those nests for smugglers, to serve as pin-pricks to Canada, Newfoundland, and the United States, whose revenues suffer in consequence of their nefarious trade. Could not the cession of one or both of these islands have been brought about, our Government presenting it, or them, to Canada? They are only ninety-three square miles in extent, whereas our Government has

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ceded to France some 8000 square miles of territory in Africa, besides paying a large indemnity for the benefit of the French fishermen.

Every Frenchman knows that his country has scored a diplomatic victory, and that England has suffered a most ignominious defeat. It would be superfluous to quote here the words of approval contained in the greater portion of our press, with but few exceptions.

One would be led to think that the Millennium had arrived. We shall see. Time will show. We may have a rude awakening before this war in the Far East is over, and when it is over the danger will be all the greater at the settlement of peace terms.

It will better serve the purpose to quote from the French press some opinions of this Agreement, especially those written during the first few days after it was signed before our neighbours had time to moderate their transports, and in order not to crow too ostentatiously over their victory, and so awaken the people of this country to the fact of the diplomatic defeat which our Government had sustained.

The *Journal des Débats* writes :

“France has only conceded rights which were without value save for the purpose of hindering and annoying the British, while the latter Power has granted most momentous concessions of real and practical value.”

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La Liberté writes :

"France has given way in purely secondary points of questionable value."

The Paris correspondent of the *Daily Telegraph*, in sending the above two quotations, adds :

"The opinion is elsewhere held that the Convention is a triumph for French diplomacy, and no attempt is made to hide the satisfaction that is felt in consequence."

La Petite République says :

"It seems to us that France receives more than she gives."

The *Figaro*, while approving the Agreement, shows the cloven foot thus :

"On the other hand, it is excessive for us to assume the whole burden of the transformation of the Shereefian Empire, while leaving to our commercial rivals the right to dispute the profits with us for thirty years."

The Paris correspondent of the *Sunday Times and Special* of April 10 writes :

"When the news became known yesterday that the Anglo-French negotiations had come to a conclusion, and that England had conceded all along the line, the feeling of astonishment was as pronounced as that of jubilation. The sentiment here has always been that Great Britain generally managed to secure her own interests at the expense of her neighbours, but this time the wildest

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Chauvinist is mute. The delight of the French press is almost childlike. You can see peeping out in every paragraph the exclamation, 'Why, we have given practically nothing and have received almost everything.' As to Newfoundland, this was slipping through France's fingers. By this Treaty the error of Utrecht is galvanised into fresh life, with this addition that the French fishing industry is now to be supplied with plenty of bait. While the unfortunate Englishmen (in Paris) are filled with dismay, Paris newspapers are in ecstasy over the Morocco Agreement."

Le Matin is most careful to explain that

"the obstruction against the disposal of the £10,000,000 of the Egyptian Debt Fund, which is to cease, is merely a business transaction and leaves the political point of view absolutely untouched. It affects no French rights, no French interests in Egypt."

Le Temps says:

"Nothing short of war would put England out of the valley of the Nile. That war we have not waged. England, now that twenty years have passed away, effaces herself in Morocco in order that we may recognise in Egypt what we have not been able to prevent and could not any longer hope to frustrate."

These candid French opinions cannot be pleasant reading for our diplomatists. This last quotation from the *Temps* especially should be framed in ebony and placed on the walls of our Foreign Office.

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In London the *Morning Post* stands almost alone against the Agreement. It describes itself as amazed, and adds :

“ But we deeply regret that the British Government has so little diplomatic insight as not to have known that for a free hand in Morocco France would have readily conceded every tittle of right which she retains to interfere in the administration of Egypt. Never in our recollection has Great Britain given away so much for nothing. We cannot but believe that our French neighbours would have been more disposed to regard this country with respect and affection if Great Britain had been fortunate enough to have in its Government diplomatists worthy of the men they had to meet.”

These words from the *Morning Post* suggest the idea whether it will not become advisable for our budding diplomatists to be trained in the art of Treaty making.

They will never be able to hold their own in this branch unless they are sent to Russia or France to study methods which will equip them for the task of obtaining justice for their country in such future Treaties as they may find themselves engaged in framing. The Ministers in our Foreign Office are too childlike and bland in the hands of Russian or French diplomatists, and when we hear rumours of a possible *rapprochement* between this country and Russia, we tremble at the thought of how totally unfitted our Ministers

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are to cope with the subtleness of that Empire's politicians.

The *Daily Chronicle* is "not at all sure that Lord Lansdowne has not paid too much and received too little."

The Paris correspondent of the *Pall Mall Gazette* writes, in speaking of the depression felt by the English colony in Paris :

"For a carte-blanche on the Shereefian Empire something more tangible might have been exacted than the prosaic advantages granted in Egypt. In fact, this Agreement is a triumph for M. Delcassé."

He complains of the poor bargaining qualities of Lord Lansdowne.

For the present the mischief is done, but not, we trust, permanently. Let us hope that an opportunity will arise to enable the question to be re-opened and adjusted in the true interests of France, of England, and of all the nations.

All the promises of Lord Lansdowne, that he would safeguard the interests of British trade, resolve themselves into his safeguarding them for thirty years only, as if the third part of a century were of any moment in the years to come in the matter of a great commercial outlet. Were the large landowners in this country to be told that after the expiration of thirty years the

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hundreds of thousands of acres of their landed possessions would revert to the State, with which they would have to negotiate afresh for a renewal of their tenure, it might bring home to their minds that the framing of the thirty years' clause in this Morocco Agreement is something very akin to treason against British commerce. Every State, every coast in Europe and America bristles with custom-houses levying heavy toll on all British products ; and here is a coast-line of 1300 miles in length, which has been an open door to our trade since the time when Queen Elizabeth granted special privileges for trading therewith to the Earl of Leicester, now handed over light-heartedly to our neighbours.

It was a coast-line and an open door which could have been secured to us in perpetuity, had the dual control been adopted for which we have so earnestly pleaded in these pages.

But, unfortunately, after the next thirty years it will become as much a closed door to our commerce as are the many other doors of the various countries of the world.

Do the people of England and the Press, who are all hailing this Agreement with acclamations of joy, realise what we have lost in this question of Morocco alone ?

(1) We have lost Tangier and the Straits, which we could have had for the asking ; or we

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could have accepted our neighbour's reiterated offers, to neutralise these two positions.

Both M. Etienne and Captain Frisch advocated their neutrality as being the only method of protecting the interests of all nations. Lord Lansdowne therefore has needlessly conceded more than was asked of him, and has abandoned a strategical point of unique and priceless value. All the safety which we should have derived from the joint possession of Tangier is lost, and this gate of the Straits may one day be shut against us.

Sir John Drummond Hay used to style himself the Sentinel of the Straits on behalf of his country.

His country has now been relieved of that post, and the guard has been changed. She has gratuitously forfeited her right to it, and it is now France which will be their Sentinel for all future time.

No vessel will be able to pass in or out of the Mediterranean but by her permission. In vain would ships attempt to pass in or out in the night. Searchlights playing over so narrow an arm of the sea would reveal everything upon it on the darkest of nights.

(2) We have lost a thousand miles of the Atlantic coast of Morocco, a fresh menace to our over-sea commerce. But, it will be said, France has undertaken not to fortify any part of that coast down to the north bank dominating the river Sebu.

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In the first place, there is a sufficiently long stretch of coast south of that river which it is open to France to commence fortifying from to-morrow ; and from the estuaries of the Oomrebeya, the Tensift and the Wad Sous and other rivers, torpedo-boats and destroyers and submarines could issue and harass our fleets and merchant vessels on this important seaway.

And in the second place, do the framers of this clause place any reliance upon these promises not to fortify ?

Russia, in the Treaty of Paris in 1856, stipulated that Sebastopol should never again be fortified. In 1871, at the Conference of London, she denounced the Treaty of Paris, and for many years Sebastopol has been more heavily fortified than ever it was. At the Berlin Congress in 1878, Batoum was ceded to Russia, which Power engaged to maintain it as a free port and never to fortify it. In 1886 she denounced the 1878 Treaty, cancelled the freedom of the port of Batoum, and this port is, to-day, as almost strongly fortified as Sebastopol.

Another case in point is Dunkirk. Louis XIV., when he acquired possession of Dunkirk, solemnly undertook to raze its fortifications to the ground, and never again to construct them ; yet Dunkirk to-day is a strongly fortified port.

Yet another case. On February 10, 1763, there

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was a Treaty made between Great Britain and France, signed by the Duc de Choiseul and the Marquis Grimaldi, which runs thus :

“ The King of Great Britain cedes the islands of St. Pierre and Miquelon in full right to his most Christian Majesty to serve as a shelter to the French fishermen, and his most Christian Majesty engages not to fortify the said islands ; to erect no buildings upon them, but merely for the convenience of the fishery, and to keep upon them a guard of fifty men only for the police.”

Yet to-day the island of St. Pierre is fortified. Again, in a Treaty signed between the two nations on September 3, 1783, there are these words :

“ The King of Great Britain, in ceding the islands of St. Pierre and Miquelon to France, regards them as ceded for the purpose of serving as a real shelter to the French fishermen, and in full confidence that their possession will not become an object of jealousy between the two nations.”

Now, these islands do cause much anxiety, for they are nests of a smuggling trade which causes great losses to the revenues of Canada and Newfoundland, and their occupation is not simply to serve as a shelter to French fishermen.

Why is it required of England that she alone should adhere to all her engagements, even those of two hundred years' standing, while France and Russia are permitted to evade all conditions of

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Treaties to which their representatives have appended their signatures?

Again, French Ministers in 1881 gave most positive assurances that there was no intention of fortifying Bizerta; to-day Bizerta is becoming one of the strongest fortified positions on the Mediterranean.

While on the subject of fortifications, let it be borne in mind that, had the dual control been adopted, there would not have been the slightest necessity for one single gun to be mounted pointing seaward all along the coast from the Algerian frontier down to Cape Bojador on the Atlantic.

To continue, as to what this country has lost by this Agreement, besides Tangier, the Straits, and the Atlantic coast-line of Morocco.

(3) We shall lose a colossal market after the expiration of thirty years. That this thirty years' clause has grievously disappointed the firms trading with Morocco goes without saying. During this interval, British capital and British energy will take a predominant part in expanding this trade in a wonderful degree, and it will probably culminate in reaching a volume by the year 1934 of some forty million pounds sterling. To-day's trade of Tunis and Algeria together amount to thirty million pounds annually. When the fateful date 1934 arrives, but probably before, the death-knell will sound of Britain's share in that gigantic trade, and

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then France will be within her right to close every door in the Empire against the trade of other nations, taxing if she wishes it—and she will wish it—British cottons to the extent of from 40 per cent. to 120 per cent. *ad valorem*, as she has, without any right, taxed them in Madagascar for years past.

The present proportion which British cotton goods to-day bear to the total trade of Morocco, imports and exports, is about one-fifth part. It is therefore to be assumed, if this proportion be maintained in the future, that something like seven or eight million pounds sterling will represent the value of British cotton goods exported to Morocco by the year 1934, and the sudden closing of this market to such a volume of trade is not to be contemplated with equanimity by the Manchester shipping houses and manufacturers. It has already been shown how the British cotton goods trade with Algeria has been utterly ruined; and after the 31st December, 1912, the date on which Lord Salisbury's Treaty will expire, France will be able to treat us similarly in Tunis.

We speak of thirty years as being the period before which British trade with Morocco will become practically extinct; but it is the firm conviction of many that long before that time France will discover methods seriously to obstruct British trade in favour of her own.

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And when the doors are closed from Tunis to Senegambia, France will have a virtual monopoly of trade, of possibly between eighty or ninety millions of pounds sterling in an Empire close to her doors, with only twenty-five to thirty millions of native populations to keep in order, and in a climate which, if we eliminate Senegambia, is most salubrious. Contrast with this how England's trade with India (Bombay, Madras and Bengal) amounts to but £60,000,000, and this, with the burden of ruling some three hundred millions of peoples of various races and creeds, at a distance from home of six thousand miles, and in a climate far from healthful.

England's total trade with Canada amounts to but £35,000,000 ; with Australia and Tasmania to £41,000,000 ; with New Zealand to £17,000,000 ; with the Cape of Good Hope and Natal to £32,000,000. The comparison of these figures with the future volume of trade we predict for Morocco will bring out in relief the magnificent market which our Ministers have virtually lost to the country.

(4) We have lost control over the whole untold mineral wealth of six hundred miles of the Atlas range.

(5) We have lost a fine field for colonisation near home.

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(6) We have lost an immense granary at our very doors.

In an earlier chapter we quoted Mr. Stutfield's words regarding Morocco as a possible granary for England. The following, also from his book, is worth quoting in this connection :

"The food-producing power of Morocco being, as I have shown, vastly in excess of the needs of the inhabitants, a large surplus would be available for exportation. The benefit England would reap from this change can hardly be overstated.

"Much has been said of late about the danger of starvation overtaking us at home in the event of a war with a maritime Power, and few will deny that this is a real and terrible danger. England can never hope to be self-supporting, but must always depend on others for supplies. Hence it must always be a matter of great moment that the sources of those supplies should be as numerous, and, above all, as near at hand, as possible. Why should Morocco not now be made one of the granaries of England?

"For this purpose the country need not pass into any other hands than those of its present owners; all that is required is that it should be opened up. . . .

"In gratitude for thus opening up his country the Powers would doubtless display the same paternal solicitude for the Sultan's welfare that they do for his rival on the Bosphorus, and beneath the sheltering wing of a multiple control, or some similar diplomatic arrangement, he could rest secure from the aggressive designs of France or Spain. Every consideration points to the desirability of an early settlement of the question.

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"The agents of France are maturing their schemes for annexing the country, and are only awaiting a favourable opportunity. The acquisition of Morocco would be a great step towards the realisation of the pet project of many French statesmen, the creation of a great North African Empire, which, extending from Suez to Cape Spartel, would rob England of whatever naval supremacy is left to her in the Mediterranean, and convert that sea into a French lake.

"Better far for Morocco herself that her regeneration, if it is to be effected at all, should be brought about by the collective action of Europe, than by that of a single Power whose former colonising efforts have been notoriously unsuccessful.

"Is it too much to hope that some settlement be arrived at, which, while safeguarding the legitimate interests of each individual Power, shall let the light of modern ideas into this most benighted region of the Dark Continent? No pains are spared to open up the distant, unhealthy and comparatively barren regions of Equatorial Africa, yet not a finger is stirred to do the like for what is, after all, the cream of the Continent, its North-West corner."

All Mr. Stutfield's words and warnings have been disregarded. Literature relating to Morocco is probably not read in the Foreign Office. He advocated educating public opinion on the subject of Morocco. But it is perhaps too greatly daring to appeal direct to a public whose Ministers have not heeded the injunctions of Lord Nelson and of Sir John Drummond Hay.

Mr. Stutfield's solicitude that this country

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should possess in Morocco a granary for the support of its people is met by the Foreign Office handing over this granary to France, which, in the year 1901, produced in her own land thirty-eight million quarters of wheat, and disclaiming all share for Great Britain, which in the same year produced only seven millions of quarters. It almost amounts to a crime to hand over to France what she herself possesses in abundance, and to withhold from England that of which she stands in so much need. Were England associated with France in Morocco, she also would be well on the road to becoming self-supporting in cereals, vegetables, and fruits; but this is now no longer possible.

France, from possessing a smaller population, with one single exception, than any other among the great Powers, a population which, in a few years more, would have reached the distinction of being the smallest (so rapidly is Italy overtaking her in this respect), has now, by the signing of this Treaty, been raised to the position of a nation numbering over fifty millions of inhabitants, all virtually in Europe, her latest acquisition affording a recruiting-ground for her armies which Europe will have serious cause to recognise later on.

(7) We have lost a coast on which the fisheries are bound to become highly developed, especially

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in the seas between Capes Juby and Bojador, which teem with fish.

The Germans are now trawling in those seas, and our own fishermen may follow, but after 1934 they will receive notice to remove beyond the three-miles limit.

(8) We have lost a share in a fine Riviera.

(9) In thirty years time we shall lose the carrying trade with those 1300 miles of coast. Our Foreign Office appears to have overlooked this aspect of the case. But this blindness is only consistent with its policy throughout.

The French Government, in its fostering care for its mercantile marine, decrees that the inter-coastal trade, both passenger and cargo, between any two ports in France, as also between any of these and Algeria, must be carried on by French vessels alone. There is not the slightest doubt that after the year 1912 in the case of Tunis, and after the year 1934 in that of Morocco, the entire coast from Tunis to Senegambia, some 3200 miles in extent, will be brought within the scope of this law of *petit cabotage*. All trading, therefore, between this coast and the 3200 miles of coast-line of France itself will be interdicted to British vessels. Every passenger, every ton of cargo between any ports situated on these 6400 miles of coast, will have to be carried by vessels flying the tricolor, and, as may be imagined, the

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interchange of the requirements of these sixty or seventy millions of peoples will be very great. At the present time there is often a fair trade for British steamers in the carrying of cargo and passengers between port and port in Morocco. After 1934, should any British ships still be trading between England and Morocco (a very doubtful survival, for British trade on that coast will be strangled), this Morocco intercoastal trade will be denied to them.

If this handing over to France of such long stretches of coast is to be continued by our Government, it may become advisable for our shipowners to dispose of many of their vessels, for which they will have no further use, and sell them to France, which will require them for her increasing trade monopolies. The case would become still more aggravated should France see her way in the future to bring the whole of her coast-line and that of her colonies, some 12,000 miles in extent, within this law of exclusive French navigation. Should the Atlas Mountains in the future yield the vast quantities of minerals which it is expected they will do, every ton of ore destined to be shipped to France for smelting purposes will have to be carried by French vessels only.

About the middle of the present century the Briton of that day will behold this enormous

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Empire—Tunis, Algeria, Morocco, Senegambia, French Soudan, French Guinea, French Congo—consolidated under the tricolor, enjoying a trade probably exceeding 120 million pounds sterling, with an enormous population, the whole but a few days distant from the English Channel.

He will see the whole of Morocco well cultivated and irrigated, growing many tropical products, which Europe never dreamed could be produced so near. French colonists will swarm over the land, to the exclusion of those from England. French railways will extend from Tunis to Senegambia and probably to Timbuctoo, as also from the coast to the foot of the Atlas Mountains. Health resorts will be developed at different points of the coast, especially at Tangier and Mogador, with visitors adding to the prosperity of the land by spending money freely. Naval stations will be erected at suitable intervals.

The harbours will be filled with shipping, seven-eighths of it under the French flag. Immense quantities of grain and raw cotton and of the hundred and one other products of that fertile soil will be shipped to Europe and elsewhere.

The land will be re-afforested, resulting in a greater and more assured rainfall, as well as yielding large quantities of timber for export.

The principal rivers will be covered with steam and sailing craft laden with European merchandise

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for the cities and towns of the interior, and returning with the country produce for the coast, for shipment to Europe and America. Vast numbers of cattle, sheep, horses and mules will be exported. The French will establish farms for improving the breeds of all these animals.

Hitherto the price of horseflesh in Morocco has been kept ridiculously low, owing to the fact that the Moorish Government strenuously opposed (save under very exceptional conditions, as in the case of a horse presented by the Sultan to a visitor about to return home) the export of horses and saddle animals. As, however, there is no reason to suppose that a similar prohibition will be continued by the new controllers of the Empire, it is obvious that the prices will find their level and will rise considerably, since in future purchasers will be able to take horses out of the country, and Morocco will thus become a new market for supplying Europe with horses.

Hotels and villas will stud the coast and the lower slopes of the Atlas.

Fishery stations south of Agadir will carry on a lucrative trade.

Regiments of native troops will be stationed at every port, representing a native army, some half-million strong, ready to be ferried across to European battle-grounds to co-operate with the armies of France.

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Britons visiting the land in those days will be divided into two categories. While the sportsman, the tourist and the seeker after health will be cordially welcomed in the land, the British trader will meet with but scant courtesy. Everything will be done, and no expense spared, to attract the one; every means that ingenuity can devise will be used to repel the other.

England's share of this colossal trade may possibly be permitted to attain a volume of four to five million pounds sterling, of which coal (which we had much better retain for our own use) will form the greater part. This means that where our share to-day of the Morocco trade is about 50 per cent., it will by that period be reduced to 5 or 10 per cent.

In contemplating this state of things, the people of this country will feel amazed when they look back to the want of foresight shown by those British Ministers in power at the commencement of the century, who missed securing for their country a half-share in this Empire.

They will institute comparisons between British incapacity and French astuteness, between Britain's South Africa, the consolidation of which cost her over 250 millions of pounds and tens of thousands of lives, and France's possession of Morocco, which she obtained with but comparatively small expenditure of either treasure or life. Here is

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an object-lesson for the world of the power of the brain and the pen over that of the sword.

Astute French Ministers may, during the progress of these negotiations, possibly have played upon the fears of our Ministers by exaggerating the cost and the sacrifices which the absorption of Morocco would entail upon France ; and our Ministers, in their ignorance of the country, and disdaining to consult those who know it well, may have credited these fairy tales ; but the French know full well that by governing in the Sultan's name, and by abandoning their harsh Algerian methods, the task will be comparatively easy, and by no means costly.

Mr. Douglas Gane, in the *Pall Mall Gazette* of April 28, appears to draw comfort from the fact that if, at the end of thirty years, France should impose fiscal barriers in Morocco, it follows that we can do the same in Egypt. Vain comfort this ! Out of the total volume of Egyptian trade of imports and exports amounting in 1901 to £32,500,000, England's share was £14,750,000, while that of France was barely £2,750,000. This relative proportion is not likely to be disturbed, and there is no preferential tariff in favour of British goods.

Now, the trade of Egypt, with a dwindling Soudan population, is not likely to expand in the future in any ratio like that of Morocco,

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which has been so long dormant under bad rule.

Does Mr. Gane imagine that France would be deterred from closing the commercial door of Morocco, which would give her a 90 per cent. monopoly of its trade—her share of it probably amounts to £35,000,000—by the fear of losing a trade amounting to three or even five millions of pounds with Egypt?

Besides, other nations have trade interests in Egypt; and, should they object to Great Britain imposing differential tariffs, how is she to retaliate against France singly?

But, we are told, there were so many points in dispute between the two countries, which, while they remained unadjusted, constituted a real danger for us, that it was necessary for this Agreement to be signed. We fail to see any grounds for these fears.

Some of these differences between us have lasted throughout two centuries, others for a quarter of a century; and yet there has been peace between us for not far short of a century.

There was talk of a war in 1840, and, had Thiers had his way, there would have been war.

That statesman feared that we had designs on Egypt. Let us mark this. France had occupied Algiers ten years previously and yet begrudged us Egypt. Again, after occupying Tunis, she

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still begrudged us Egypt; and, even now that Morocco has been handed over to her with other most valuable concessions, she still proclaims that she begrudges us exclusive rights and interests in Egypt. Surely the Ministers of this country are as clay in the potter's hand. France's great ally is, moreover, in trouble herself and not in a position to aid her in any designs upon us.

But even now, had the various questions in dispute been definitely settled once and for all, there would have been a few crumbs of comfort. Something tangible would have been secured had France, in consideration of the large cession of territory to her in Africa, given up the two islands of St. Pierre and Miquelon; had her fishing rights within the territorial waters of Newfoundland been abolished, had she renounced all her political interests and rights in Egypt, and had she assisted England to proclaim a protectorate over that land in return for England's virtual permission to her to establish later on a protectorate over Morocco.

Even had the Agreement contained a clause that any proclamation of a protectorate over Morocco by France was to be contingent upon England being allowed by her to do the same in Egypt, the disaster of handing Morocco over to her would have been modified.

But these points have not been conceded.

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She still retains St. Pierre and Miquelon, the former fortified in contravention of solemn Treaties, exciting jealousies, owing to their illicit traffic. She still may fish and buy bait in Newfoundland waters. She still maintains her rights in Egypt. She may, later on, give us trouble in her newly acquired territory of part of Sokoto, on the Say Burruwa line. There is danger ahead with our Australian colonists over the New Hebrides.

The question now arises as to what England would have left, with which to bargain in case of future trouble between the two nations. France will not accept money compensation. She is too wealthy to be bought off with money, she will require payment in kind. What will our Foreign Office have to offer her? Positively nothing. It has been trading on its capital, and has parted with its chief asset, Morocco.

As it is commonly alleged that it is to the benefit of a nation to exist in the midst of wealthy neighbours, there are possibly some who may contend that it is improper for us to grudge France any of the wealth which she will certainly reap from her new position in respect of Morocco.

There is no question of grudging in the case. It has merely been advocated in these pages, that England should share with France the burden of Morocco, its expenses as well as its profits.

But this argument of the prosperity of a nation

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benefiting its neighbours does not invariably hold good, and it is proposed to show in an Appendix in the case of our neighbours how self-sufficing their country is, receiving very little from us in exchange for the vast amount we take from her.

We have already referred to the possible dangers likely to arise by leaving it to France to come to terms separately with any of the Powers who object to this Anglo-French Agreement, and now Mr. Douglas Gane points out a most serious one.

We have seen that England sanctions fortifications on those parts of the coast of Morocco occupied by Spain.

Now, Ceuta, opposite Gibraltar, is one of these points; and as a fortress is by many (and Sir John Drummond Hay was of their number) considered to be vastly superior to Gibraltar.

But Mr. Gane points out that there is nothing in the agreement which would prevent Spain transferring Ceuta to France. The latter Power would pay any price for its possession; and now that Morocco is finally lost to Spain, this position is of no great value to her. France would then be established in a first-rate position opposite Gibraltar, with all the danger that would arise to us from her proximity. The Agreement, it is true, stipulates that our Government must be informed of whatever arrangement may have been come to

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between France and Spain, but these secret arrangements are not always divulged until some convenient moment.

Mr. Gane points out what an opportunity we have lost in not associating Spain with us and France in these negotiations. He says :

“The recognition of Spanish susceptibility in regard to Morocco was a trump card in our hands, and it may be wondered if British statesmanship has made the most of its opportunities in omitting to play it.”

This co-operation of Spain with us and France was earnestly advocated in chap. vii. of the present volume.

France still poses, to our prejudice, as the friend of Spain.

For two centuries the Newfoundland shore has been a standing menace to the peace between our two countries.

Now the scene has shifted, and it will be the Straits of Gibraltar and the Mediterranean where the danger of the future will lie. Gibraltar watched by Tangier, and possibly by Ceuta ; Malta by Toulon, Rachgoun, Oran, and Algiers ; Cyprus and Egypt by Bizerta.

Having quoted French and English organs, it is only fair that we should quote a few opinions of our countrymen residing in Morocco ; they must know something of the question. The following

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are from the English paper at Tangier, *Al Moghreb al Aksa*. In its issue of April 16, announcing the signing of the Agreement, there is the following leader :

"THE DECLARATION AS VIEWED IN MOROCCO.

"The details of the Anglo-French Declaration, which we insert in this issue, afford sorry reading and offer a further proof, if indeed such were necessary, of the incapacity of our Foreign Office.

"The senility which has marked its action for years past has reached a climax in this its latest act, and the Declaration will, without doubt, remain a colossal monument of political folly, shortsightedness and trifling with the best interests of Great Britain, that has perhaps ever been recorded in the annals of British official blundering. . . . The events that have been fully before the eyes of British subjects in Morocco in the abnormal condition of the country during the past two years, seem to have been ignored by our Foreign Office. In short, it fully appears that our Foreign Office policy has been designed to lead the Sultan to political destruction, and to sacrifice every British interest. About two years ago our Foreign Office began well in starting the Sultan on the path of progress ; in carrying out its aims it has done nothing but blunder.

"Had it but acted with a little firmness, the opening up of this country would have already begun, and there would have been no 'Declaration,' which will assuredly give future Foreign Secretaries matter for some anxiety.

"The Declaration is only a display of political fireworks that will dazzle the eyes of the British public for a

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while, delighting our little Englanders, but only making the future hazy and possibly more dangerous to deal with. It seems only a way of putting off the real settlement, which may not wait for thirty years to be dealt with, on the points still at issue, and for which a splendid opportunity has been thrown away at Downing Street, and could have been availed of to maintain British interests, prestige and influence in this country.

"Briefly, we fear that the attainment of the end in view may yet cost millions to the British nation.

"That Morocco will progress under French guidance there can be no question, and France may be congratulated on her superior diplomacy and the working of her Foreign Office system. . . .

"Whilst the large part of the British Press is favourable to the Anglo-French Agreement, some of its leading organs have better realised that in other hands than those of our Foreign Office, Great Britain would have secured compensation which would have at least balanced the interests now thrown away.

"Whether five per cent. of the Press organs really understand the subject in all its bearings, both past and future, is, we are fully persuaded, something more than doubtful.

"The comfortable editorial office of a newspaper at home is not the place where the Morocco question could be studied. So far as opinion in Morocco is concerned, there is not a native or European, excepting French citizens, who does not condemn the Agreement."

We entirely concur with every word in this article of the *Al-Moghreb al Aksa*.

That this Declaration will give future Foreign

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Secretaries matter for anxiety, and that it will make the future hazy and possibly more dangerous to deal with, and that the attainment of a proper solution may yet cost millions to the British nation is certain.

We maintain that this Anglo-French Agreement does not settle the question. We maintain that the whole question should be re-opened and settled by the Concert of Europe. This is the only solution likely to make peace in the future, and at the rising of this Council each representative will have the satisfaction of knowing that he has done the best in his power for the interests of his nation. The question of the Straits of Gibraltar will be settled for ever. Better far that Spain should be given an accession of territory around her present possessions, with a guarantee to the Powers that she will not part with Ceuta. Better far that Germany should be given a coaling-station on the Atlantic, and Great Britain a similar station on the same coast, than to leave the whole coast exclusively in the hands of France.

But M. Etienne may say that this is impossible; that a Treaty once signed cannot be re-opened.

To this we reply that, in recommending the re-opening of the question, we are but following the declaration of M. Etienne himself, which will serve as a model in our present contention. In

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his article in the *National Review* to which we have already referred, there is a third section entitled "The Delimitation of the Frontier between the Niger and Lake Tchad." The Declarations which settled these questions were signed by France and England, the one on August 5, 1890, the other on June 14, 1898, and the matter was considered finally settled. Thus M. Etienne :

"Now, though the question was settled, so far as strict legality was concerned, by this instrument, the question has not, as a practical matter of fact, received a solution which France can accept or England impose. There is a question of equity as well as of law.

"It can never have been in the minds of those who negotiated in 1890, nor in those who drew up the arrangement of 1898, that the line to be drawn between Say and Barroua should have for its object, not the junction of the French Soudan with the Lake Tchad district, but the raising up of an impassable barrier between the two parts which it was meant to join. Such, none the less, is the result which has been practically obtained . . . But these conventions must be taken for what they are: they are texts subject to revision from the fact that they necessarily contain errors. The British Government, if it is to keep faith, cannot but recognise them."

The upshot of this is that the revision demanded by M. Etienne has been carried out in the present Anglo-French Agreement to the entire satisfaction of France.

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M. Etienne having fixed this precedent, it is easy to adopt his pronouncement in order to make it applicable to a revision of this Anglo-French Agreement.

M. Etienne, in his manifesto in the *National Review* to this nation, as also to the nations of Europe, promised and insisted on the neutralisation of Tangier.

He promised that there should be commercial freedom.

He promised that there should be no differential tariff.

These last two promises were not limited to any period of time.

The readers of that article concluded that these conditions were to exist for all time. Such must have been the interpretation put upon these words of M. Etienne by England and by the other nations of the world. And all these nations, our own included, were content to leave matters to our Foreign Office, and to the diplomatists of France.

It is now found that Tangier has not been neutralised, and that, under certain circumstances, the passage between the Mediterranean and the Atlantic may be barred against all the nations.

It is now found that, in place of perpetual freedom of commerce, and of an absence of

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differential tariffs, these boons to all the nations are to exist for a period of thirty years only.

Captain Frisch has told us that it is inadmissible that the European Powers can permit any one whomsoever among their number to establish itself on the southern shore of the Straits, and that therefore the only solution that remains is to neutralise it.

But this has not been done in the present Agreement, and therefore, in the words of M. Etienne, we maintain that this Agreement must be taken for what it is, these are texts subject to revision from the fact that they contain errors, and such errors are to be discovered in this Agreement of 1904.

The good fortune of France is as remarkable in this matter as our ill luck.

But for the anxiety of our Ministers to secure the good offices and friendship of France, as shown by their lavish generosity in this Agreement, and but for the undue haste with which this Agreement has been rushed through, with the war in the Far East continuing as unfavourable to the Russian arms as it is at present, we might yet have seen France approach this country, hat in hand, seeking an alliance and ready to subscribe to a convention containing far fewer advantages to her than she appears to have been able to extort in the present Agreement.

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The following quotations from *Al Moghreb al Akhsa* will bring this little book to an end.

The leading article (April 30) says :

“Of the thousands of British visitors who come to this country, scarcely one can be found who, in speaking of our occupation of Tangier in the seventeenth century, does not exclaim, ‘What a mistake to have given it up!’ A visit to this city by some competent member of the British Foreign Office, to study the subject of the present Anglo-Foreign Declaration on the spot, would doubtless have led that functionary to echo the words of the visitors. The Foreign Office would then without doubt have been guided on a saner course than the one taken. France, with a fixedness of purpose which does her credit, sent Monsieur Cambon here on two occasions within the past three years ; and that gentleman was thus better prepared to deal with the matter, and with a fuller knowledge, in which the British Foreign Office seems to have been wanting. If ignorance to a great extent was not the principal factor in the arrangement with France, then our policy must have been one of an over desire to please, to obtain in fact the probability of future ‘peace at any price’ a depth of political effacement and disregard of British interests present and future to which we could not believe any English statesman would descend, *facilis descensus* ; and the British nation may well fear that, in continuation of the Anglo-French Arrangement, Great Britain will suddenly realise that in geographical and commercial matters, as in her over-done free-trade system, she has nothing to play against the wiles and advantages of those with whom she has to deal.

“The true history of the doings of those who have

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worked with such fatal effects to British interests is one that would, without doubt, make even Lord Lansdowne more than stare, and perhaps wish that it were possible to undo what has been done. The British nation, almost unconsciously, has largely applauded the Agreement ; but to Britishers in this country, and they know best, never was a more glaring case presented to the world of a people showing their approval of a matter quite beyond their ken.

“To believe that the Agreement will last thirty years is to show a faith that is said to be able to move mountains.

“We in Morocco are wanting in this faith.”

In this article the writer deplores that our Foreign Office had not sent some competent member of its staff to Tangier to study the question on the spot, in the same way that the French Government had sent M. Cambon, the present French Ambassador in London, a co-signatory with Lord Lansdowne in this Agreement. How in these circumstances is it possible for Lord Lansdowne to be a match for M. Cambon ? It is a matter for regret that, on his recent tour to Egypt, Mr. Chamberlain could not have halted at Gibraltar and there studied the position, with a view to checking Lord Lansdowne's exuberant generosity.

Another correspondent to *Al Moghreb*, writing from Mogador, reconciles himself to our defeat, deplores that the Sultan, after having been taken in hand by England, and after showing

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himself a willing pupil under English tutelage, had been abandoned, and his country brought to a state of anarchy.

“So much for poor Morocco ! A more important point is, what has English influence done for England and English trade ? Can you quote one single measure adopted by the Moorish Government, during the past eight years, for the improvement of commercial facilities ?

“Granted willingly, that a few individuals, mainly adventurers, buffoons, and ‘artists’ of various kinds, have been well paid out of the treasury ; of what service is this to the general public ? Out of the borrowed millions has any attempt been made to protect shipping by a mole or a breakwater ? Are English traders in a better position for extending their commerce with the interior than they were eight years ago ?

“Has a single high road been made for wheel traffic ?

“Are the caravan routes safer than they were eight years since ? Have the resources of the country, from which foreigners as well as natives might benefit, been developed in the smallest degree by such simple means as increased irrigation ? Every British merchant in Morocco knows that nothing of the sort has been done, or ever dreamed of. Protect your trade by all means. Insist *vi et armis* on the open door for your calicoes and tea ; but, as for any more meddling in the internal affairs of Morocco, confess that France has every bit as much right as England. And I think most Englishmen who have studied their Morocco will admit that France has the advantage over us in knowing precisely what she wants, and in meaning to have it.

“I said that England has had her chance. This is putting

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it feebly—she has had chances flung at her. It is now ‘Too Late.’”

The utter despair shown in this letter represents the feelings of all Englishmen who know what they are talking about.

Let us trust that it be not too late.

Let the whole question be re-opened. The expansive ambition of Germany would serve this purpose.

It may be that if she could foresee all the trouble that is to come to her, and the probable neglect of, and the danger to, her own colonies as predicted by M. Méline, France herself would intercede to this end.

In that case it would be well for her that England should consent.

This time, however—if ever this time should come—let Parliament deal with the matter.

The Foreign Office has shown itself hopelessly unequal to the occasion.

There is not in all its archives a more painful evidence of incompetence than this Anglo-French Agreement in so far as it relates to Morocco.

By one stroke of the pen Lord Lansdowne has stultified all the life-work of Sir John Drummond Hay, who was appointed to the Legation at Tangier by a greater Foreign Minister than he.

This in itself was a proud achievement. But Lord Lansdowne is not satisfied. He has

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completely disregarded that wise pronouncement of his political chief Mr. Balfour, who, speaking at the Mansion House, November 1903, with reference, it is true, to another international problem, nevertheless propounded a sound principle which Lord Lansdowne might have taken to heart, the principle of "corporate action" as opposed to "the individual caprice" and "possibly the individual selfishness of this or that particular Power."

But Lord Lansdowne knew better. He preferred to act in opposition alike to the intelligent perspicacity of his present chief and the splendid traditions of his greater predecessors at the Foreign Office.

A P P E N D I X

THE following tables may, it is hoped, help to bear out many of the arguments discussed in the foregoing chapters.

They are in every case taken from official sources, but the need of getting out the book as quickly as possible, while the Anglo-French Agreement is still fresh in the public mind, has compelled a measure of haste in their compilation.

TABLE I

COMPARISON OF PRODUCE FROM CROPS IN UNITED KINGDOM AND FRANCE

| IN UNITED KINGDOM, 1901. | | IN FRANCE, 1901. | |
|-----------------------------------|------------|--|------------|
| Wheat . . . Quarters | 6,741,000 | Wheat and spelt (Quarters | 37,666,000 |
| Barley . . . „ | 8,455,000 | Barley . . . „ | 4,707,000 |
| Oats . . . „ | 20,147,000 | Oats . . . „ | 27,290,000 |
| | | Rye . . . „ | 7,050,000 |
| | | Maize . . . „ | 3,197,000 |
| | | Millet . . . „ | 135,000 |
| | | Buckwheat . . „ | 3,066,000 |
| | | Mixed corn . . „ | 1,044,000 |
| Total Quarters | 35,343,000 | Total Quarters | 84,155,000 |
| Beans . . . Quarters | 769,000 | Haricots, beans, peas, lentils (Quarters | 977,000 |
| Peas . . . „ | 502,000 | Potatoes . . . Tons | 11,824,000 |
| Potatoes . . . Tons | 7,043,000 | Beetroot for fodder „ | 12,228,000 |
| Turnips and Swedes „ | 25,299,000 | Hay from clover, lucerne, sainfoin „ | 11,798,000 |
| Mangold . . . „ | 9,226,000 | Hay from permanent grass „ | 15,422,000 |
| Hay from clover, Sainfoin . . . „ | 4,309,000 | Hops . . . „ | 3,148 |
| Hay from permanent grass . „ | 7,050,000 | Colza . . . „ | 54,000 |
| Hops . . . „ | 32,469 | Beetroot for sugar „ | 8,873,000 |
| | | Flax seed . . „ | 15,000 |
| | | Flax fibre . . „ | 24,000 |
| | | Hemp seed . . „ | 8,000 |
| | | Hemp fibre . . „ | 20,000 |
| | | Olives . . . „ | 105,000 |
| | | Tobacco . . . „ | 25,000 |
| | | Wine, 1321, 630,420 galls. valued in 1899 at . | 50,570,000 |
| | | Sugar from beet valued in 1899 at . | 7,500,000 |
| | | Tobacco valued in 1899 at . | 835,000 |
| | | France produced immense quantities of fruit and vegetables, these in 1899 were valued at . | 10,000,000 |
| | | Milk in 1899 was valued | 50,610,000 |

Appendix

TABLE I—*continued.*

| LIVESTOCK IN UNITED KINGDOM, 1901. | LIVESTOCK IN FRANCE, 1901. |
|---------------------------------------|--------------------------------------|
| Cows 4,102,061 | Cows 8,068,857 |
| Other cattle 7,375,763 | Other cattle 6,604,953 |
| Sheep and lambs 30,829,889 | Sheep and lambs 19,669,682 |
| Pigs 3,411,129 | Pigs 6,758,198 |
| Horses 2,011,701 | Horses 2,926,382 |
| | Mules 200,310 |
| | Asses 354,642 |
| | Goats 1,529,280 |

A glance at the above figures will show the immense agricultural superiority of France.

Thus endowed by nature, and possessing the requisite skill to develop the extraordinary resources of their soil, it is not to be wondered at, that the French show themselves averse from any scheme of expatriation, even to gratify the ambitions of M. Etienne and the Colonial party.

TABLE II

COMPARISON OF FOOD-STUFFS AND TOBACCO IMPORTED INTO THE UNITED KINGDOM AND FRANCE

| INTO UNITED KINGDOM, 1902. | | INTO FRANCE, 1902. | |
|---|----------------------------|---|------------|
| | Reshipments of Imports. | | |
| Cereals | £66,664,925 | Cereals | £9,138,475 |
| Living animals for food | 8,269,175 | Living animals for food | 2,354,994 |
| Oilseed cake for cattle food | 2,472,938 | Oilseed cake for cattle food | 562,563 |
| Hay for cattle food | 1,359,967 | Hay for cattle food | 23,093 |
| Dead meat and live and dead poultry | 40,378,906 | Dead meat, dead poultry | 1,290,356 |
| Lard | 4,118,992 | Lard | 221,007 |
| Fish | 4,108,786 | Fish | 2,379,851 |
| Butter | 20,526,690 | Butter | 653,885 |
| Margarine | 2,569,503 | Margarine | 4,914 |
| Cheese | 6,412,002 | Cheese | 1,461,392 |
| Milk | 1,707,031 | Milk | 23,282 |
| Eggs | 6,308,985 | Eggs | 882,518 |
| Dried and fresh fruit | 13,590,146 | Dried & fresh fruit | 1,639,067 |
| Potatoes | 1,589,432 | Potatoes | 195,097 |
| Fresh and dried vege- tables | 2,168,479 | Fresh and dried vegetables | 159,738 |
| Confectionery, glu- cose, molasses, and saccharin | 1,602,342 | Confectionery, glu- cose, molasses, and saccharin | 108,191 |
| Tea | 8,786,965 | Tea | 122,922 |
| Cocoa | 1,694,589 | Cocoa | 1,374,304 |
| Chocolate | 895,537 | Chocolate | 99,598 |

Appendix

TABLE II—*continued.*

| | | | | |
|---|--------------|------------|---|-------------|
| Coffee | £2,616,009 | 1,051,244 | Coffee | £3,536,598 |
| Sugar, 1,579,340 tons | 14,732,306 | 73,751 | Sugar, 97,000 tons | 799,080 |
| Beer, wines, spirits, liqueurs, mineral waters | 7,434,878 | 828,961 | Beer, wines, spirits, liqueurs, mineral waters | 5,188,285 |
| Spices | 865,079 | 530,031 | Spices | 344,473 |
| Chicory | 45,025 | 1,817 | Chicory | 89,105 |
| Tobacco, cigars, cigarettes | 5,792,353 | 438,649 | Tobacco, cigars, cigarettes | 1,211,754 |
| Hops | 798,586 | 21,401 | Hops | 226,900 |
| Yeast | 284,360 | 86 | Yeast | 10,059 |
| Seeds for sowing . . | 896,900 | 107,058 | Seeds for sowing . . | 409,052 |
| Total imports | 228,690,886 | 10,380,907 | Fruits and seeds for distillation and wine-making | 53,792 |
| Deduct reshipments | 10,380,907 | | | |
| | 218,309,979 | | | |
| Deduct shipments of foreign imports manufactured or prepared in United Kingdom— | | | | |
| Cocoa | £129,431 | | | |
| Coffee | 6,441 | | | |
| Rice | 160,169 | | | |
| Sugar (re- fined) | 399,458 | | | |
| Confection- ery | 850,825 | | | |
| Tobacco, cigars, &c. | 707,414 | 2,253,733 | | |
| Left in United King- dom for home con- sumption | £216,056,241 | | Left in France for home consump- tion, which is styled "Com- merce special" . . . | £34,564,405 |

The above table shows how this nation is compelled to spend £216,000,000 on foreign food-stuffs and tobacco, as against only £35,000,000 similarly spent by France.

Had our Foreign Office not done everything in its power to further the ambitions of France in Morocco, had we advanced a similar claim on the internal administrations of that Empire, we might surely have grown for ourselves much of these exotic requirements in a land but five or six days distant, instead of having to send our ships voyages lasting as many weeks and even longer.

Appendix

TABLE III.

COMPARISON OF TRADE BETWEEN THE UNITED KINGDOM AND FRANCE IN THE YEARS 1871 AND 1902.

YEAR 1871.

| UNITED KINGDOM IMPORTED FROM FRANCE. | FRANCE IMPORTED FROM UNITED KINGDOM. |
|--|--|
| Manufactured goods, including £2,543,000 of wine . . . £20,668,000 | Manufactured goods £12,010,000 |
| Agricultural produce 3,798,000 | Agricultural produce 2,750,000 |
| Raw materials . . 1,808,000 | Raw materials . . 217,000 |
| Books and pictures . 54,000 | Books and pictures . 24,000 |
| Fish . . . 150,000 | Fish . . . 120,000 |
| Minerals (asphaltum) 16,000 | Minerals (coal, £910,195) . . 1,010,000 |
| Other goods . . 3,252,000 | Other goods . . 2,076,000 |
| | Total of British produce and manufacture . . £18,207,000 |
| | Foreign and Colonial produce . . 15,388,000 |
| | <u>£33,595,000</u> |
| <u>£29,746,000</u> | |

Total trade in 1871, £63,341,000.

YEAR 1902.

| UNITED KINGDOM IMPORTED FROM FRANCE. | FRANCE IMPORTED FROM UNITED KINGDOM. |
|--|--|
| Manufactured goods, including £2,186,000 of wine . . . £35,232,000 | Manufactured goods £9,121,000 |
| Agricultural produce 11,596,000 | Agricultural produce 612,000 |
| Raw materials . . 1,776,000 | Raw materials . . 68,000 |
| Books and pictures . 361,000 | Books and pictures . 157,000 |
| Fish . . . 330,000 | Fish . . . 77,000 |
| Minerals . . . 588,000 | Mineral (coal, £4,378,961) . . 4,687,000 |
| Other goods . . 805,000 | Other goods . . 458,000 |
| Parcel post . . 220,000 | Parcel post . . 426,000 |
| | Total of British produce and manufacture . . £15,506,000 |
| | Foreign and Colonial produce . . 6,689,000 |
| | <u>£22,295,000</u> |
| <u>£50,908,000</u> | |

Total trade in 1902, £73,203,000.

Appendix

TABLE IV.

AMOUNT OF TRADE BETWEEN THE UNITED KINGDOM AND FRANCE IN THE DECENNIAL PERIODS 1861, 1871, 1881, 1891, 1901, AND ALSO 1902.

This table has been drawn up as a reply to a passage in an article of M. Paul Doumer in the *National Review* of June, 1904 :

| Year. | United Kingdom Imports from France. | Proportion of French manufactures taken by United Kingdom. | France's Imports from United Kingdom. | Proportion of British manufactures taken by France. |
|-------|-------------------------------------|--|---------------------------------------|---|
| | £ | £ | £ | £ |
| 1861 | 17,827,000 | 11,945,000 | 17,427,000 | 5,584,000 |
| 1871 | 29,746,000 | 20,668,000 | 33,595,000 | 12,000,000 |
| 1881 | 39,984,187 | 27,776,000 | 30,100,000 | 13,120,000 |
| 1891 | 44,778,000 | 29,150,000 | 24,337,000 | 11,200,000 |
| 1901 | 51,213,000 | 37,504,000 | 23,701,000 | 9,310,000 |
| 1902 | 50,908,000 | 35,232,000 | 22,295,000 | 9,121,000 |

Tables III. and IV. were compiled after reading an article of M. Paul Doumer in the *National Review*, in which the following statement challenged critical examination :

"No two nations have ever been able to point to better commercial relations ; no people has ever had better customers than the English have proved to the French. The truth of this may easily be proved. Forty years ago our exports to England amounted

"in 1861 to £20,000,000
 "in 1871 they had reached 32,000,000
 "in 1881 to 36,000,000
 "in 1891 to 40,000,000
 "in 1901 to 48,000,000
 "in 1902 to 51,000,000."

Appendix

As will be seen by these tables, M. Doumer has somewhat liberally interpreted the expression, "No two nations have ever been able to point to better commercial relations," to suit his own argument.

While stating quite correctly that this country has been an increasingly important customer of his own over a period of several decades, he omits to inform his readers that France has correspondingly fallen off as a purchaser of British goods.

The figures in the Tables III. and IV. will surely remove any doubt on that score.

While the people of this country give employment to a vast army of skilled workmen in France by consuming thirty-five millions of pounds value of their handicrafts annually in the shape of manufactured goods, our neighbours limit their purchases of goods manufactured by our skilled artisans to a matter of nine million pounds only. Were this difference due to the superior skill of French workmen, there would be nothing further to be said on the subject, but this in many cases is not so; it is rather the outcome of tariff barriers deliberately raised and of set purpose, and with a skill worthy of a better cause, for the express object of reducing year by year the value of British manufactures imported into France—a poor return for the unstinted hospitality, unfettered by taxation, which is extended by this country to France's skilled products.

Were it possible to assemble on one large plain these masses of French skilled workmen engaged in supplying the wants of the people of these islands, and to place beside them the infinitely smaller number of their British co-workers engaged in similarly providing for French requirements, it might serve as an object-lesson and bring home to the minds of our workers how unfairly they are treated by the tariff framers of France. In pondering over this matter they might argue, so far as concerns their own class, that it would be an advantage

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had we for a neighbour across the channel a nation less rich and less self-sufficing.

Had the object of this Appendix been to furnish complete material for a statistical study of the import and export trade between Great Britain and France, it would have been necessary to add several more tables.

The sole purpose, however, of the figures here presented has been to illustrate, as indicated in the concluding chapter of the book, the fallacy of that argument which insists upon the advantage of living in the midst of prosperous neighbours.

Surely, without the need of further examination of facts and figures, the tables given in this Appendix have in a measure served the purpose claimed for them.

Since the foregoing book was written events have not stood still. As to whether the relations between the two countries were ever so strained as to render the hurried conclusion of an Agreement so imperative as we have been asked to believe, it seems desirable, in corroboration of a doubt expressed earlier in the book, to quote a sentence from the article by M. Doumer already referred to :

“But what of other questions?—what of politics? Is it really true that the political relations of the two countries were of a hostile character? If so, that hostility was certainly intermittent, for every year, and sometimes more than once in the course of the same year, arrangements were arrived at with perfect cordiality. At the moment of our most serious differences no one in France was anxious for war, indeed, no one ever seriously thought of it. The very idea of such a thing appeared monstrous and impossible.”

It might be thought necessary to consider the recent episode of brigandage and kidnapping, in which a respected American resident was detained in durance by Raisuli until the Sultan satisfied certain of his demands, in relation to the present political state of Morocco.

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Beyond, however, seeing in this burlesque affront upon Mr. Perdicaris, who had never shown towards the natives any feelings but those of a philanthropist, anything more than further evidence of the impossibility of administering an Empire like that of Morocco by any ordinary standards of control, we cannot attach any great importance to the affair.

We here throw out a suggestion to the Tariff Reform Commission, as to the advisability, in the event of its not having already done so, of furnishing the libraries of the various Working Men's Institutes and Clubs throughout the kingdom with copies of a volume issued by the Board of Trade, entitled "Foreign Import Duties" published by Messrs. Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1903, and marked [Cd. 1735]. Every skilled workman in the land should have an opportunity afforded him of studying this book.

In it he will recognise how tariff-framing abroad has been reduced to the nature of a fine art, with the object of closing the door of each State against the entry of the results of labour of other peoples, and of crushing all outside competition with its own workers.

The book provides most instructive reading for all those who take an interest in our manufactures.

We cull a few examples of this Protectionist taxation ruling in France :

| | | |
|--|-----------------------|--|
| Cotton yarns, single threads unbleached pay from | d. s. d. ½ to 1 1½ | per. lb. weight according to fineness. |
| Cotton twist and thread, unbleached If bleached 15 per cent. is added on to these rates | „ ½ to 1 6 | per lb. weight |
| Cotton tissues, unbleached . . . „ | 2½ to 2 3 | „ „ |
| Cotton tissues, bleached . . . „ | 3½ to 2 11 | „ „ |
| Muslin curtains, embroidered . . | 3 6 | „ „ |
| Ribbons, a mixture of cotton and silk | 1 4 | „ „ |
| Hosiery cotton gloves | 2 11 | „ „ |
| Linen tissues, unbleached . . . „ | 1 to 1 9 | „ „ |
| Linen tissues, bleached . . . „ | 1½ to 2 7 | „ „ |

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| | s. | d. | s. | d. | |
|---|--------|-----|---------|--------|---------------------------------|
| Linen, damasked table linen . . . | | | 2 | 4 | per lb. weight |
| Linen hosiery | | | 2 | 6 | " " |
| Silk hosiery | | | 2 | 2½ | " " |
| Silk gloves | | | 4 | 4½ | " " |
| Silk lace | | | 1 | 9½ | " " |
| Woollen gloves | | | 2 | 0 | " " |
| Woollen hosiery | | | 2 | 6 | " " |
| Iron and foundry work | | 7½ | | | per cwt. |
| Steam engines | from 4 | 10½ | to 8 | 1½ | " " |
| Steel wire | | | 12 | 2 | " " |
| Pins of iron or brass | | | 20 | 4 | " " |
| Steel tubes, bored tempered steel, ½ in. interior diameter | | | 81 | 3 | " " |
| Steel tubes, bored tempered steel, ½ in. interior diameter | | | 182 | 11 | " " |
| Steel tubes, bored tempered steel, ¾ in. interior diameter | | | £81 | 5 | 8 or 14s. 6d. per lb. weight |
| Table knives pearl or ivory handles | | | 2 | 6 | " " |
| Other fine cutlery | | | 1 | 9 | " " |
| India-rubber garments | | 10½ | | | " " |
| Cycle and motor cycles | | £4 | 9 | 5 | per cwt. |
| Incandescent lamps | from | £7 | 2s. 3d. | to £14 | 4s. 6d. per cwt. |

It may here be mentioned that Germany taxes cycles at 12s. 2d. per cwt., and motor cycles at 4s. 0¾d. per cwt., and incandescent lamps at 12s. 2d. per cwt.

France prohibits the general importation of foreign cigars and cigarettes, but allows their admission for personal use of the importer under certain regulations to the extent of ten kilogrammes per consignee per annum at the following rates:

| | |
|-----------------------------------|---|
| Cigars and cigarettes | £101 12s. 1d. per cwt., or over 18s. per lb. |
| Turkish smoking tobacco | £50 16s. per cwt., or over 9s. per lb. |

This case of tobacco demonstrates how the French tariff compels the nation to consume its own inferior manufactures, to the exclusion of the superior foreign article.

Just as this book goes to press comes the news that, in view of her newly acquired dominion over the land, France is sending a party of experts to explore it, under the leadership

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of M. de Segonzac, who has already travelled over a considerable part of the Moorish Empire.

We can well imagine the mineralogist of the party gazing in pleasurable anticipation at the grey bulwark of the Atlas, which has hitherto shut out all foreign mining enterprise, but which he soon will penetrate to report for the information of his Department.

The agriculturist, turning in the saddle, may cast his eye, if the season be propitious, over oceans of wheat, seas of barley, and lakes of maize, with many other more tropical products of a bounteous soil and a fruitful climate.

The military expert, having perhaps got over the first alarm inspired by the apparently impregnable barrier of the Atlas in the course of a protracted guerilla campaign, will next take stock of so promising a field for recruiting as is offered by that hardy population of many races. Then, on his return to the coast, meeting his naval *confrère*, the two would look from the heights above Tangier on those narrow seas, where a flotilla of submarines and torpedo-boats, once Tangier were made a port of refuge, would have slight difficulty in very seriously harassing, if not indeed altogether impeding, the ingress and egress of the Mediterranean.

Then, having spied out the land, the entire party might feast at Tangier's most sumptuous hostelry.

Natives of the country will wait at table, and if they understand the language of the Frank, they will say in their beards that the Englishman is a fool, for that he has given away, not so much that which was not his own to give, as that which neither its natural owner, nor he himself, when he had the chance, had the energy or the foresight to develop.

Merry will be the toasts on that occasion at the expense of Lord Lansdowne and his officials at the Foreign Office, and the Frenchmen will leave the banquet with a feeling of great thankfulness in their hearts that Providence gave them neighbours so much less astute than themselves. *Al hamdu li'llahi!*

Appendix

COPY OF INCLOSURE No. 1 OF THE ANGLO-FRENCH AGREEMENT.

“DECLARATION RESPECTING EGYPT AND MOROCCO.

“ARTICLE I.

“His Britannic Majesty’s Government declare that they have no intention of altering the political status of Egypt.

“The Government of the French Republic, for their part, declare that they will not obstruct the action of Great Britain in that country by asking that a limit of time be fixed for the British occupation or in any other manner, and that they give their assent to the draft Khedivial Decree annexed to the present Arrangement, containing the guarantees considered necessary for the protection of the interests of the Egyptian bondholders, on the condition that, after its promulgation, it cannot be modified in any way without the consent of the Powers Signatory of the Convention of London of 1885.

“It is agreed that the post of Director-General of Antiquities in Egypt shall continue, as in the past, to be entrusted to a French *savant*.

“The French schools in Egypt shall continue to enjoy the same liberty as in the past.

“ARTICLE II.

“The Government of the French Republic declare that they have no intention of altering the political status of Morocco.

“His Britannic Majesty’s Government, for their part, recognise that it appertains to France, more particularly as a Power whose dominions are conterminous for a great distance with those of Morocco, to preserve order in that country, and

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to provide assistance for the purpose of all administrative, economic, financial, and military reforms which it may require.

"They declare that they will not obstruct the action taken by France for this purpose, provided that such action shall leave intact the rights which Great Britain, in virtue of Treaties, Conventions, and usage, enjoys in Morocco, including the right of coasting trade between the ports of Morocco, enjoyed by British vessels since 1901.

"ARTICLE III.

"His Britannic Majesty's Government, for their part, will respect the rights which France, in virtue of Treaties, Conventions, and usage, enjoys in Egypt, including the right of coasting trade between Egyptian ports accorded to French vessels.

"ARTICLE IV.

"The two Governments, being equally attached to the principle of commercial liberty both in Egypt and Morocco, declare that they will not, in those countries, countenance any inequality either in the imposition of customs duties or other taxes, or of railway transport charges.

"The trade of both nations with Morocco and with Egypt shall enjoy the same treatment in transit through the French and British possessions in Africa. An Agreement between the two Governments shall settle the conditions of such transit and shall determine the points of entry.

"This mutual engagement shall be binding for a period of thirty years. Unless this stipulation is expressly denounced at least one year in advance, the period shall be extended for five years at a time.

"Nevertheless, the Government of the French Republic reserve to themselves in Morocco, and His Britannic Majesty's Government reserve to themselves in Egypt, the right to see that the concessions for roads, railways, ports, &c., are only

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granted on such conditions as will maintain intact the authority of the State over these great undertakings of public interest.

“ARTICLE V.

“His Britannic Majesty’s Government declare that they will use their influence in order that the French officials now in the Egyptian service may not be placed under conditions less advantageous than those applying to the British officials in the same service.

“The Government of the French Republic, for their part, would make no objection to the application of analogous conditions to British officials now in the Moorish service.

“ARTICLE VI.

“In order to insure the free passage of the Suez Canal, His Britannic Majesty’s Government declare that they adhere to the stipulations of the Treaty of the 29th October, 1888, and that they agree to their being put in force. The free passage of the Canal being thus guaranteed, the execution of the last sentence of paragraph 1 as well as of paragraph 2 of Article VIII. of that Treaty will remain in abeyance.

“ARTICLE VII.

“In order to secure the free passage of the Straits of Gibraltar, the two Governments agree not to permit the erection of any fortifications or strategic works on that portion of the coast of Morocco comprised between, but not including, Melilla and the heights which command the right bank of the River Sebou.

“This condition does not, however, apply to the places at present in the occupation of Spain on the Moorish coast of the Mediterranean.

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"ARTICLE VIII.

"The two Governments, inspired by their feeling of sincere friendship for Spain, take into special consideration the interests which that country derives from her geographical position and from her territorial possessions on the Moorish coast of the Mediterranean. In regard to these interests the French Government will come to an understanding with the Spanish Government.

"The agreement which may be come to on the subject between France and Spain shall be communicated to His Britannic Majesty's Government.

"ARTICLE IX.

"The two Governments agree to afford to one another their diplomatic support, in order to obtain the execution of the clauses of the present Declaration regarding Egypt and Morocco.

"In witness whereof his Excellency the Ambassador of the French Republic at the Court of His Majesty the King of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland and of the British Dominions beyond the Seas, Emperor of India, and His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, duly authorised for that purpose, have signed the present Declaration and have affixed thereto their seals.

"Done at London, in duplicate, the 8th day of April, 1904.

"(L.S.) LANSDOWNE."

The French text of this Agreement was signed by M. Paul Cambon.

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LATEST PHASE OF THE SITUATION.

The *Times* correspondent at Tangier, himself in some recent danger from brigands, telegraphs that the Sultan declines to entertain the proposals made to him for the organisation of a French police.

This refusal, particularly when viewed in the light of the present unrest among the tribes near Tangier, creates a serious *impasse* ; but it certainly confirms the opinion, offered in the foregoing pages, that the last seventy years' record of the French occupation of the colony of Algeria is not such as to reconcile the natives of Morocco to an undivided French control of that Empire. It is once more the old story of the sacred work of building the Temple devolving on the more peaceful Solomon, in preference to his martial father, King David, whose hands had shed so much blood.

While this is mere surmise, based on some knowledge of the country and its people, we are of opinion that, as the introduction of outside control has by common consent been decreed as inevitable, the association of Great Britain in such a work of rehabilitation would do much to overcome the rooted objections of the Moors to such a *régime*. Dissatisfied as some of them are alleged to be with the oppression of country kaid, the Moors are essentially monarchical in their traditions, and they know that many of their most cherished institutions would be treated with greater consideration by British officials than by those trained in the Republican atmosphere of the Quai d'Orsay.

The situation is one that calls for the exercise of infinite tact, but it is rare for our officials to be found wanting in diplomacy when dealing with Orientals.

It is for this and other reasons that we regard a Dual Control of Morocco as the one arrangement compatible with the early development of that country's resources and the lasting peace of Europe. If it should be found possible to submit the

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recent agreement to revision on this basis, it is of the greatest importance, in view of harmonious co-operation, that His Majesty's Government should insist upon the appointment to this work of the very best available officials, military and civilian, rigidly excluding all who have served in Algeria or worked with the French Colonial Party for the absorption of Morocco. It will likewise be only equitable for the French Government to insist upon similar conditions, exacting that our Government shall employ only the pick of our services, men of the high stamp of Lord Cromer, Lord Milner, or Sir Arthur Lawley. There is no lack of such men in the British service, though the want of opportunity may hitherto have kept many in the background. Not one Englishman who has been in the entourage of the Sultan Moulay Abdelaziz during the past five years should be admitted even to a subordinate position on the staff of the Controllers. At first sight it may look anomalous to exclude just those whose previous experience of the country might seem to qualify for further service; but the objections to the retention of their services are so sound and so insuperable that the comparatively slight advantage of previous experience may well be waived.

A work has just been published in Paris entitled "*Le Maroc d'aujourd'hui*." It is by M. Eugène Aubin, and the publishers are Armand Colin Cie. The author's account of life at the Moorish Court does not furnish very edifying reading for Englishmen.

It is, therefore, for reasons which need not be elaborated, since it is more agreeable to take them for granted, of the first importance that the men appointed to the future administration of Morocco should have had no connection with the past history of either that country or the neighbouring colony of Algeria. Such men will approach the problems of setting Morocco in order with an open mind free from the bias, prepossession and prejudice bred of prolonged residence at an Eastern Court.

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Touching the project of raising a local police, it may be mentioned that the Sultan has given the command to a most efficient native officer of the name of Hamza ben Heema. The efficiency of this officer is unfortunately handicapped by absolute lack of funds to meet the current expenses of the force.

It will be well for France to use every effort to second this official in his attempt to police Tangier and its neighbourhood, else it will take very little to set Morocco ablaze if European intervention is summarily introduced to the same end. Neither the bourgeoisie nor peasantry of France can view with equanimity the prospect of a war of conquest merely, as M. Meline expressed it, to gratify the vainglorious ambition of attaching to the triumphal car of France an Emperor of Morocco. Finally, then, we express our strong faith in the lasting benefits of a Dual Control. It is not without difficulties and dangers, but it is the least of many evils. It would appeal to the natives. It would undertake the great work of reorganisation with confidence. And all would go well with that land, of which of late its friends and enemies have alike despaired.

THE END

